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ABSTRACT 
The Subsea blowout preventer (BOP) which is latched to a subsea wellhead is 
one of several barriers in the well to prevent kicks and blowouts and it is the 
most important and critical equipment, as it becomes the last line of protection 
against blowout. The BOP system used in Subsea drilling operations is 
considered a Safety – Critical System, with a high severity consequence 
following its failure. Following past offshore blowout incidents such as the most 
recent Macondo in the Gulf of Mexico, there have been investigations, research, 
and improvements sought for improved understanding of the BOP system and 
its operation. This informs the need for a systematic re-evaluation of the Subsea 
BOP system to understand its associated risk and reliability and identify critical 
areas/aspects/components. 
Different risk analysis techniques were surveyed and the Failure modes effect 
and criticality analysis (FMECA) selected to be used to drive the study in this 
thesis. This is due to it being a simple proven cost effective process that can 
add value to the understanding of the behaviours and properties of a system, 
component, software, function or other. The output of the FMECA can be used 
to inform or support other key engineering tasks such as redesigning, enhanced 
qualification and testing activity or maintenance for greater inherent reliability 
and reduced risk potential. This thesis underscores the application of the 
FMECA technique to critique associated risk of the Subsea BOP system. 
System Functional diagrams was developed with boundaries defined, a FMECA 
were carried out and an initial select list of critical component failure modes 
identified. The limitations surrounding the confidence of the FMECA failure 
modes ranking outcome based on Risk priority number (RPN) is presented and 
potential variations in risk interpretation are discussed. 
The main contribution in this thesis is an innovative framework utilising 
Multicriteria decision making (MCDA) analysis techniques with consideration of 
fuzzy interval data is applied to the Subsea BOP system critical failure modes 
from the FMECA analysis. It utilised nine criticality assessment criteria deduced 
from expert consultation to obtain a more reliable ranking of failure modes. The 
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MCDA techniques applied includes the technique for order of Preference for 
similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), Fuzzy TOPSIS, TOPSIS with interval 
data, and Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment of 
Evaluations (PROMETHEE). The outcome of the Multi-criteria analysis of the 
BOP system clearly shows failures of the Wellhead connector, LMRP hydraulic 
connector and Control system related failure as the Top 3 most critical failure 
with respect to a well control. The critical failure mode and components 
outcome from the analysis in this thesis is validated using failure data from 
industry database and a sensitivity analysis carried out. The importance of 
maintenance, testing and redundancy to the BOP system criticality was 
established by the sensitivity analysis. The potential for MCDA to be used for 
more specific analysis of criteria for a technology was demonstrated.  
Improper maintenance, inspection, testing (functional and pressure) are critical 
to the BOP system performance and sustenance of a high reliability level. 
Material selection and performance of components (seals, flanges, packers, 
bolts, mechanical body housings) relative to use environment and operational 
conditions is fundamental to avoiding failure mechanisms occurrence.  Also 
worthy of notice is the contribution of personnel and organisations (by way of 
procedures to robustness and verification structure to ensure standard expected 
practices/rules are followed) to failures as seen in the root cause discussion.  
OEMs, operators and drilling contractors to periodically review operation 
scenarios relative to BOP system product design through the use of a Failure 
reporting analysis and corrective action system. This can improve design of 
monitoring systems, informs requirement for re-qualification of technology 
and/or next generation designs. Operations personnel are to correctly log in 
failures in these systems, and responsible Authority to ensure root cause 
analysis is done to uncover underlying issue initiating and driving failures. 
 
Keywords:  
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The dwindling onshore oil and gas reserves and the ever increasing global 
demand for petroleum products is driving exploitation of reserves in remote 
offshore locations in order to cope with the insatiable appetite of an energy 
hungry world. The volatile oil price and the unprecedented hike in energy 
demand, prior to the current climate in which oil supply exceeds demand, had 
ushered the affinity for prospects in great water depths. This rapid shift towards 
great depth and ultra-deep waters offers complex environment, which is remote 
for operations and not typically explored part of the earth. Exploration and 
production within this harsh environment offers a number of technical 
challenges in the area of flow assurance, installation, intervention and 
monitoring especially for ultra-deepwater (DNV-GL, 2014; TTA 7, 2008). The 
pressures to the system and challenges associated with subsea-production are 
magnified by the highly saline wet environment (Fidler, 2009).  
Considering the entire exploration and field development cycle, drilling 
operation is the most expensive element with a high need and requirement for 
safety. There are a number of problems that can occur during drilling 
operations, particularly for subsea wells. The occurrence of kick is an example 
of an issue that can be catastrophic. Kick is described as the unwanted influx of 
formation fluid into a wellbore during drilling operation as a result of pressure 
difference in the wellbore. This influx is undesired, because it can flow up to the 
surface and result in a blowout with potential consequence of a major spill, 
fatalities and loss of rig. A blowout is an uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbon or 
even salt water from a well to the surrounding environment, an ultimate 
consequence of a kick. To avoid an undesired influx and maintain well control, 
drilling systems have been designed with first-line and backup barriers. The 
blowout preventer (BOP) is one of several barriers in the well to prevent kicks 
and blowouts. It is the most important and critical equipment, as it becomes the 
last line of protection against blowout.  
The BOP is a structure with a large set of valves and rams placed on the top of 
the well that can be closed when the drilling crew have uncontrolled flow of 
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formation fluid in the wellbore. Naturally blowouts do not just happen, there are 
series of unscheduled events with indicators that require actions from the 
supervisors and when this is not properly managed, fatal accidents occur with 
an associated failure of the last line of defence (the BOP). Globally and in the 
history of the offshore industry there have been blowout cases which is not 
uncommon given 573 well releases/blowouts is recorded in the Stiftelsen for 
industriell og teknisk forskning -Foundation for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (SINTEF) database as at 2013. It is important to mention not all past 
blowout incidents have had potential to result in a major spill such as the most 
remarkably IXTOC 1 well blowout in 1979 which led to the greatest single spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) before the Macondo incident in 2010 (Page, 2010). 
The six worst offshore blowout incidents by volume are listed in Table 1-1.  
Table 1-1: Six worst offshore blowout incidents by volume (Adapted from King, 
2010) 
Blowout Incident  Location/Year Amount of Oil Spill (bbl.) 
 Deepwater Horizon (Macondo) Gulf of Mexico, USA/ 2010 4,900,000 
Sedco 135F  and the Ixtoc I Bay of Campeche, Mexico/1979 3,552,000 
Abkatun 91 Bay of Campeche, Mexico/ 1986  247,000 
Ekofish Bravo Platform  North Sea, Norway/ 1977 202,381 
Funiwa No. 5 Well Forcardos, Nigeria/1980 200,000 
Hasbah Platform Well 6 Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia/1980 105,000 
 
Nineteen blowouts cases had occurred in the GOM between 2007 and 2009 
(Cheremisinoff and Davletshin, 2010). The published results of the Bureau of 
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) on dangerous well occurrences 
such as blowout shows a decrease in the gulf between 2008 and 2012, and a 
reverse trend observed for the UK (Mannan et al., 2014). Although the actual 
number of blowout occurrence was higher in congruence with the level of 
drilling activity.  It is evident from the above Table 1-1 that blowout incidents 
have been and will still remain a global concern especially with considering the 
number of wells that were under development and a potential over six thousand 
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wells expected to be drilled (see Figure 1-1 showing statistics and forecast for 
Subsea market and operations). 
Despite the awareness that would have sprung up given the lessons learned 
and the opportunities for improved training and research on the subject of well 
control and the BOP, these incidents still occur. Preventive and mitigation 
measures can be used to reduce the risk of a blowout as it cannot be 
eliminated.  
 
Figure 1-1: (a) Subsea market forecast 2014 to 2018, (Douglass Westwood 2014). 
(b) Statistic of Offshore production systems worldwide operational and 2014 
onwards (Morgan 2014). 
Priority is given to preventive safety measures to reduce the probability, as risk 
is the product of probability of occurrence and the consequence. Thus risk 
analysis has been seen to be of great importance with applicability in offshore 
drilling operations, challenged with safety issues arising from harsh and remote 
environments. It is pertinent to note, that besides the ultimate failure of the BOP 
which can be catastrophic, there are other failures of the BOP that may require 
its retrieval to surface and a suspension of drilling activity.  Retrieving the 
Subsea BOP and the marine riser owing to a problem have been associated to 
be one of the most expensive downtime events. The maintenance of reliability 
and readiness of well control equipment for the safety of lives, equipment and 
environment, is thus of great importance and top priority.  
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The prevalence of subsea BOP system related failures amidst several studies 
on the system and its component(s) carried out questions its reliability. Thus 
there is a new call to understand BOP failures and malfunctions, and how risk 
studies can be translated to improved reliability. The foregoing corroborates 
with the Norway’s Petroleum Safety Authority identification of people 
management, risk and barriers as the three main issues/ subjects requiring in-
depth study for better management tools, reliable decision making and 
prioritisation process, and overcoming safety challenges within the petroleum 
industry. 
1.1 Past Blowout Events  
Blowouts incident constitutes one of the highest occurrences amongst other 
recorded accidents within the offshore industry’s exploration and production of 
oil and gas (Ismail, et al. 2014). In the life of a well, the drilling operation phase 
has been associated with the greatest number of loss of well control/blowout 
incidents. In Ge et al (2015) survey of 134 blowout incidents from 1970 to 2013, 
89% occurred during drilling operation. Table 1-2 shows a list of notable 
incidents in the last fifteen (15) years. This section attempts to discuss some 
notable past blowout incidents (major accident and some near misses) for 
context as part of the introduction and to support the rationale and importance 
for the research work.   
Table 1-2: Notable past blowout incidents 
 
On December 10, 1978 the IXTOC 1 well (water depth of 50m) drilling was 
commenced by Sedco 135F for Petroleos Mexicanos. Drilling mud loss started 
at a depth of 3615 m on the early of June 2, and circulation was lost at 3625 m. 
Blowout Incident  Location/Year Damage /Associated Loss Water Depth
Ensco 51 Gulf of Mexico, USA/ 2001 Gas blowout and fire. 191ft (58.2m)
Arabdrill 19/ Khafji Field Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia/2002 Structural collapse, blowout, fire, and sinking (Gas &Oil) 94ft(28.6m)
Adriatic IV (Temsah Platform) Mediterranean Sea, Egypt/2004 Well blowout and fire on platform (Gas) 263ft (80m)
Usumacinta (Kab 101 Platform) Gulf of Mexico/2007 Well blowout on platform, 22 Killed 82 (25m )
West Atlas Rig (Montara Wellhead Platform)East Timor sea, Australia/2009 Well blowout and fire on rig and platform (Gas &Oil) 250 ft (76m)
 Deepwater Horizon (Macondo) Gulf of Mexico, USA/ 2010 Well blowout and fire on rig, 11 killed in explosion (Gas) 5000 ft (1500m)
Vermilion Block 380 Platform Gulf of Mexico, USA/ 2010 Well blowout and fire, 1 injured 340ft (104m)
 Funiwa 1A well (KS endeavour Rig) Nigeria/2012 Well blowout and fire on rig,  2 killed in explosion (Gas) 40ft
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As well appeared stable after several unsuccessful attempts to regain 
circulation, a decision was made to pull the drill string and insert a plug into well. 
Mud flowed up unrestricted to platform, given no mud hydrostatic column, and 
the extreme high pressure during well sealing attempts. The BOP was closed 
on the lower pipe but it could not shear the thicker drill collars, and thus could 
not prevent flow of oil and gas to surface. The well blowout occurred on the 3rd 
of June, 1979, thereafter rig collapse and sank on wellhead area on the seabed, 
spilling over 3.5 million barrels of oil to the GOM as well was not capped until 
290 days later. To relieve the gushing well pressure, two relief wells were drilled 
and then IXTOC-1 well killed nine months later (Jernelov and Linden, 1981)  
The 2002 Arabdrill 19 blowout in Saudi Arabia was the result of a structural 
failure. One of the legs of the jack-up rig, located over a production platform, 
buckled leading to the rig collapse on the platform and destroying the 
production tree. This resulted into a blowout and fire with both rig and platform 
sank. In August 2007 the Minerals Management Services (MMS) published a 
decrease in fatalities following blowout incidents between 1992 and 2006 within 
the GOM (Izon et al., 2007). Not long in October, 2007, there was the 
Usumacinta blowout incident which occurred during the drilling of Kab-103 well 
when the rig collided with the platform, ruptured the production tree on Kab-101 
and subsequently led to a fire, death of 21 persons with one missing, and 
estimated spill of roughly 422 barrels/day rate. The main cause of the incident 
was a rig move off following a cold weather front that brought storm winds of 
130km/h with waves of 6-8m in the GOM forcing oscillating movements of 
Usumacinta (Ismail et al., 2014). 
The Seadrill owned West Atlas rig had been drilling H1 Well on the Montara 
Field development and progressively bedding smaller casings from January to 
April, 2009. The water depth was 77m, well depth below the rig being 3787m, 
and vertical depth of 2655m with 9 5/8” casing string in reservoir. The 9 5/8” 
casing shoe (primary barrier) which was defectively installed failed and despite 
noticeable indications, there was no pressure test conducted. Only one of two 
approved secondary well control barriers, pressure containing and anti-
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corrosion cap (PCCCs) that were slated to be installed was actually fitted. There 
was no testing and verification in-situ of the PCCCs and H1 Well drilling activity 
was suspended (Rig departed) with believe that the casing fluid was over-
balanced to the pore pressure. On the 21st August, 2009, Rig returned to 
discover the 13 3/8” PCCC was never installed on well and the 9 5/8” cap 
required removal following thread corrosion. Fifteen hours later a blowout 
occurred, as equipment was moved off to other wells. The unmanned rig caught 
fire and collapsed onto the platform below it. There was no loss of human life, 
hydrocarbon flowed for 75 days at an estimated rate of 400 to 1500 barrels of 
oil/day, and the environmental damage was relatively little (Galton, 2011).  
Unfortunately, on the 20th April, 2010, uncontrolled high flowrate hydrocarbon 
from the Macondo well in the GOM found its way to surface of the Deepwater 
Horizon Rig resulting into an explosion (upon contact with an ignition source), 
and killed 11 persons. This incident was caused by the inability of the 
Deepwater Horizon BOP (10K Cameron 18 ¾” upper and lower annular 
preventers, 15K Cameron 18 ¾” Rams with ST locks except the Casing Shear 
Ram) to shut the well, which led to the sinking of the drilling rig following the 
explosion, and one of largest spill ever in recent times (speculated to be over 
4million barrels) as the leak lasted for 87 days prior to well been plugged and 
killed.  
The Macondo well had been drilled and to be abandoned temporarily for 
completion later with plan for required activities in place, negative leak-off tests 
was conducted and results which noticeably indicates seepage into well was  
misjudged by well-site personnel.. Thereafter an underbalance was observed 
allowing flow from reservoir during mud and seawater displacement. The 
weaknesses in the well barrier, testing, verification, maintenance and monitoring 
led to the Macondo incident with the root technical cause being poor annular 
cement and shoe track barriers which failed to isolate hydrocarbons in the 
formation (Christou & Konstantinidou, 2012). There was further warning signals 
missed especially in relation to mud monitoring before differential pressure 
noticed. The upper annular preventer (UA) was closed at 21:43 to seal the 
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annulus   around drill pipe and prevent fluid from rising above the BOP to riser, 
but this failed as indicated by well data. The rubber element of the UA is 
believed to have eroded, thereafter a pipe ram of similar rubber element and 
design was activated to close which sealed the flow. The middle and upper pipe 
rams were likely closed by rig crew as indicated by pressure data at 21:47, 
which resulted in pressure build-up within the drill pipe and fluid above BOP 
from through riser to rig without any fluid addition given closed pipe ram. First 
explosion occurred at 21:49 on the rig. 
Emergency disconnect sequence (EDS) were activated at 21:56, and rig 
abandoned at 22:28. The emergency functions failed as the blind shear ram 
(BSR) should have been activated, rig and riser disconnected from BOP 
allowing for move away of the rig from the wellhead. The well was not sealed as 
the initial explosion probably satisfied conditions for the AMF/deadman backup 
system automatic activation severing hydraulic lines, power and 
communications to the BOP, hence BSR could not close as designed. The BSR 
was closed 33 hours after the explosions. 
Further failure analysis by the Chemical safety Board suggested the segment of 
the drill pipe that was between the BSR blades was off-centre, as it had buckled 
due to increased internal pressure and resultant significant differential pressure 
between inside and outside the pipe, thus the BSR was partially closed and 
could not seal well (see Appendix A.3). The partial closure was because side of 
the drill pipe was trapped in the ram blocks and not within the perimeters of the 
shearing blade. The punctured drill pipe led to flow from the well re-established 
and also there were latent failures in the redundant control pods which aided 
AMF/deadman activation. Such latent failure includes and not limited to (CSB, 
2014): 
 drainage of 27 V battery, that powers solenoid valves during the 
AMF/deadman sequence, arising from miswired blue pod 
 Failure of the AMF/deadman sequence activation through the yellow pod 
whose solenoid valve was also miswired and as such coils should have 
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generated magnetic fields opposed each other. However due to draining 
battery only one was energised unopposed to activate AMF. 
 There is an assumption of a possible reduction in performance of 
batteries given the temperature of the environment. 
In addition, another limitation was the inadequacy in the design and operation of 
the BOP System, as it had a single shear ram which was not able to cut tool 
joints. 
Table 1-3: BP payments related to the Gulf Coast recovery (BP, 2015) 
BP’s payments related to Gulf Coast recovery 
Activity (as at  28
th
 February, 2015) Funding 
Response and Clean-up $ 14.3 billion 
Claims, advances and settlements $13.6 billion 
Funding for the natural resources damage assessment process $1.3 billion  
Early restoration projects (approximate cost of approved projects) $ 698 million* 
State-led tourism campaigns $179  million 
State-led seafood marketing programme $48.5 million 
State-led seafood testing $25.4 million 
 
*$629 million has been provided to the trustees to date. 
 
BP has spent over 28 billion dollars for the recovery of the Gulf coast as seen in 
Table 1-3 The cost of failure is huge and this cost could rise depending on the 
US Supreme Court judgment on claims, excluding the lives lost and production 
lost.  
Following the Macondo incident was a well kick taken on Gullfaks C well on the 
19th of May, 2010 that could have resulted in a sub-surface blowout and /or 
explosion, as gas was released on platform. The root cause was a hole in the 
casing leading to a drilling mud loss to formation during reservoir hole cleaning 
and subsequently an influx of exposed reservoir fluid into the well. (see PSA, 
2013 & Vinnem, 2014). Thereafter was the Mariner Energy’s vermilion Block 
380 incident (platform blowout and fire, one injured and 13 survivors) in the 
same 2010. In 2012, a likely gas-kick issue that lead to an outburst of flame on 
Chevron’s KS Endeavour drilling rig, approx. 6miles off coast Nigeria, with a 
blowout on rig which collapsed and two persons killed. The cause was linked to 
a failed BOP; hence drillers could not control the gas-pressure. There have also 
been a number of recorded cases of the BOP system component failures such 
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as damage of both the blue and yellow multiplex (MUX) control lines of the BOP 
control system. This resulted in the Mobile offshore drilling unit crew 
disconnection of LMRP in Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area, 
March 2015, and abandonment of drilling perforation operations due to the 
malfunction of a BOP valve in April 2015 during drilling of the Isobel deep 
exploratory well in the Falklands/Malvinas islands. 
A brief review of the notable past blowout incidents have been presented in this 
section and it shows there are a number of possible causes or factors such as 
the failure of the BOP system. Figure shows the several contributing factors of a 
blowout which informed Dervo and Blo-Jensen (2004) approach for calculating 
blowout frequency. Holand (1997) opines the causes are complex and that 
though simple direct causes can lead to blowout incidents, the associated 
indirect cause are complex. These includes poor decision, ineffective or 
inadequate maintenance and procedures, complex organisational structure, 
working environment, low manning, inadequate use and training of personnel. 
This is in agreement to Ge et al. (2015)’s survey which concluded that design 
and management defects were found to be two most important causes from a 
contribution rate to a blowout incident standpoint. It is evident that besides 
prevention measures, early warning signs, mitigation, preparedness and 
planning to manage accidents of this nature, the failure of the BOP System, the 
interest of this thesis, as a secondary barrier is crucial (Christou and 
Konstantinidou, 2012). Stakeholders need to assure the performance of the 
BOP system as an entity and its constituent components as a well barrier, given 
the consequences can be far-reaching as proven by the Macondo accident. 
1.2 Statement of Research Drive 
Original Equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of BOP system and components, 
drilling contractors, operators of Subsea wells, class societies and regulatory 
bodies desire to have a better understanding of the `Subsea BOP System given 
its safety critical nature. Regarding the BOP system, the following information is 
vital: 
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 Details of each component or subsystem such as failure modes and 
mechanisms, historical failure rates, functional and pressure testing 
intervals, related maintenance activities, spares change-out regime, 
operating equipment condition, and installation. 
 Operation engaged when failure occurred or was identified, weather 
condition and other environmental characteristics associated with the 
region of drilling operation, rig type (e.g. semi-sub), and level of 
experience of operations personnel. 
 Details of critical components in the system, complexity of the system 
(BOP type- number of rams) and redundancies, interdependencies, 
consequences given failure of a component/activated function, age of 
system, cost of repairs following downtimes, and a possible blowout with 
spills. 
Improved understanding of the BOPs system relative to its functionality, 
operating condition and environment is important to avoiding and/or reducing 
blowout occurrence during drilling operations especially. 
There is a considerable amount of works on the application of risk and reliability 
analysis techniques to assess or understand the risk and reliability level of the 
BOP system. This entailed the failure data analysis of BOP system components 
for different set of exploratory wells as documented in the different phases of 
SINTEF JIP reports, fault tree analysis to ascertain the availability of the BOP 
system, failure modes effect and criticality analysis of the BOP System, other 
system specific studies such as comparison of BOP control systems, and a 
combination of these (discussed in detail in Chapter 2).   
It can be attested that in some of the previous works on BOP system, where 
data (e.g. MTTF) was accessible, quantitative reliability assessments have been 
done. It is no surprise that failures have occurred from the industry’s experience 
which could be associated to how much insight relative to improving 
functionality or the preciseness such assessments provide. It is important to 
state that MTTFs do not explicitly define reliability without a statement of the 
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principal statistical distribution of time to failure which informs why different 
reliabilities can be associated with an MTTF value. Also obtaining exact 
quantitative expressions, following reliability assessment, cannot be attained for 
complex systems- often characterised by multiple failure mechanisms with 
possible interacting stresses (mechanical and environmental).  
While it can be admitted that data access can be challenging, manufacturer’s 
equipment specifications and statistical failure rates are the easiest to access. 
However, the available information may not be in proper format with the 
necessary specific detail for different situation. It may be important to know 
which failure modes were considered, confidence limit relative to sample size 
and failure rate, specific equipment, application, and environment in deriving the 
reliability data. Also these may have been considered in a company’s database, 
but their correctness and how they have been post-processed can be a concern 
if details of applicability of such data are not made available to users. Example 
of concerns could be if non-random failures and/or some level of criticality 
failures have been filtered out in the derivation of the failure rates. This informs 
the requirement for data to be cross-checked or validated against expert’s 
judgement prior to being used in the assessment of a system. In essence 
identification of component failure modes contributions to the unavailability 
and/or unreliability of a complex system using statistical data can potentially be 
challenging.  
In a system reliability study, the first step usually involves a Failure Mode Effect 
and criticality Analysis (FMECA) as a technique at a design stage of a project. It 
has been useful for reviewing safety critical systems to identify possible 
problems. The FMECA is that tool for identifying and understanding failure 
modes and mechanisms proactively and does provides a basis for continuous 
improvement actions. State of the art analysis of the BOP System using 
FMECA includes Januarilham, (2012) and American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), 
(2013). In both works, critical failure modes were realised using the risk priority 
number (RPN) scores derived from the product of ratings assigned to severity, 
occurrence and detectability. The rating for the three factors can take several 
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scales e.g. a scale of 1 to 10 as in ABS (2013) with 10 corresponding to almost 
certainty to occur and 1 unlikely to occur or a scale of 1 to 5 as in Januarilham, 
(2012). The shuttle valve for the BSR, BSR piston, BOP stack Flange, BOP 
stack gasket, and the rubber housing annular preventer were identified as the 
first five critical items in Januarilham, (2012) while ABS identified the double-
acting Sub-plate mounted valve, Shuttle valve, Choke and kill lines and valves, 
Annular and pipe ram. Januarilham, (2012) analysed both components and sub 
components and also considered some failure cause/mechanism as failure 
mode.  
FMECA outcome heavily depends on experience of experts as to minimize 
failures at initial life especially is to foresee failure modes where there is no 
history of failures and this depends heavily on competency, experience and 
access to information to the designer. While FMECA has been beneficial to the 
understanding and ranking of identified failure modes, it is not without 
limitations. This includes how representative is the use of three criteria 
considered in deriving RPN,  the relative importance of the criteria are not 
considered, and also different failure modes may have the similar RPN, from 
different set of scores assigned to the criteria, of which their individual risk 
implication (Pillay and Wang, 2003).  
The foregoing weakness associated with the RPN approach and in addition to 
complex systems being associated with multiple, and often conflicting factors 
which needs to be optimised, presents a multi-criteria decision problem (Walker 
et al., 2006).. There is a need for work on assessment of the BOP system, 
given the possibility of incidents cannot be ignored. Thus, an approach that 
would guide the assessment of critical failure risks for informing and/or priorities 
reliability improvement effort is eminent. This research attempts to verify and 
validate known knowledge and potentially contribute to increasing the know-
how of the BOP system, inform knowledge on improvements for equipment 
specification, and design and also general well control procedures (from the last 
line of protection/barrier perspectives) for a safer deepwater drilling. The design 
of the next generation BOPs and maintenance strategy development for the 
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BOP systems can also benefit from the results of this work. This research is 
timely as currently there is an increased number of deepwater explorations, and 
operations, with multiple planned wells to be drilled ahead, provided oil and gas 
price is fairly stable for viability. 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives  
The aim of the research is to provide an enhanced understanding of the BOP 
functionality and associated failure modes with a focus on determining their 
criticality order of importance. Consequently, the objectives that would support 
this aim can be summarised as:  
 An assessment of the BOP system using the traditional FMECA method 
which will entail :  
• System breakdown and component identification  
• Identify the critical failure modes and  
• Critical components identified from the Risk Priority Number 
(RPN) ranking inference.  
 Analyse risk implications in the evaluation and identification of critical 
failure modes e.g. using the RPN or classical risk definition as the basis 
for criticality order.  
 Develop a multi criteria analysis approach for a robust assessment of the 
BOP system reliability, by way of failure mode rankings, which considers 
more than 3 criteria.  
 A comparison of different MCDA and FMEA methods ranking order 
outcomes and demonstrating the utility of MCDA in risk and reliability 
analysis. This is supported by a sensitivity analysis.  
1.4 Methodology 
This section sets out to describe the framework for the research which aims to 
understand the criticality importance of the components of the BOP system and 
how they can fail using a multi criteria assessment approach. Here the 
methodology following the research problem identified in section 1.2 is 
contextualised with respect to the system of interest, and decision outcome 
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sought. The implementation approach described in 7 steps proposed to achieve 
the aim of this research. 
The assessment of the BOP System entails a technical risk (failure modes) 
identification and evaluation with an incorporation of uncertainty. While some of 
the uncertainty such as lack of data or correct model to represent the system, 
(model and statistical uncertainty) there may be other sources. Uncertainty 
sources such as limited knowledge of decision maker influencing his 
preference, and unforeseen variations from system and/or environment (e.g. 
stress on systems due to greater drilling depth, for which information is limited) 
may result in imprecision in decision makers or expert’s preference or assigned 
values. However, the MCDM method applied has capability to handle such 
limitations. A methodology is proposed based on the following Steps: 
The first step is scoping for problem definition. This entails the review of state of 
the art in literature and field reports to understand the system and be able to 
identify the nature of the problem and decision sought. In the context of the 
research problem being a decision problem, its definition entails an identification 
of alternatives (failure modes), analysis criteria, constraints, and any other 
information available for the selection of an appropriate MCDA technique. 
The second step entails the definition of the BOP system, boundaries, 
component functionalities, and operational requirements. This will serve as the 
basis for the application of FMECA analysis. Step 3 involves the application of 
Failure modes effect, and criticality analysis technique to the BOP system to 
identify failure modes and their associated mechanisms and their effect with 
respect to a loss of well control. An initial assessment based on RPN and risk 
as a product of consequence and likelihood of failure occurrence will be 
conducted to understand their criticality. 
Critical failure modes based on Step 3 are identified and a select list of critical 
failure modes (risk) to be assessed as alternatives using enhanced techniques 
is deduced in Step 4. Step 5 is the development and application of MCDA 
technique using multiple criteria for evaluating identified failure modes 
alternatives. This involves the selection of an appropriate list of criteria to 
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assess the technical failure risk criticality, Selection of decision makers and 
elicitation of their preferences and application of MCDA framework to BOP 
system failure modes. Step 6 is the generation of a list of critical failure modes 
ranks given the failure risk criteria used in the analysis. Finally Step 7 is the 
validation of analysis outcome. This involves a sensitivity analysis with a 
discussion of outcome in itself and against other results, and final presentation 
of a robust reliability case for assessing the reliability of a BOP System. The 
methodology is depicted in Figure1-1 and details of the actual elicitation 
process and MCDA framework is described in Chapter 3. 
Problem Definition
Obtain the Ideal Positive Solution and Ideal 
Negative Solution
Generate Ranking of Failure Mode(s )
Critical Failure Mode Identified  & Study List 
Selected
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA)
Define Associated System and Boundaries
Development and Application f MCDA framework 
to Subsea BOP System elect Failure Mode (s)
Discussion of Analysis, sensitivity of Failure Modes 
Ranking Outcomes and Validation of Analysis 
Outcome
E
xpert Input
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Figure 1-2: Flowchart of Research Methodology 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This report is structured in Chapters ranging from 1 to 6. Chapter 1 presents the 
premise for the research from a broad angle and then specifies the research 
aim and objectives to drive contributions. Given the concerns from past 
accidents such as the notable recent Macondo incidence case discussed in the 
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introduction, related and previous works, a definition of the analysis problem 
and implementation approach as part of the research methodology were 
presented. Chapter 2 introduces the background of subsea blowout risk and 
then a focused review on the BOP system design, components, functionality, 
and other concerns. Also reviewed are previous risk and reliability analysis 
works with application to the offshore/marine/subsea industry and more 
specifically the BOP System of interest. In the review of failure modes, effect 
and analysis technique, salient concerns to note when implementing the 
FMECA process as part of a project is discussed. Thereafter an introduction to 
MCDM application to risk analysis methods such as the FMECA to improve 
decision making which stems from the limitations with FMECA technique is 
presented. Chapter 3 presents the development of the multi criteria decision 
making techniques in more detail (The techniques of interest (TOPSIS, 
PROMETHEE, and Fuzzy sets) are also presented). This entails the data 
collection process and how it was achieved. Also presented is a description of 
the expert elicitation, the selection of assessment criteria and alternatives, 
definition of criteria and how the data was processed and interpreted for the 
assessment.  
Chapter 4 is an assessment of the Subsea BOP system using the FMECA to 
identify critical failure modes and their varying effects ranging from no effect to a 
complete loss of well control is presented. It also presents how a failure mode 
can be more critical than another depending on the ranking approach 
considered. The application of the developed research framework to the BOP 
system and assessing the risk importance of selected component critical failure 
modes as a case study is presented. The different ranking outcome from the 
application of MCDM techniques to the BOP System is also presented.  Chapter 
5 presents a discussion of results and validation of outcome from MCDM 
analysis. Also, the challenges with the data collection process and general 
lessons learnt from implementing the framework are highlighted. Finally, the 
thesis is completed in Chapter 6 with a conclusion, statement of contribution, 
and recommendations. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Drilling and Well Control 
There was an increase in exploratory and developmental drilling operations 
within the oil and gas industry in the last decade, before the recent drop in oil 
prices in 2015 slowed down these activities. Main operation of a typical drilling 
process commences with lowering and setting up of initial conductor casing with 
the aid of an installed wellhead assembly at the seabed, providing mechanical 
foundation for further drilling by cementing around the casing, thereafter 
lowering of a riser and BOP in preparation for setting up and cementing of 
further casing strings, and the production casing. Throughout most of the drilling 
process (running and pull out of hole of drill string/casing repeatedly with 
smaller diameters), the BOP is placed on the well (see Figure 2-1 for a typical 
offshore well design schematic). These operations are very risky and expensive 
as they require a lot of man-hour planning, execution, and support. One of the 
major challenges they face is the risk of a possible loss of well control. This 
chapter will explore well concepts: kick mechanism, detection and prevention. 
Well barriers are discussed for drilling operations with a special attention to the 
Blowout preventer (BOP). The BOP’s components, functions, operation and 
testing, failures and failure modes with a synopsis on its design and reliability 
guidelines are also addressed.       
 
Figure 2-1: Typical offshore well design schematic 
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2.2 Well Control Concepts 
All means of preventing the uncontrolled release of wellbore fluids to the 
external environment and uncontrolled underground flow is collectively known 
as well control. During normal drilling two pressures operate at the well bottom: 
the hydrostatic pressure from the weight of drilling mud and pressure from the 
reservoir. The former counterbalances the latter to prevent inflow into the 
wellbore. This is known as primary well control and should the balance be 
disrupted by well problems (e.g. improper mud control or poor casing 
installation), a potential loss of well control could arise.  
High pressure combination in sections of the well and low formation strength in 
other parts, often combined with high temperatures, create the possibility of loss 
of well control during drilling. Hence a requirement that the operations must be 
carried out with a set of barriers. For every intended operation, a risk 
assessment usually needs to be carried out considering the possibility of a loss 
of well control or general well integrity failure. Typical well control systems 
consist of the BOP and its control system, diverter system, choke and kill 
system, riser system, and wellhead connectors. 
2.2.1 Kick Mechanism 
The influx of gas, oil or water into the well resulting in instability in the well is 
known as a kick. It is commonly defined as “an intrusion of unwanted formation 
fluid or gas into the wellbore such that the effective hydrostatic pressure of the 
wellbore fluid is exceeded by the formation pressure” (US CSB, 2014). The two 
conditions necessary for a kick to occur are: (a) exposure of the permeable and 
porous formation and (b) pore pressure is greater than the bottom-hole 
pressure (BHP). The kick is an initial event that can potentially escalate into a 
blowout. 
There is a great deal of uncertainty before and when planning drilling 
operations. This is evident as the fracture pressure, pore pressure and BHP are 
not known prior to drilling. The well planning team decides on an anticipated 
BHP and this could vary during drilling, affected by factors such as irregularities 
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in hole shape and temperature. These factors are special for different drilling 
sub-operations. Pressure contributors to the BHP for each of these phases are 
the hydrostatic pressure (𝑃ℎ ), frictional pressure ( 𝑃𝑓 ), and those of swab ( 𝑃𝑠𝑤 ), 
and surge ( 𝑃𝑠𝑔 ) (see Eqn 2.1). Five different sub operations are identified in 
(Khakzad et al., 2013):  
 Drilling ahead 
 Tripping operations 
 Static conditions 
 Casing operation 
 Cementing operation 
𝐵𝐻𝑃 = 𝑃ℎ + 𝑃𝑓 + 𝑃𝑠𝑤 − 𝑃𝑠𝑔  2.1 
The hydrostatic pressure is that arising from the drilling mud column and is a 
function of the mud density, and height. Gas-cut mud and annular losses can 
result in a decrease in the hydrostatic pressure as it reduces the height and 
density respectively. The pumping rate is associated with frictional pressure. 
During tripping operation (drill string been run into wellbore), the positive 
pressure gradient formed is known as surge pressure and on the other hand 
when the drill string is pulled out of the well, the negative pressure gradient is 
known as the swabbing pressure. The viscosity of the mud, wellbore diameter 
and speed of tripping determines the 𝑃𝑠𝑤 value.   
(Holand and Awan, 2012) stated kicks do not just occur, hence anticipating 
situations that can result in kicks and taking preventive actions is the best way 
to avoid well control issues. Wellbore pressure control through pressure margin 
is a basic means of kick prevention. The difference between the maximum pore 
pressure and minimum fracturing pressure in an open-hole section is the 
pressure margin during drilling. It is important that a fracture or kick does not 
occur by ensuring, any increment in the BHP is smaller than the difference 
between the fracture pressure and the BHP, while a reduction in the BHP is 
smaller than the difference between the BHP and pore pressure (Assuming a 
constant pore pressure and fracture pressure). Maintaining the BHA within this 
margin will prevent a kick or fracturing from occurring.  
 20 
Conventional overbalance drilling appears preferable from a kick prevention 
stand point but could also lead to annular losses and a kick likely, should the 
formation be fractured from a major over balance drilling. In the alternative, 
despite the advantage of higher penetration rate by near balanced drilling, 
which makes it seemingly preferred for deepwater drilling, it could result into a 
kick, following an event of certain conditions (e.g. loss of circulation or 
unexpected gas cut) leading it into an underbalanced condition (Nguyen, 1996). 
A better insight into the kick mechanism would aid the definition, evaluation and 
planning of well control procedures, safer and lower-cost well operations. Kick 
simulators can also be used to study kick scenarios to provide realistic kick 
tolerances margin. To avoid well control problems, it is not only about having 
practices/procedures that will prevent a kick, but identifying swift means of 
detection. While kick free drilling cannot be guaranteed by any technique, the 
detection of influx remains critically important. Influx detection is traditionally by 
observed mud-level increase in the mud pit, flow checking, or having to stop 
drilling and to check if the well is flowing. Early detection is necessary. 
2.2.2 Blowout 
A blowout arises as the result of well secondary barriers failure. This is the 
outcome of a kick escalation, following either a non-detection of the kick and 
thus not activating the barriers or failure of the secondary barrier.  More insight 
can be gathered on the effect of the secondary barrier on the well control 
process, when the blowout path is known (given kicks can arise through the drill 
string, annulus and casing as well). A kick up in the drill pipe would consist as 
the greatest drilling risk (Flak, 1997). When well pressure control is lost, a 
blowout occurs. The cause of a blowout may be too low mud weight, technical 
equipment failure, stuck pipe (swabbing), procedural failure, gas cut mud, poor 
cementing, improper fill-up of hole, and more often a case of the combination of 
several factors (Hauge et al., 2011). During drilling, sudden lost circulation and 
blowout can result from a casing holed by pipe defects or drill pipe wear. 
Blowout is characterised as an abrupt, powerful and unrestrained release of 
gas, oil, water, and mud from the well.  
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Blowout potential varies from one well to another based on factors such as well 
design, formation characteristics and flowing fluid (see Appendix A.1 for 
different elements that can contribute to blowouts as in (Dervo and Blom-
Jensen, 2004).    The catastrophic nature of blowouts is depicted in Figures 2-2. 
The deepwater horizon is shown before and after the blowout to depict the 
explosive nature of a blowout occurrence. Some of the consequences of a 
blowout include a loss of human lives, loss of equipment, Loss of reserves, 
production stopped, environmental problems. There have been as much as 49 
remarkable offshore well blowouts with oil spills since 1955, eight of which was 
between 2001 and 2012. It is recommended that every week a blowout 
prevention drill be carried out for such emergency readiness by the drilling 
team. There should be an audio-visual alarm/warning device close to the 
driller’s console, for indicating pit level following an increase or decrease in the 
drilling mud volume.  
 
(a) Rig before blowout (b) Rig after a blowout. 
Figure 2-2: Deepwater horizon rig (US CSB, 2014) 
There should be also an accurate measurement of the required mud volume 
and an assurance that when string is being pulled out, the well is filled with 
mud. There is a need to ensure that when a well kicks the mud pump is closed 
using a control device near the driller stand. 
2.2.3 Well control Methods 
There exists a number of well control techniques which can be classified based 
on the nature of bottom-hole pressure applied. If the control of influx into well is 
done using a constant BHP, there are three methods namely: Wait and weight 
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method, driller’s method and concurrent methods. When a constant BHP cannot 
be applied, applicable well control methods are: volumetric methods, bull 
heading, top kill, killing diverted blowout and low choke pressure methods. A 
procedure needs to be established for controlling the well using any of the 
above methods. This procedure will describe the well killing. A sample flow 
chart for kick control procedure when drilling, tripping or pulling out of hole (no 
pipe in BOP) is shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
Figure 2-3: Sample Kick Control Procedure flowchart (Schlumberger, 2013). 
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2.2.4 Well barriers 
In ensuring well integrity for safe operations, barriers are used as a medium to 
prevent, control, or mitigate unwanted incidents or accidents. These barriers 
can be physical or non-physical; active or passive, technical or human 
operational systems.  A means of containing wellbore fluid and pressure is 
using barriers. Thus barriers ensure unintended influx, cross-flow and outflow to 
the external environment is prevented. Ideally at least two barriers are required 
for most operations, in the event one fails, there exist a back-up. The first 
impediment to this unwanted flow (kick) is the primary well barrier and the back-
up is the secondary well barrier that impedes any further undesired flow; this is 
known as the two-barrier principle. Although for operations in which the 
pressure differential does lead to uncontrolled cross flow in the wellbore 
between formation zones (but not to external or surface environment) one 
barrier can be used. In the (NORSOK Standard, 2012) for well integrity in 
drilling and well operations, 58 different barriers were listed with their 
acceptance criteria presented (entailing their constituents, function, design 
selection and construction, use, test and verification as well as common barrier 
elements possibility).  If there exist common barrier elements (an element that is 
shared by the primary and secondary barriers thus two independent barriers 
envelops cannot be established), risk analysis should be carried out with risk 
reduction methods applied. The barriers required should be identified before the 
beginning of any operation or activity with a plan on how it is to be monitored 
and clearly defined acceptance criteria. Following the installation of the barriers, 
integrity and function verification of the barrier needs to be done through 
techniques such as function testing, pressure testing and other methods. In the 
event of a change in loads, conditions or even lifetime extensions, a re-
verification has to be done.  
In respect of well control during drilling there is a hydrostatic and mechanical 
control point associated with the barrier. The drilling stage entails the periods 
from when the well is spudded to preparation for completion or testing or side-
tracking, suspension and abandonment of well. It is important to understand the 
level of risk associated with the drilling process and then ascertains if a 
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minimum or higher standard of barrier is required. A Swiss cheese description 
of the different barriers that failed which led to the Macondo Deepwater Horizon 
accident in 2010 is shown in Figure 2-4. Some barriers are conditional, typically 
functional as a barrier in some operations and in others not as a barrier. The 
BOP system is seen as a last line of defence whose failure to seal well can lead 
to fire, and spill. Another important aspect is the understanding of the stability of 
barriers to outgassing and corrosion (relative to seal failures), high/low 
temperature, pressure spikes, tensile loads and corrosion component (relative 
to barrier degradation). There is thus a need for risk assessment to be carried 
out following well barrier degradation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: A Swiss cheese description of the barriers (Physical and 
operational) that failed at the Macondo Deepwater Horizon accident (BP, 2010). 
Another important aspect is the understanding of the stability of barriers to 
outgassing and corrosion (relative to seal failures), high/low temperature, 
pressure spikes, tensile loads and corrosion component (relative to barrier 
degradation). There is thus a need for risk assessment to be carried out 
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following well barrier degradation. This is to ascertain its cause, potential for 
escalation, the reliability and availability of the primary and secondary barriers. 
There also has to be a plan to re-establish well barrier following a restoration.  
The different well barrier elements that have to be established for the four 
drilling operation situations (running non-shearable drill string; drilling, coring 
and tripping with drill string; running non-shearable casing; and through tubing 
drilling and coring) is depicted in Figure 2-5, however the BOP systems is the 
focus of this thesis. 
 
 
               (a)         (b) (c’)                      (d) 
Figure 2-5: Well barrier schematic for different drilling situations (Left to Right) 
(a) running non-shearable drill string (b) drilling, coring and tripping with drill 
string; running non-shearable casing; and through tubing drilling and coring 
(NORSOK Standard, 2012). 
2.3 Blowout Preventer System 
The BOP system is an integral part of the drilling system and is a safety critical 
system. It is located between the riser and the wellhead for subsea drilling 
system. The BOP system usage goes beyond the primary well control barrier 
function to include a range of routine operational tasks such as formation 
strength and casing pressure tests. The BOP system entails three major 
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components: the lower marine riser package (LMRP) assembly, the BOP stack 
and the control system. The blowout preventer in itself comes in two major 
types: annular and ram preventers, however different BOP types are arranged 
in a certain configuration into what is known as a BOP stack. The blowout 
preventer (BOP) stack consists of an assembly of valves with unique functions 
such as closing around the drill string pipe, casing, or tubing and even severs 
the string and plugging the wellbore, in an emergency. In the instance of fluid 
influx into the wellbore to the surface, when other well barriers have failed, the 
BOP is used to hold flow and pressure of reservoir fluid. There are two basic 
types of BOPs namely the annular and ram preventers and they are 
characterised by different sizes, pressure ratings and styles. The BOP stack 
has at least one annular BOP on-top of several ram BOPs. A subsea BOP stack 
is expected to have at least four remote-controlled, hydraulically operated BOP 
consisting of an annular BOP, one BOP equipped with blind shear rams and 
two Pipe rams. The deepwater Horizon BOP stack and its components are 
shown in Figure 2-6. Also a detailed description of the LMRP assembly in 
Figure 2-7 with the parts described in side Table. The BOP is the secondary 
barrier or seemingly the last line of protective action against kicks and blowouts.  
The BOP stack basic functions include: 
 Restricting well fluid to the wellbore 
 Serve as a medium to add fluid to wellbore, and 
 Ensuring withdrawal of controlled volumes of fluid from the wellbore 
Other functions, in addition to the above include (API STD 53, 2012): 
 Shut-in well by sealing the annulus between the casing and the drill pipe. 
 Wellbore pressure monitoring and regulation 
 Averts any further influx into the wellbore from the reservoir 
 Completely closing off the wellbore to seal the well, if no pipe is in the 
hole 
 Severs the drill pipe or casing to seal well in emergencies (e.g. 
emergency disconnect) 
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 Centralizes and supports the weight (hang off) of the drill string in the 
wellbore 
During drilling operations, the BOP is used in different scenarios namely well 
shut in, snubbing, stripping and BOP testing as seen in the functions listed 
earlier. Some well control approach may require the use of both the ram and 
annular preventer. Usually the choice preventer for well control is the annular 
preventers, when a kick is taken. However both have often been used to 
highlight the grave degree of safety measures taken to avoid the occurrence of 
a blowout. The BOP is attached to the wellhead using collect or flanged 
connectors and how it is installed is dependent on the location and nature of the 
drilling environment. For an onshore well, it is located below the drilling rig floor 
in the cellar, for offshore environment with a floating drilling unit, the BOP is 
attached to the wellhead on the seabed and just below the rig floor on the 
Texas deck, if it is offshore with a bottom supported drilling unit. BOP stack can 
be classified based on the number of components, into 6 classes namely Class 
V-VIII. Table 2-1 shows the class configurations of annular and ram preventers 
by Chevron, with greater redundancy found in the subsea types. This reflects 
the complexity with subsea environment and the need for improved system 
reliability. The arrangements of the BOP stack is usually based on rated 
working pressures in psi of 2K, 3K, 5K, 10K, 15K and 20K which determines the 
types of flanges and gaskets used in the design. 
Table 2-1: BOP Classes and their Component Counts (Source: Satler J., 2013) 
Installation Class 
Number of Components 
Annular Rams 
Surface 
IV 1 3 
V 1 4 
Subsea 
VI 2 4 
VII 1 6 
VII 2 5 
VIII 2 6 
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The conventional and modern typical BOP configurations are placed in parallel 
in Figure 2-6 for comparison. Refer to the Appendix A.2 for alternative 
description of the BOP System. 
 
Figure 2-6: Typical BOP configuration comparing conventional and modern 
architectures (Holand and Awan, 2012). 
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Figure 2-7: Detailed view of the LMRP assembly (Source: Transocean, 2010) 
From the figures in addition to the annular preventer on the LRMP and the rams 
in the BOP stack as earlier mentioned, there are other special additional 
components. The BOP components will be described in the following sections. 
2.4 Annular blowout preventers 
This blowout preventer is used to seal around pipes and casing or wire line. 
Annular preventer squeezes an elastomer packer across the annulus in an 
upward and inward movement to seal the well and prevent upward fluid 
movement within the wellbore. It allows slow rotation and vertical movement 
while sustaining sealing action, thus of great use for drilling operations like 
stripping and snubbing.  There a number of companies that manufactures the 
annular preventers used in the oil and gas industry, with each having their 
LABEL COMPONENT 
1 Flex Joint Riser 
Adapter 
2 Upper Annular 
Preventer 
3 Lower Annular 
preventer 
4 Control Pod 
5 Choke and Kill 
connectors 
6 Choke and Kill 
Isolation Valves 
7 LMRP Connectors 
8 Gas Bleed Valves 
9 Choke and Kill Flexible 
Lines 
10 ROV Interface Control 
Panel 
11 LMRP Hydraulic 
Accumulators 
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unique product design features. Annular preventers such as Cameron DL, 
Hydril GL, Hydril GK, Hydril GX/GXS, Hydril Annu-Flex and Shaffer Spherical 
have been known to be used. The Cameron DL BOP is shown in Figure 2-8 and 
for its specific details and those of Hydril Appendix A.2 can be referred. 
 
Figure 2-8: The Cameron DL BOP 
2.5 Ram blowout preventers 
The Ram BOP is a valve that consists of two opposing rods (a pair of opposing 
pistons and ram blocks) which are hydraulically operated for sealing function.  
The ram block extends through the BOP housing guide chambers and towards 
the centre of the BOP wellbore to stop flow or left retracted to allow flow. 
Elastomeric seals and packers for sealing against the ram blocks are fitted into 
the inner and top faces of the ram blocks, against each other, against the guide 
chambers, against the drill pipe running through the wellbore, and against the 
wellbore. Choke and kill valves and piping are connected through outlets on the 
body of the BOP. There are various sizes and design of the ram block for 
handling different specific drilling operations. Ram preventer type design 
determines the nature of the sealing such as complete closure by cutting drill 
pipe (Blind shear ram), sealing capabilities for one pipe size (pipe/casing ram) 
and for more than one pipe size (variable rams). 
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a) Pipe/Casing ram 
Pipe or casing ram preventers can close the annular space around a drill pipe 
and casing respectively, when hydraulically activated. Their openings are semi-
circular which matches the diameter of the pipe or casing (see Appendix A.2. for 
a plan view of the BOP Pipe ram before and upon demand). 
b) Variable Bore Rams (VBR) 
This type of pipe rams can close around a range of drill pipe diameters and 
tubing utilising flexible packers (Transocean, 2011). There is also a dual bore 
flex packer that can seal three different pipe sizes in two different bores. A 
typical bore ram, and a flex packer type shown in Appendix A.2. 
c) Blind shear ram 
A ram designed to close off annulus when no pipe is in the hole is known as a 
blind ram. This means should a demand be made on a blind ram when a drill 
string is in the hole, it would not shut the annulus. A blind shear ram (also 
known as sealing shear ram) is designed to seal the wellbore, regardless of the 
bore been occupied by a drill pipe. Usually this type of ram is activated when all 
other rams have failed in shutting the well. A typical blind shear ram operation is 
depicted by Figure 2-9.  
d) Test rams 
This is a VBR that is inverted for sealing pressure from above. It reduces 
required time for both BOP pressure testing preparation and drilling operations 
resumption afterwards. Once the test ram is closed, pressure testing can be 
carried out on other ram preventers above against the drill string and the 
annulus (Transocean, 2011). This inhibits the exposure of the wellbore below 
the BOP from test pressure. The quality of the wellhead connector test and 
successful closure of the BOP probability will be reduced by the test ram. It is 
believed potential leakage paths below the lower pipe ram preventer in the 
stack will be added (Holand and Awan, 2012). 
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The principle of the closing and opening functions of a ram preventer are the 
same, with direction of the hydraulic fluid relative to the intended piston and 
wedge lock movement (inward or outwards) as the difference. The ram 
preventer functions are driven the BOP control systems and basically 
hydraulically powered. Figure 2-10 shows the working of the ram as fluid from 
the control pod is routed through the inlet port to the shuttle valve. The 
operation sequences prior to this point described (i.e. hydraulic fluid moving 
from the accumulators (subsea or surface) through the regulator and SPM valve 
in the control pod to the shuttle valve) is explained in detail in the BOP control 
system section.  
The fluid that passes through the shuttle valve is routed to push the piston 
inwards for a closing function and the wedge-lock moves behind the piston to 
prevent back movement. During this piston-inward movement that projects the 
packers or blades (for sealing or shearing depending the ram type), the 
hydraulic fluid behind the piston is circulated to the surface through another 
shuttle valve. 
 
Figure 2-9: A schematic of three possible functional mode of the BSR. 
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Figure 2-10: How a ram works with the shuttle valve zoomed in. (Lund, 2011) 
2.6 Choke and kill system 
The BOP system is equipped with two parallel high pressure rated pipes (choke 
and Kill lines) for providing flow connections between the surface and the BOP 
stack on the seabed. The choke and kill for surface BOP Stacks are attached to 
the drilling spool on the opposite sides, below one of the ram preventers while 
for subsea BOP stack, multiple staggered connections are used to control the 
route of flow (see Figure 2-15 [right]) (Chapman and Brown, 2009), (Hawker, 
2001) . The subsea BOP stack choke and kill lines thus offers multiple flow 
paths routes with a difficulty to ascertain which will be choke line. The outlet on 
BOP stacks and rig pumps are connected via the Kill line (Schlumberger, 2011). 
When pumping through drill string is not possible (say when drill pipe is pulled 
out and the well is pressured), heavy mud can be pumped into the wellbore 
through the kill line. It can be located below blind ram.  The functions of these 
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lines are as their name implies and the primary role common to both the surface 
and subsea BOP system are (Chapman and Brown, 2009): 
 Well control fluid routing from the annulus of the drill pipe or drill casing 
to the choke manifold using the “choke line” 
 Route kill fluid, when needed, into the annulus using the “Kill line” 
In addition to the above for subsea BOP Stack system, other functions include: 
 In the event of a leak or plugged line, a back-up line is available 
 To aid pressure testing by providing a path for such test. 
 Providing a circulation route for sweeping the BOP to remove gas (one 
way down and the other up). 
 Providing circulation medium for a well-sealed by the BSR and drill pipe 
hung off on a pipe ram (see Figure 2-11 [left]). 
How the BOP stack is built up and the operator’s preference determines where 
the lines are attached to the stack. A typical choke and kill line configuration is 
shown in Appendix A along with additional functions.   
 
Figure 2-11: Subsea Stack with two choke and kill lines having five connections 
to the stack at dissimilar heights (left) and well circulation using two Choke and 
Kill lines to a suspended subsea well with drill pipe hung off on a pipe ram and 
BSR closed over it (right). (Chapman and Brown, 2009) 
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The choke/kill lines are closed or isolated using the choke/kill valves. As close 
to the outlets as possible, two valves are placed in series with the goal of 
increasing system reliability. These valves are hydraulically controlled by the 
BOP control system. A fail safe design is used for the choke/kill valves to 
ensure that an operator always has control of the valves. This implies hydraulic 
pressure is required to sustain opening function and if pressure is lost. They 
would be forced into close position by loaded springs. The choke and kill valves 
provide the means for controlling the BOP functions. They can be adjustable or 
fixed. An advantage of the adjustable valve is in its ability to allow more control 
of fluid parameters, but may be more susceptible to erosion than the fixed type 
under prolonged use.  
2.7 The BOP control system 
A critical component of the BOP stack is the BOP control system which is 
responsible for activating the functions of the rams and annular preventer using 
rig power or not. The components of the control system which can be found 
topsides and subsea are electrical /electronic and hydraulic components make 
up the subsea BOP control system. There are two main control system 
principles for the BOP in different drilling systems: 
 Pilot Hydraulic control (Conventional and Pre-charged type) 
 The electro-hydraulic system and/or Multiplex (MUX) control  
The different control systems have similar operating philosophy for control of 
fluid. How the pilot signal is transmitted from the rig to the pilot valve in the 
subsea pod is what defines the difference between these control systems. 
While plain signal is used for activating the pilot valves in the pilot hydraulic 
control system (conventional), a pre-charge pressure is given to the pilot signal 
for the pre-charged control system to reduce the response time (period between 
activation and complete operation of an intended function) of the BOP function. 
Thus the conventional pilot hydraulic and the pre-charged pilot hydraulic are 
similar, with the possibility of the former been converted to the latter type 
(Transocean, 2010). Control system types vary from rig to rig, however there 
has been an increase in the use of multiplex control system, as seen in some 
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rigs being changed from pilot hydraulic to multiplex one in the last decade, 
following maturity of the technology. This move has been seen for drilling in 
greater water depths (900 meters to greater than equal to 1600 metres) which 
requires quicker closing times for the BOP and overcoming umbilical handling 
problems. Thus the electrical cables which operate solenoid valves were used 
to replace the hydraulic lines that controlled the pilot valves.   
The electro-hydraulic system like the MUX uses electric signals instead of 
hydraulic pilot signals (from the surface) to actuate the solenoid valve on the 
control pod that transmits a hydraulic pilot signal to the control valve that 
releases power fluid for chosen BOP function. However large amount of wires 
are required for solenoid valve activation to effect BOP functions (since a set of 
wires with a pod-mounted solenoid valve is required for a single BOP function). 
Hence the interface connections and control bundles are bulky (see Figure 2-12 
for typical cables of the different controls system types).  
 
Figure 2-12: Typical hydraulic hose (left), electro hydraulic cable (middle), and MUX 
cable (right) (Goins, W., Sheffield, R., 1983) (Umbilicals, 2009) (Rig Train, 2001) 
Simultaneous execution of commands through the time division multiplexing 
system provides a relatively compact electrical umbilical thus control umbilical 
having fewer lines. The SEM using programmable logical controller (PLC) 
receives a command which is decoded and translated to an electric signal to be 
sent to the right solenoid valve and then other sequences which is similar to 
those of electro-hydraulic control systems. The pre-charged pilot hydraulic 
system can also be used for deepwater of depths ranging from 900 metres to 
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1600 metres. It is worth mentioning, that the response time increases with depth 
for the pilot hydraulic system while it is independent of water depth for the MUX 
system. The response times is based on the valve or BOP closure and seal off. 
The API recommended practice specifies the maximum closing times for BOPs 
(for subsea installations) should not exceed 60 seconds for annular preventers 
and 45 seconds for rams. BOP controls system for subsea drilling operation 
consists of the following main components discussed thereafter and a functional 
diagram is depicted in Figure 2-13. 
The control items topsides consist of the control panels and the hydraulic/ 
supply utilities central. There are at least 3 panels namely the central control 
unit (CCU), the driller’s panel and the tool pusher’s panel. The CCU is an 
integrated console with redundant stations for system monitoring, system 
diagnostics and back-up control which serves as the point of interface to both 
subsea and surface controls and the main electronic hub. The driller’s panel is 
the one of the surface controls panel that is located on the driller’s floor. It is 
micro-processor based and multiplexed with the CCU with colour coded 
labelling for component functions, alarm monitoring and general system status 
monitoring.  The interdependency of the panels with the CCU is reduced by the 
micro-processor electronics. 
There are accumulators (pressure vessels designed to store fluid power) 
located on the topsides and a collection of these is known as the accumulator 
bank. The topsides accumulator provides back-up should the HPU fails. As 
drilling operation progresses into deeper waters, the time requirement for 
executing a BOP function increased and informed the desire to have hydraulic 
fluid readily available subsea through mounting accumulators on the subsea 
stack. Subsea accumulators may reduce the Emergency Disconnect Sequence 
execution time, depending on the design (McCrae, 2003). The hydraulic power 
unit (HPU) delivers hydraulic fluid from topsides onwards into hydraulic jumper 
hose bundle, through the hose reel, subsea hydraulic hose bundle (umbilical), 
subsea accumulator and finally subsea control pod. The subsea controls on the 
BOP stack is housed in the subsea yellow and blue pods.  
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The subsea electronic modules (SEMs), hydraulic pressure regulators, subsea 
transducer modules (STMs), hydraulic accumulators and hydraulic valves, and 
solenoid pilot valves. In response to commands from the surface control with 
the exception of the Automatic Mode Function system, functions on the BOP 
stack are activated by the yellow and blue pods (Shanks et al., 2013). In each of 
the pods on the BOP stack, there are two SEMs, hence 4 SEMS in a BOP 
system (see Appendix A.2 for a picture of a typical SEM). The SEMs consist of 
AMF controllers, programmable logic controllers (PLC), fuse boards, power 
supply units, batteries, and communication boards. The activation of functions 
from the surface controls implies transmission of a signal to the SEMs to 
energize the respective solenoid valves, which directs the pressurized hydraulic 
fluid to a specific BOP function (US CSB, 2014). There are two operating coils 
in every solenoid valve with one coil connected to each SEM in a pod, 
permitting either or both SEMs to operate the valve. During normal subsea 
operation, both SEMs in each pod receive a surface control system signal for 
the activation of their respective coil in the solenoid simultaneously. 
The pod selector valve position determines the direction of flow of hydraulic 
power fluid (3000 psi) from surface into subsea regulator valve within one of 
subsea control pods. Supply of power fluid from the subsea accumulator is 
routed to the regulator as a backup. The subsea pods (active and redundant) 
each have two subsea plate mounted (SPM) valves which are meant to regulate 
the valve for venting the power fluid on the opposite side of the ram and majorly 
direct power fluid to the ram. The active pod’s SPM valve is responsible for 
supply of hydraulic control fluid for opening or closure of the ram BOP. 
Pressurized hydraulic fluid is not supplied to the redundant pod’s SPM valve, 
though the valve is open, no flow goes through the valve. The regulated fluid 
(1500 psi) goes through to the shuttle valve and then enables flow to execute 
the intended function BOP function. 
 
.
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Simple Hydraulic Control System Multiplex Control System schematic 
Figure 2-13: BOP Control Systems Schematics (Kozel, 2015)
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The BOP stack function can have different operating position such as the 2 
position function (open or close function), 3 position function (open and close 
function), close assist function and the straight through function. The difference 
between the 2 positions and 3 position functions is that the former has only one 
pilot line, as it has only close or open positions. This control function (pilot lines 
which moves from the manipulator valve, connecting pressure switches and 
branches to the different pods) can be operated manually and remotely from the 
control panel.  
The block position function is activated to detect leakage in the preventer and 
control system by flow in the pilot control valve. It enables the preventer to be 
closed and released off any control pressure through the SPM valves in both 
pods. It is similar to the close and open position function but the solenoid valves 
are half-way open to enable pilot control valve being centred with access for 
venting pilot fluid into SPM valves. Subsea hydraulic valves on the BOP side 
outlets use the two-position function, since they must be hydraulically 
pressurized to be in open position or closed under their own spring force by 
venting hydraulic fluid. This is known as the Fail-safe-close principle however, 
this type of operation for subsea choke and kill valves or terminology is not used 
in the industry today. This is owing to rumblings from incidents and court cases 
stating under certain conditions, the “Fail-safe-close” valves have proven to 
malfunction. This is also the case with the close assist function, which is similar 
to the BOP side outlets with two position control, but with a combination of a 
separate accumulator cylinder dedicated for supply of closing pressure. The 
straight through functions such as the supply of pressure to the ball joint, pod 
latches, and accumulator isolation valves which require small volume of fluid 
avoids the SPM mounted valves and uses the pilot pressure (orange line) 
directly for the functions. 
In recent MUX systems, redundancy has been introduced with multiple PLCs 
driven by software (vendor supplied or custom). Redundancy can be seen in 
several paths in the design of the electronic systems to reduce any single-point 
failure potential. Sequential actions and logic can be exploited, an advantage 
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the MUX system offers, via custom programming. Also compared to the 
hydraulic system, there is no control valve manifold present in the MUX, as 
electric signals would be used rather than pilot signals, as in hydraulic for 
control of subsea functions. MUX system remote control panels are completely 
electric with no interface with the hydraulic pump unit for control or read-back of 
subsea functions. Thus relinquishes the pump hydraulic unit’s ability of a direct 
manual control (Vujasinovic and McMahan, 1988).  
The complexity introduced by the signal processing hardware, which raises 
some concerns on the reliability of the MUX control system, calls for well-trained 
personnel to operate, maintain and troubleshoot the system. Though they 
possess quicker response time than the all hydraulic and thus usable for 
deepwater but the difficulty to activate automatic or sequenced controls (a 
requirement for drilling from a dynamically positioned rig) and the reliability 
concerns informed the drift to the preference of the MUX a preferred control 
system choice (Childers et al., 2004). Experience has shown that the retrieval of 
the BOP and riser for repair has been associated with the hydraulic component 
rather than the electrical. There are some precautionary concerns or measures 
that are worthy to be mentioned relating to the BOP control system. These 
include 
 The control of power should be within easy reach on driller’s floor and 
there should be an installation of a remote control panel for the BOP, 
within safe distance from the driller’s floor.  
 Suitable markers to be used for identification of BOP controls.   
2.8 Secondary Intervention Systems (Emergency Modes) 
Shutting in a well using an automated system has become standards on all 
drilling rigs, following greater concerns for safety of personnel and the 
environment. The potential use of use of emergency backup systems could be 
required by three emergency situation systems namely: procedures initiated by 
operator, loss of main control mitigating emergency and major disasters (e.g. 
riser system damage). Any of these back-up systems depicted below can be 
used depending on the need in a particular situation. The two most important 
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types the ROV and the Acoustic alongside the Automatic Disconnect functions 
are discussed. Figure 2-14 shows the different emergency control system types. 
Refer to Sattler, (2004), Holand, (2011), Kozel, (2015) and Appendix A.2 for 
more details. 
 
Figure 2-14: Different Emergency Control Systems (Cameron, 2006) 
2.9 Previous Works on the BOP System 
Most of the earlier documented work on the BOP system is confined within the 
industry and equipment manufacturers especially. However there have been a 
few in publications on salient concerns based on authors experience or 
company development programme to sell the sophistication of their product, 
while others are outcome of Joint Eras, with the third being after the Macondo 
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Incident at the Gulf of Mexico as Industry Projects (JIP) made available to the 
public. These works have been divided into 3 shown below: 
2.9.1 Earlier works on Blowout Preventer Pre-1998 (Era 1):  
SINTEF have presented the most in-depth work on the BOP system and its 
reliability for subsea operations. These studies have been funded by the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and different oil companies for more than two 
decades now. Initial SINTEF Studies have been carried out in phases namely: 
Phase I (Rausand, 1983), Phase II (Rausand et al., 1985), Phase III (Holand 
and Molnes, 1986), Phase IV (Holand, 1987), Phase V (Holand, 1989) entailed 
failure data analysis for exploratory wells that were drilled submersible wells, 
evaluation of mechanical BOP components, testing and operations control, 
maintenance, availability and test intervals recommendations. (Holand and 
Rausand, 1987) presented a study on the performance of subsea BOP in the 
North Sea between 1978 and 1986. Daily drilling reports, final well reports, BOP 
test reports and equipment failure reports were reviewed and meantime to fail 
failure rate and downtime estimation conducted for different components of the 
BOP system. Regarding the blowouts and the BOP being a safety barrier, its 
components testing and testing intervals were examined. Variations were 
observed in the test interval and found to influence a components Mean 
fractional dead time. It was also reported that the reliability of the lower pipe ram 
and the wellhead connector were vital towards enhancing BOP availability.  
The Emergence of greater depth exploration for oil and gas led to Deepwater 
(DW JIP studies). The Phase I DW study was carried out between on 140 wells 
drilled between 1992 and 1997 and also different control systems were 
compared in the Phase 1 DW using fault tree analysis to understand their 
performance relative to closing a well in the occurrence of a kick (Holand, 
1997a; Holand, 1997b).  
(Fowler, 1994) used the failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) and the FTA 
in the safety system analysis of well control equipment. The ram BOP and the 
accompanying controls were found to be very reliable despite human errors. 
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2.9.2 Blowout preventer works between 1999-2009 (Era 2):  
SINTEF Phase II DW analysed BOP failures for the MMS in relation to both 
safety and downtime. This study was analysed 83 deepwater wells ranging in 
depths of 400 to 2000 m, which were drilled between 1997 to 1998 (Holand, 
1999b; Holand, 1999a; Holand and Skalle, 2001). These were updated in a 
subsequent report that examined different configurations, testing and kick data 
from a safety perspective for enhancing the availability of the BOP report 
(Holand and Skalle, 2001).              Other publications from industry 
includes:(Chapman and Brown, 2009; Childers et al., 2004; Sattler, 2002; 
Shanks et al., 2003; Sattler, 2003; Sattler, 2004; Springett and Franklin, 2008; 
Sattler, 2009; Jorge et al., 2001). 
Jorge, N. (2001) review on BOP system depicts an increasing failure rate and 
higher downtimes with the effect of depth- the result of greater hydrostatic 
pressures and stress. The understanding of the depth effect followed on with 
the investment of industrial research on controls systems and improvement of 
maintenance and testing intervals as seen in the 2001-2010 follow-on 
publications. (Shanks et al., 2003) had showcased a novel way of meeting 
planned requirements in the offshore Drilling industry by performance 
specification of equipment. It discusses the practical reliability issues associated 
with a deepwater (10,000 ft.) BOP control system from design consideration to 
estimation and planning tests for reliability requirements to assure evasion of 
unplanned maintenance by pulling system to surface. 
The BOP controls systems and how associated reliability issues can be 
addressed through qualification testing for a defined period of use and between 
maintenance periods were presented in Shanks et.al (2003). It was observed 
functionality specification given to vendors rarely had performance requirements 
for the components, rather these were developed in the process. The 
importance of testing requirements for component level reliability demonstration 
was emphasised. It was reported that the shipyard time of a MODU was the 
best time to perform major maintenance, on a complex deepwater MUX BOP 
control systems, during its five-year interval inspection period. Childers et al., 
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(2004) reviewed the BOP controls system technology and then presented a new 
cost effective, simple electro-hydraulic (EH) control system design that can 
serve as an alternative to existing MUX systems used in deepwater and ultra-
deepwater drilling. “The new concept centres on running electrical lines to 
critical solenoid pod functions that are very time dependent and hydraulic pilot 
lines to all other non-critical time dependent functions”. Piloted all-hydraulic 
controls system components may be used with the new EH without a 
requirement for modifications to the existing BOP stack or LMRP. 
Springett and Franklin, (2008) presented innovative design aspects of new 
generation BOPs which were informed by challenges associated with greater 
water depths and challenging reservoirs. These includes but not limited to: 
 a reduction in stack-mounted accumulator bottles from 98 of as much as 
126 bottles for shearing function to 7 depth compensated bottles,  
 an increased available shearing force by an innovative split piston which 
can result in a reduction in rubber pressure and consequently shear ram 
blocks exposed to lower stresses. 
 Improved monitoring with the use of MUX cable 
 An enhanced fluid recovery system rather that can overcome possible 
closing of BOP functions inadvertently due to surface high back 
pressure, should hydraulic fluid be returned rather than been vented to 
sea. 
Denney, (2009) presented a decision tree to assist drilling crew in deciding on a 
stack-pull decision or not. It presents two case studies and acknowledges that it 
is almost impossible for a comprehensive decision matrix to be developed 
however, recommends for minimum requirements for LMRP/BOP functions and 
a consensus on stack-pulling philosophy be specified prior to drilling program 
commencement. The need to invest resources in root cause finding and to 
analyse scenarios especially in relation to how the minimum requirements is 
impacted is emphasised (see Sattler, 2009 for full paper with 4 case studies). 
2.9.3 Post Macondo period from 2010-2015 (Era 3):  
This incident has come to be a game changer for the drilling and well control 
industry with direct impact on the blowout preventer technology, operation 
procedures, qualification procedures, regulations, and how it relates to the new 
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drilling limits. Consequently, number of works with focus on different aspect of 
the technology arose as discussed below and in the following subsection. While 
majority of these relate to improvement in requirements, technology and 
regulatory aspects, there have been also technology assessment or appraisal 
works from Academia amongst the post-Macondo interest groups.  
(Sattler and Gallaner, 2010) studied the reliability history of well control systems 
operating in the GOM (based on 99.58% of subsea wells drilled between 2004 
and 2006 under the jurisdiction of the Mineral Mining Service (MMS)) 
considering both surface and subsea BOP systems. It was observed that failure 
rates were lower for subsea systems than surface and that the higher the 
redundancy, the lesser the MTTF hence the higher classes of BOP had smaller 
MTTF. Failure distributions for subsea components from four different studies 
(Post Latch-JIP data, Pre-Latch-WEST surveys, SINTEF Phase V and DW 
phase II) were compared with controls system having the most substantial 
number of failures compared to other equipment classes. It is believed the 
complexity associated with the system and the challenges with hydrostatic 
resulting from deeper water were the responsible for the significant number of 
failures. However, given that the chances of well control incident resulting from 
an equipment related problem is very remote, upon consideration of 
redundancy in system with reliability. Also the control related failures could 
easily be spotted during a function test. The study showed improvement in BOP 
reliability over prior studies as it showed components with higher MTTF days 
than those of SINTEF phase V and then Phase II DW. However, Phase II DW 
was not directly comparable as it included failures during testing (before first 
successful testing) which accounted for higher failure rates. 
Holand and Awan (2012) divided BOP failures into two main groups namely the 
safety critical and non-safety critical failures in their study of 279 wells spudded 
between 2007- 2009 in the US GOM. The criticality is with respect to well 
control and observed failures were summarized relative to BOP location and 
operation/test.  The non-safety critical failures, those that occur when the BOP 
is not acting as a well barrier, can be observed when the BOP is on the rig floor, 
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being run and during installation testing. The safety critical ones, those that 
occur when the BOP is acting as a well barrier, can be observed when drilling 
starts following the acceptance of the installation test.  
A failure of the BOP would not mean the complete safety barrier function of the 
BOP failed. It can imply a component failure or failure of the BOP control 
system. BOP failures based on where/when they were detected can be grouped 
into three as shown in Table 4-2. In Holand and Awan, (2012), most of the BOP 
failures (i.e. 71%) occurred when the BOP was on the wellhead. 35 of the 110 
failures on the wellhead occurred during installation testing and the rest were 
during normal operations or regular BOP test. The testing after landing the 
BOP, the first time or during subsequent landings of the BOP or the LRMP is 
referred to as installation testing. In the study, 156 failures were identified in 
total of which 45% are attributed to control system.  
Table 2-2: The classification of BOP failure based on observation (Holand and 
Awan, 2012) 
 
The failure modes associated with the BOP components are mainly similar and 
common modes includes failure of a component to open or close, leakages 
which could be internal or external, failure to lock/latch or unlock/unlatch, failure 
to shear or seal, etc. The annular preventer had the internal leakage and fail to 
fully open as the dominant failures with the former greater in occurrence (see 
 48 
Table 2-6 for failure rates). Fail to close is a rare failure mode for the Annular 
BOPs based on Holand, (1999).  The internal leakage has been observed also 
to be the most dominant failure mode amongst others (external, leakage, fail to 
close, fail to open and other unknown) and has accounted for about 70% of the 
ram BOP failures in Holand and Awan, (2012) study. The choke line has 
leakage as one of the major failure modes associated with it. The External 
leakage is the most severe failure mode in a choke and kill valve. A leakage in 
the BOP will ensue should such leakage occurs in the lower inner valve below 
the LPR when attempting to close in a well kick. In all-purpose, more external 
leakages have occurred in the link between the inner valve and the BOP body, 
than the link between the two valves in series. Commonly, within a common 
valve block would the two valves be located (Holand, 1999) 
The internal leakage failure mode is not as serious as an external leakage. 
Choke and kill valves are always in series of two. However, in the event of the 
two valves fail another leakage would be needed before the well fluid can reach 
the surroundings. Failure of both valves in series has been mentioned in earlier 
studies. 
There was no direct trend observed for MUX control system reliability (MTTF) 
with age (Holand and Awan, 2012), when it was desired to ascertain if the 
improvements in newer built equipment would translate to improved reliability. 
In a particular category of failures, 7 out of the 11 failures in the MUX happened 
during the running of the BOP to the wellhead and they were all failures on the 
blue pod. Considering the control systems generally five types of failure modes, 
which are associated with the control functions and the pods, are mentioned in 
Holand and Awan, (2012). These include: 
 Loss of one function both pods 
 Loss of all functions one pod  
 Loss of all functions both pods  
 Loss of one function one pod  
 Loss of several functions one pod 
Of the control system failure modes the loss of functions and both pods, a 
critical failure mode, is found only in the multiplex control system. This failure 
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mode implies that the BOP cannot be operated. A spurious operation of the 
BOP function may occur with any of the control systems. The spurious 
operation failure mode had been considered in a previous SINTEF report 
(Holand, 1999). 
State of the Art FMECAs are those of Januarilham, (2012) and American 
Bureau Society (ABS). Januarilham (2012) carried out an analysis of critical 
component in the BOP System relative to safety of personnel following a kick 
occurrence and initiation of well shut-in procedures. The reliability block 
diagram, FMECA & criticality matrix, and redundancy & effect analysis 
techniques are applied to the BOP system with hydraulic control. Shuttle valve 
for blind shear ram (e.g., for closing function), Blind shear ram, additional critical 
components inside shear ram: ram piston, flange and gasket (in the BOP stack) 
and annular preventer (rubber housing) were identified as the critical 
components of the BOP system. The shuttle valve was identified as a most 
critical component in all three analysis outcomes while the others were 
identified in two of the three analysis approaches. It was however emphasised 
that these critical component might not be critical should they fail after a shut-in 
has already been initiated (consequence will be a case of delay to operation) 
and during testing given several safety measures and procedures to manage 
expected problems. The redundancy table shows a several redundancies have 
been built into the BOP system such as an alternative hydraulic supply and 
control system, redundant flow path route, redundant similar or alternative 
component for required function.  
The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and ABSG Consulting Inc. (ABS 
Consulting) FMECAs is more comprehensive given three (3) different analyses 
was conducted with different experts from OEMs, drilling contractors, and 
Operating companies and findings summarised in a fourth report (ABS, 2013b; 
ABS, 2013a; ABS, 2013c; ABS, 2013d). This level of depth in detail can only be 
achievable due to available resources, considering the cost of experts’ time. 
The analysis of the BOP system, components and associated control systems 
data presented in these ABS studies are in relation to an operation in the GOM, 
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operating depth of 5000ft and deeper and three BOP configurations (Classes 
VI, VII, and VIII BOP system). Eleven (11) major BOP functions (eight of which 
are specified in API RP 53 Standard, Section 7.1.3, and the extra functions 
identified by the analysis team) and 52 functional failures were identified, and 
agreed upon following the initial scoping for the functional FMECA and during 
the FMECA sessions. In addition to the 11 major functions, FMECA 3 
considered two (2) more items (not functional failures- The acoustic and ROV 
secondary control systems), to be of importance to safe BOP system 
operations, however these were not assessed in the equipment-level FMECA. 
Both functional and equipment level FMECA approaches were considered in 
the studies with the major equipment failures which are responsible for and/or 
contributed to a functional failure identified through the former approach. Also in 
the equipment FMECA, potential generic failure modes for equipment were 
adjusted to better portray the major failure means as understood from the 
functional FMECA. General equipment failure modes identified were grouped 
into mechanical (e.g. corrosion, leaks, and plug) and electrical/electronic 
failures (e.g. erratic output, processing error, and loss of or degraded power).  
Critical failure modes by way of risk ranking techniques and their effects were 
identified in order to evaluate the BOP maintenance, inspection and testing 
(MIT) current practices which were aligned with the related 
component/functional failures frequencies.  Also potential major equipment 
failures (failure modes) including associated components were identified and 
evaluated to understand their impact on BOP performance, as well safe-guards 
for detecting and preventing failure modes. Functional failures were ranked 
using highest average RPN and the greatest occurrences due to equipment 
failures in all three FMECA. The severity rankings in the functional FMECA 3 
were also subdivided into personnel, environment, and downtime. Majority of 
the functional failures assessed had high scores of 8 and above assigned to 
downtime severity (from the worst case ranking among the three groups).  The 
control system was the most frequent equipment occurring failure in the BOP 
system in all three FMECAs and next three items were those of Pipe rams, 
Choke and Kill lines and valves and Blind shear rams failure respectively in two 
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of the three FMECAs.  In two of the 3 FMECAs, the connector and rigid conduit 
were the hardest to detect while the autoshear system was hardest to detect in 
all three FMECAs. The most important equipment failures are the Blind Shear 
Rams in all three FMECAs. The Blind Shear Rams is recorded as the most 
important item in all three FMECAs, and Casing shear rams, Connector, Blue 
and yellow Pod hydraulics, Choke and Kill lines, Pipe rams, Hydraulic Supply 
Lines and Subsea Accumulators in two of the three FMECAs. Function test, and 
pressure tests are the most frequent safeguard measures/MIT task in all three 
FMECAs and thereafter dimensional/ultrasonic testing and rebuilding/replacing 
equipment in two of the three FMECAs. The level of indenture in FMECA 3 is 
slightly different as it had more distinct components and more specific failures 
causes than in FMECA 1 and 2.  The difference in these 3 FMECAs are minor 
with the outcomes similar with varying degree of details. The other significant 
difference as identified in the report is the variation in RPN rankings which can 
be due to differences in design and operations, and subjectivity associated with 
assigning score to the RPN factors, as they are dependent on the experience of 
the expert. 
Drægebø, (2014) compared the reliability of an electro-hydraulic and that of an 
all-electric BOP system using Reliability Block diagram, FMECA, functional 
analysis and the fault tree techniques. It concluded that he all-electric BOP 
technology was more reliable and less susceptible to failures. The all-electric 
system was of lesser weight, have accumulators been replaced with batteries, 
no shuttle valves, with more redundancies in the controls items with superior 
monitoring, and more environmental friendly. However, it is still a new 
technology with potential challenges and several other important factors that 
needs to be considered to support the conclusion in (e.g. it has to be 
commercially and technically viable). 
 
(Cai et al., 2012b) carried out an evaluation of the subsea BOP considering 
common cause failures which included a Markov model for reliability 
assessment. This was influenced by research findings that redundant systems 
(e.g. BOP systems) reliability analysis is best conducted in a flexible manner 
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using the Markov model (Liu and Rausand, 2011; Yu et al., 2005). (Cai et al., 
2012b) took account of the BOP system complexity and the difficulty of solving 
large Markov models, the BOP system split into seven independent (failures 
and repair) modules: control stations, ram preventer (RP), control pod, LMRP 
connector, TMR controller, annular preventer (ANP), and wellhead connectors 
and combined with the Kronecker product approach (see: (Rausand and 
Høyland, 2004)). BOP stack configurations and mounting types control pod (i.e. 
retrievable and non-retrievable pods) effects on three subsea BOP systems (1 
ANP, 4 RP; 2 ANP, 5 RP; 1 ANP, 6 RP) was studied based on the Markov 
model. The finding showed lower performance for BOP systems with non-
retrievable than for those with retrievable. Also over a period of time, 
Performance a BOP system can be reduced from with a one less annular 
preventer and cannot significantly improve with a one more ram preventer. The 
subsea control pods and the control stations were suggested to be the two most 
important components (compared to others) given a variation in their MTTF and 
failure rates produces greater effects on the system reliability and availability.  
(Cai et al., 2012a) presented a reliability analysis of two subsea blowout 
preventer control systems configurations (Double dual modular redundancy and 
the triple modular redundancy) using Markov modelling. A comparison of the 
configurations was done using the multiple error shock approach (see: (Hokstad 
and Bodsberq, 1989) for common cause modelling. The system was split into 
independent modules and the Kronecker product of the modules state 
probabilities used to compute the Probability of failure on demand (PFD) and 
their safety integrity levels calculated to be SIL 3. The subsea BOP control 
system being a low-demand system, thus its reliability can ideally be measured 
using the PFD. 
(Klakegg, 2012) discussed current conventional reliability assessment 
techniques applied to the BOP as an example of a safety critical systems and 
proposed improvements to the approaches. A possible improvement of the BOP 
reliability computed estimates presented using the fault trees and minimal-cut 
sets post processing with possibility of common cause failures being 
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considered. Following the challenges with functional testing of BOP 
components, especially the shear ram, not all dangerous undetected failures 
are discovered. Thus approximations for the PFD as defined in (Rausand and 
Høyland, 2004) is rendered non-conservative, given an imperfect functional 
testing. The need to consider undetected failures by functional test was also 
proposed, thus considering criticality to safety, (Klakegg, 2012) suggested the 
inclusion of the probability of critical to safety unavailability or test independent 
failure (Hauge and Onshus, 2010) or a test coverage factor C (Hauge et al., 
2010) to the computation for PFD for minimal-cut set. It is believed this approach 
would deduce more conservative and better reliability estimates than the 
conventional. The PFD value is increased by the inclusion of common cause 
failures which results in a reduction of reliability. The event tree analysis was 
identified to be very useful in presenting a better risk picture of different BOP 
operational conditions and an out of well control escalation event. In (Klakegg, 
2012), the control system failure modes offer the greatest contributions to the 
BOP system unreliability. (Pinker, 2012) presented an integration of the event 
tree analysis with the fault tree analysis was applied to the BOP system for an 
enhanced assessment of the BOP system reliability. Sequence of events is 
considered and the event tree end states were evaluated using the fault tree. 
The approach of minimal-cut set post processing for estimating PFD towards a 
better conservative approximation was earlier presented in (Lundteigen and 
Rausand, 2009) and the rational is that computed BOP system PFD (relative to 
failure to close wellbore during a well kick) using fault tree analysis in previous 
reliability of BOP studies have been approximations. 
Zhang, (2015) assessed the BOP system using Bayesian network modelling 
approach. It attempts (to show how a more detailed analysis than those of 
traditional Fault tree analysis can be achieved as multiple states and dependent 
failures can be handled. The availability and reliability of three different BOP 
configurations was compared. The modern BOP (2 AP, 2BSR, 3 PR) was more 
reliable than the DWH (2 AP, 1BSR, 2 PR, 1CSR) and the classical (2 AP, 
1BSR, 3 PR), however overtime, there would be no difference in the reliability of 
the latter two configurations suggesting the absence of one pipe ram Is not fully 
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masked by the inclusion of an additional CSR. The pipe rams contributed more 
to the total system failure than the BSR and the Annular. However, the results 
are dependent on the modelling assumptions and data used or the analysis. It 
was also concluded that critical to availability improvement is an effective repair 
strategy. 
2.9.4 Blowout and BOP System components failure database. 
Several national and international databases with records of drilling operation 
related failures and accidents exist and these include (Godziuk, 2015): 
 Hydrocarbon Release Database (HCR) – United Kingdom;  
 Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) – United Kingdom;  
 Danish Energy Agency (DEA) – Denmark;  
 Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) databases – Norway;  
 Well Control Incident Database (WCID) - International Association of Oil 
and gas Producers (OGP);  
 Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) – Det Norske Veritas - 
Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL).  
 SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database – Norway;  
The SINTEF database is the most comprehensive blowout and BOP component 
failure related database. The BSEE e-Well system- well activity reports (WAR) 
is the main source of information for the study in the unrestricted published 
version of ExproSoft report on Deepwater Subsea BOP Systems Reliability and 
Well kicks (Holand and Awan, 2012). WARs provide well and operational data, 
with an activity summary conducted on the well, which operators submit to 
BSEE. The study entailed data collected systematically from 259 wells spudded 
between 2007- 2009 (all drilled in water depths of greater than 610 m) in the US 
GOM Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). While there was data for when the BOP 
was on the rig, being deployed or pulled up, and when the BOP is on wellhead, 
only the last was considered as the first two were considered as non-safety 
critical failures. Failures considered in the study, for a total in service time of 
15056 BOP-days, were 156 BOP related failures in total. Table 2-3 shows an 
overview of failures and associated data. 
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Table 2-3: Overview of failure and associated data (Holand and Awan, 2012) 
*                  BOP- days refers to number of days spanning from the first time when BOP was latched on the wellhead to when it was pulled from 
wellhead last time. 
 
 In order to provide more context for validity of the above data to be used for 
validation, given the limited source of data and survey period (2007 -2009) for 
data in Table 2-3 , an additional data set (SINTEF Phase II DW data shown in 
Table 2-4) from an earlier study is further considered to follow good practice. 
SINTEF Phase II DW data were collated from wells drilled in the US GOM OCS 
from 1997 and 1998 in water depths ranging from 400 m to 2000 m (Holand and 
Rausand, 1999). However, for this study daily drilling report (DDR) was the 
major source. A detailed description of a well’s drilling activity is what makes up 
a drilling report (which was not accessible to the general public) and thus more 
detailed than WAR. Only DDRs from Operator AP were analysed. Besides the 
survey periods, the difference between the two survey data sets in this section 
is an increased BOP-days in service and an improvement in Mean Time to Fail 
(MTTF) compared to previous studies. Although the level of the average 
downtime per BOP-day for both studies were similar, (Holand and Awan, 2012) 
suggested that that WARs do not contain details of less critical failures which 
would normally result in less downtime. 
While ExproSoft is still pursuing the WellMaster BOP product consisting of 
SINTEF database on offshore blowout and kicks, hopefully in the near future a 
better robust data handbook would be made available. 
 
BOP System Component
BOP-days* 
in Service
Item 
Service 
days
Number 
of 
Failures
Total 
Lost time 
(hrs)
MTTF 
(item in 
service)
MTTF 
(BOP-
days*)
Average 
Downtime 
per failure 
(hrs)
Average 
Downtime 
per BOP- 
day* (hrs)
Annular Preventer 15056 28150 24 2344.5 1173 627 98 0.156
Hydraulic Connector 15056 31142 8 638 3893 1882 80 0.042
Flex/Ball Joint 15056 15056 1 288 15056 15056 288 0.019
Ram Preventer 15056 77264 23 1765.5 3359 3359 77 0.117
Kill and Choke  Valves 15056 160310 4 136 40078 40078 34 0.009
Choke and Kill Lines, all 15056 15056 17 1992 886 886 117 0.132
Main Control System 15056 15056 72 4712 209 209 65 0.313
Dummy item 15056              - 7 1572  - 225 0.104
Total 15056              - 156 13448  - 86 0.893
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Table 2-4: Overview of failure and associated data (Holand and Rausand, 1999) 
 
* BOP- days refers to number of days spanning from the first time when BOP was latched on the 
wellhead to when it was pulled from wellhead last time. 
** For one LMRP connector failure the lost time was not available because the daily drilling reports 
were missing. Two to three days were lost. 
**
* 
For the flexible joint failure 250 hours more time was used to work on stuck pipe/fishing problems 
after the flex joint failure was repaired. This work was most likely a result of the flexible joint 
failure. 
**
** 
The Dummy item in Table x is used to include two BOP failures that were impossible to link to a 
specific BOP item. Both these failures occurred when preparing to run the BOP and were poorly 
described. 
          
In the absence of any other open accessible sources BOP WellMaster data 
source is considered the best case for validation as the widely used OREDA 
database does not contain BOP component failure data. However, for some 
control related items failure data for similar components would be considered 
from the OREDA volume 2, handbook. 
Considering failure criticality, a further failure data set available for some 
specific failure modes is presented in Table 2-5 as the earlier tables data were 
overall component failure (which considered all modes for a particular 
component). Chief source is from the Holand report and a few from the OREDA 
handbook and one from Expert engineering judgement. Also it is important to 
state that only critical failure modes have been considered in terms of a loss of 
well control. 
BOP System Component
BOP-days* 
in Service
Item 
Service 
days
Number 
of 
Failures
Total 
Lost time 
(hrs)
MTTF 
(item in 
service)
MTTF 
(BOP-
days*)
Average 
Downtime 
per failure 
(hrs)
Average 
Downtime 
per BOP- 
day* (hrs)
Annular Preventer 4,009 7,449 12 336.50 621 334 28 0.08
Connector ** 4,009 8,019 10 117.75 802 401 11.8 0.03
Flexible Joint *** 4,009 4,009 1 348.5 4,009 4,009 248.5 0.06
Ram Preventer 4,009 16,193 11 1,505.25 364 364 136.8 0.38
Kill and Choke  Valves 4,009 31,410 13 255.5 308 308 19.7 0.06
Choke and Kill Lines, all 4,009 4,009 8 37 501 501 4.6 0.01
Main Control System 4,009 4,009 60 1,022 67 67 17 0.25
Dummy item **** 4,009 - 2 116  - 2,005 58 0.03
Total 4,009 - 117 3,738  - 34 31.1 0.91
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Table 2-5 : Critical failure data available for some specific component modes 
(Adapted). 
 
*                  BOP- days refers to number of days spanning from the first time when BOP was latched on the wellhead to when it was pulled from 
wellhead last time. 
The BOP control system components were attributed to be cause of 45% of 
failures in the dataset and also associated with the highest downtime of BOP 
subsystems. In addition, while data in (Holand and Awan, 2012) shows a lower 
frequency of failures, a coarse ranking of safety critical failures was presented 
in the study (though based on severity) as follows (in order of criticality 
importance): 
1. One failure causing wellhead connector external leakage 
2. One spurious opening of the LMRP connector (Unknown cause, no 
autoshear in BOP) 
3. One control system failure that caused total loss of the BOP control 
4. One shear ram leakage in closed position 
5. Upper and lower variable bore ram leaked at the same time 
Lower 
Limit
Mean
Upper 
Limit
Annular Preventer Fails to Close 15,056 28,150 1 268.00 0.018 5,934 28,150 548,805 Holand
Annular Preventer Fails to fully Open 15,056 28,150 8 84.00 0.006 1,950 3,519 7,071 Holand
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage 
(leakage through a closed annular)
15,056 28,150 4 712.00 0.047 3,075 7,038 20,603 Holand
Annular Preventer External Leakage - Holand
Wellhead Connector External Leakage 15,056 15,056 1 96 0.006 3,174 15,056 293,528 Holand
Wellhead Connector External Leakage 15,056 15,056 1 96 0.006 3,174 15,056 293,528 Holand
Connector Fails to Lock 15,056 15,056 1 168 0.011 3,174 15,056 293,528 Holand
Connector Fails to Spuriously Unlocks 15,056 15,056 1 24 0.002 3,174 15,056 293,528 Holand
Flexible Joint External Leakage 15,056 15,056 1 288 0.019 3,174 15,056 293,528 Holand
Ram Preventer Fails to Close 15,056 77,264 1 6.00 0.000 16,287 77,264 1,506,318 Holand
Ram Preventer Fails to fully Open 15,056 77,264 1 24.00 0.002 16,287 77,264 1,506,318 Holand
Ram Preventer Internal Leakage 
(leakage through a closed annular)
15,056 77,264 7 660.00 0.044 5,876 11,038 23,516 Holand
Choke and Kill  Valves Internal Leakage 15,056 160,310 1 0 0.000 33,793 160,310 3,125,360 Holand
Choke and Kill  Valves External Leakage - - Holand
Choke and Kill  Valves Fails to Open - - Holand
Choke and Kill  Valves Fails to Close - - Holand
Choke and Kill Lines (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage 15,056 15,056 6 924 0.061 1,271 2,509 5,762 Holand
Choke and Kill Lines (Jumper Hose Line) External Leakage 15,056 15,056 0 0 Holand
Choke and Kill Lines (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage 15,056 15,056 0 0 Holand
Controls- Loss of one function one pod 10,942 6 144 0.013 934 1,824 4,188 Holand
Controls- loss of several functions one pod 10,942 1 0 0.000 2,307 10,942 213,322 Holand
Controls (All modes- Multiplex electrohydraulic) 10,942 28 10,942 0.230 285 391 550 Holand
Solenoid Valve Fails to close 8,403 34 27,778 86,508 4,166,667 OREDA Vol2 Pg.60
Shuttle Valve Failure 4 13,750 Expert Judement
Subsea Loss of Accumulation 1 50,813 277,778 ∞ OREDA Vol2 Pg.60
Hydraulic Tubing Leakage 2,825 10,851 4,166,667 OREDA Vol2 Pg.60
Item 
Service 
days
BOP-
days* in 
Service
BOP System Component
MTTF (days in service)
Data
Source
Average 
Downtime 
per failure 
(hrs)
Total 
Lost 
time 
(hrs)
Number 
of 
Failures
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6. Two incidents, pipe ram failed to close 
7. Nine incidents, loss of all functions one pod 
8. Two incidents, pipe rams leaked in closed position 
9. One flexible joint external leak 
10. One failed to close annular incident 
11. Four incidents, annular preventer leak 
12. Six choke and kill line leaks 
13. Five incidents with loss of one function both pods. 
2.10 BOP Testing and Maintenance 
Given the use of state of art design approach (e.g. Design for excellence), 
industry standards (American Petroleum Institute, API specification 16A) high-
class company standards by Equipment Manufacturers, the products are 
usually fit for purpose upon delivery. Thorough testing and maintenance is 
required as a used system may not perform as the old one –knowing equipment 
that has been in operation (in the field) is associated with most problems and 
not with new ones (Montgomery, 1995). A 7 to14 days window is recommended 
for a function test on the BOP and its controls, although every 7 days is 
recommended by (API STD 53, 2012) and Oil and Gas UK, as operations allow. 
The BOP needs to be pressure tested every 14 to 21 days after use or before 
the day crew is on board (MMS Consents up to 21 days, UK allows 14 days 
only). However, local regulations have to be followed with respect to test 
frequency and duration (HSE, 2015). This informs the need for proper 
procedures and specification to be available for equipment inspection and 
testing by third party maintenance personnel. Also technical information 
should/must be shared by manufacturers as a basic part of a quality 
management system. The quality control process should involve proper 
documenting of changes/modification through the use of inspection and testing 
procedures for consistency and criticality identification. This procedure should 
be living with constant updating and distribution. It should also specify 
acceptance criteria for activities and provide a list of sources for the 
specifications, so personnel can refer to them when required. 
When not in service and in the process of moving from one well to another, 
inspection (visual and dimensional) of the BOP components and operating 
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system can be carried out. Also ram blocks can be greased and protected, 
gaskets, ram packers and rubber seals can be removed. The gaskets and seals 
can be replaced annually. Damaged metal parts can be repaired or replaced. 
Upon completion of the aforementioned and reassembling, testing of the 
operating system and preventers can then be done. 
Preservation is also a recommended practice when the equipment is 
temporarily stored or moved or shipped and in the case of the BOP being 
located onshore pending shipment to offshore location. This requires a 
corrosion protection assurance procedure such as cleaning and painting 
exterior, upon disassembly, application of anti-rust on cavities, use of 
preservative fluid to fill up hydraulic system and plug holes. Proper maintenance 
needs to be carried out as a way of assurance that rams at their rated 
pressures is fit- for- purpose. In between well maintenance, elastomers can be 
re-qualified using specific tests like the drift test for annular and sealing 
characteristic test for ram preventers (O&G UK, 2014). Mckay et al., (2012) 
presented a BOP dashboard development process by simplifying complex BOP 
diagnostics with the goal of having to improve operational decision process in 
assessing risk when critical functions are impaired. Huse and Alme, (2013) 
showed a real time BOP monitoring tool developed to understand the effect of a 
potential failure as it relates to if to halt drilling and pull a BOP for repairs or not. 
Risk Spectrum software was used to build a BOP risk model using integrated 
information from a fault-tree modelling and FMEA workshops with risk and 
subject matter experts. Qualitative risk levels can be monitored on-line and 
actual fault-finding and planning process is enabled. 
 
2.11 Regulatory/Recommended Practice/ Standards 
requirements 
The installation of the Blowout Preventer is a common insurance warranty and a 
normal regulatory requirement for well control related system activities. The 
importance of this mechanical equipment for sealing a well, as a means of well 
control, is seen in the Energy Exploration and development (EED 8/86) 
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definition of “well out of control” for insurance purposes/coverage in United 
States.   
“… a well shall be deemed to be out of control only when there is an unintended 
flow from the well(s) of the drilling fluid, oil, gas, and water above the surface of 
the ground or water bottom, 1. Which flow cannot be: 
Stopped by the use of equipment onsite and/or the blowout preventer, 
storm chokes or other equipment required…” 
The relevance of the BOP is also seen in the EED8/86 only drilling warranty 
statement: 
“It is warranted that where the Assured is the operator or joint operator on any 
insured well being drilled, deepened, serviced, worked over, completed and/or 
reconditioned, a blowout preventer(s) of standard make will, when in 
accordance with all regulations, requirements and normal and customary 
practices in the industry, be set on surface casing or on the wellhead and 
installed and tested in accordance with usual practice”  
Besides this warranty perspective above, generally in different regions, some 
statements or guidelines concerning the BOP system functionality are stated in 
national or regional standards or regulations. The API RP 53 is the 
recommended practices for blowout prevention equipment systems for drilling 
wells, with the last edition being the 3rd and following the Macondo accident, a 
number of amendments are being made a 4th edition. This however has some 
statements or rules which the US Bureau of Safety and Environmental Safety 
(BSEE) may disagree with in every/some context and as such may require 
some consultations before it is released. The Australian regulation (NOPSA) 
expects companies to follow recent industry best practice on the use of 
preventive barriers or alternate accepted standards like the API.  Risk-based 
approach to regulation is adopted rather than a prescriptive one. 
As was evident in the Macondo case, the BSR was not able to shear and seal 
the 51 2⁄
”
  drill strings in compression. This fuelled the obvious requirement for 
 61 
redundancy, given there is only one BSR, one shuttle valve and monitoring of 
the BOP systems using MUX cable not been independent. The need for back-
up systems has heightened given the occurrence of BOP failure events and as 
such there is new interest concerning the extent of regulatory requirements for 
BOP control systems. The US Mineral Management Service (MMS) specifies 
three types of back-up control systems for subsea BOP in use in the Gulf of 
Mexico which includes acoustic, deadman and ROV operated. However in 
Norway, there is a regulatory requirement for the use of back-up control system 
for subsea BOP functions (NORSOK Standard, 2012). In the UK, there is no 
explicit regulatory requirement for the use of acoustic back-up control systems 
for subsea BOP, but the HSE does specify a requirement that suitable 
equipment and procedure be provided to handle drive-off situations for 
dynamically positioned rigs. While in other countries like Brazil and Italy, it is not 
compulsory to have back-up systems with acoustic signal transmissions. So far 
we have seen that despite the occurrence of certain accidents in the time past 
and the call for innovations or review of failures, the BOP design is not without 
limitations and this poses some reliability concerns. This guides the basis for 
regulatory requirements within a prescriptive environment. Some of these 
limitations as identified by Rees (2011) are: 
 The pace of advancement in drilling technology is fast and as such the 
maximum BOP pressure rating is struggling to match up in pace. 
 Frequent full emergency testing of all functions is not considered to be 
practicable. 
 Component failures have come to be seen as random failures, which 
might still occur, while some go unseen/unknown, regardless of BOP 
manufacturers continued research and development. 
 Inability of the BOP to cut through some tubular components e.g. (drill 
string connection) 
The design of the control systems are usually in accordance to specifications of 
certain standards like the API 16D and API 16E. In addition to API RP 53 other 
recognised standards associated with well control systems and BOP System 
and these are all being reviewed incorporating the lessons learnt from the 
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Macondo and Montana incidents. Table 2-6 shows a summary of some 
changes in regulations, standards and policies following the Macondo incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes registered
Discussed standards in this study, as 
revised after Macondo blowout
Earlier 
edition
New edition
API Spec 16A
“Drill through equipment (BOPs)” 2004 Dec. 2012
API Spec 16C “Choke and kill systems”
1993 May, 2013
API Spec 16D
Control systems for drilling well 
control equipment and diverter systems
2004 Jan. 2013
API Std 53 “Recommended Practices for 
Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems 
for Drilling Wells” 1997 Jan.2012
API RP 65-part2 “Isolating potential 
flow zones during well construction” 2002 Dec. 2010
API RP 75 “Recommended Practices for 
a development of safety and 
environmental management for OCS 
operations and facilities”
2004 Apr. 2013
API RP 96 “Deepwater well design 
Considerations”
New Ed.1, Mar. 2013
Norsok D-001 “drilling facilities”.
1998 Ed 3, Dec. 2012
Norsok D-002 “well intervention”
2000
Applicable for 
all wells after 
Jan 1st, 2014
Norsok D-010 “well integrity in drilling 
and well operations” 2004 Rev4, 2013
UK
- The creation of the DHIRG, OSPRAG and WLCPF
- peer review reinforcement of well design assessments and 
rigorous auditing for MODUs
- adoption of minimum, prescriptive safety standards for fail-safe 
devices such as the blowout preventer
- - -
ISO
- Several ISO standards are being updated, and mostly are
- To adopt the outcome of the API work and Norsok standards.
ISO/TC 67 “Materials, equipment and 
offshore structures for petroleum, 
petrochemical and natural gas industries”
The latest 
update 
2009
Majors Changes
Country
USA - New offshore drilling regulation including the Drilling Safety 
Rule, the Workplace Safety Rule, and the requirement of the 
performance – based regulations for all operators in the OCS
- BOEMRE split into 3 institutions: BOEM, BSEE and ONRR
- SEMS regulations that authorize unannounced rig inspections and 
third party audits
Norway - PSA established a project team to follow the DwH accident
- Supervision and other measures which could improve health, 
safety and the environment (HSE) on the Norwegian continental 
shelf (NCS)
- Specification in Norsk D-001 that the mud gas separator (MGS) 
should no longer be connected directly to the diverter system.
- a “safety system” designed to divert any gas in the riser to the 
overboard lines and safely away from the rig
- improved procedures in Norsok D-010 for planning, mixing, 
pumping and qualification of cement as a primary barrier
- MOC procedure covering the well life cycle should be included in 
the operator’s management system steering documentation
- Requirement in Norsok D-Z013 of a quantitative analysis to 
establish and/or tone required performance standards for all 
relevant barriers
Norsok Z-013 “Risk and emergency 
preparedness assessment”
2010 Ed. 3, Oct. 2010
Table 2-6: A summary of changes in policies, regulations and standards following 
Macondo blowout 
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Surprisingly for some BOP system components, there exists no industry 
standard. The shearing capability of the ram is not guided by any form of 
standard which is currently being addressed by amendments in new regulations 
and standards. See the recent BSEE final ruling on well control for updates 
(Reference). It is worth mentioning that besides the use of regulatory 
requirements or specification for design and operation of critical components 
like the BOP, if available, that of company or equipment manufacturers based 
on best engineering judgement is used. 
2.12 Current Reliability concerns and Improvement Strategies  
According to (Huse and Alme, 2013; Sattler, 2013) some of the concerns of 
interest associated with the BOP are:  
 Identification  of the non-critical and critical components, their failures, 
effects and mitigation factors 
 Reliability of the BOP system and function 
 Components and systems Redundancy capabilities and stack 
configuration 
 Management of change 
 Hydraulic control systems leak 
 Advance maintenance systems and philosophies 
 Integrity of the system as a whole 
 Regulatory/ Industry minimum requirements 
Recommendations made in (Holand, 2011) concerning the BOP control 
systems and the independency of the pods includes: 
 Each pod should have a separate hydraulic line 
 The pods should have as little as possible communication and for 
instances where a communication is required, it should be ensured that 
possibilities for isolation be available 
 A case of the control of both pods being ruined by a single subsea failure 
should be avoided 
In McCarthy (2012), considerations regarding design requirements for new BOP 
were presented for assurance in their use. This includes: 
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 The need for operators understanding on the use of BOP- this entailed 
how, when and their ability to execute such task when under pressure. 
This requires unambiguous procedure. 
 Drilling operation be put to a stop following a faulted BOP.  
 The need for expert system decision aids and instrumentation for timely 
warning of a loss of well control to enable quick and effective action prior 
to rig’s safety system. 
There are some BOP system components or aspects that there exists no 
industry standard for example, the shearing capability of the ram is not guided 
by any form of standard which is currently being addressed by amendments in 
new regulations and standards.  
Another interesting dimension is the concern of challenge offered by new drilling 
limits and technology capabilities. Currently there are a number of technologies 
developed to address associated drilling industry difficulties such as 
deepwater/greater water depths, hurricane/typhoon, remote Areas (e.g. Artic 
Cycle <-40 to -60 deg. C), managed pressure, geothermal conditions, 
underbalanced drilling challenges (Lobo, F., 2010). This presents reliability 
concerns such as the maximum working pressure of the BOP’s is normally 
1500psi with a 10000 ft. limit water depth. However, a new generation BOP with 
a 20,000 psi working pressure has been unveiled with main components 
designed, built and qualified by testing (see (Shanks et al., 2012)). Figure 2-15 
depicts the operating conditions for BOP components and Limitations offered by 
HPHT Environments while global HPHT fields have been categorized to show 
the current BOP limits and future challenge in Appendix A.2.8 
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Figure 2-15: Operating conditions for BOP components and Limitations 
offered by HPHT Environments (Lobo, 2010) 
 
 
2.13 Risk and Reliability Analysis- Recap of its Application to 
the BOP system  
In all systems and products developed, an acceptable well-known inevitable 
phenomenon is failure, hence the need to understand why, how, and when they 
seize to meet required functions. (ISO 20815, 2010) defined failure “as the 
termination of an item’s ability to perform a required function”. It further 
emphasis that failure is an event, differentiating it from fault which is a state of 
item after failure. (Del Frate et al., 2011) defined failure as the inability of an 
engineered system, product or service to meet design team’s goal for which it 
has been developed. There are several variations in the definition of failure 
(event or goal-oriented, state or condition) for greater detail see (Del Frate, 
2014). These potential failures could introduce hazards to system, individuals 
and the environment or constitute a loss and, whatever the perception is, they 
may constitute undesired events and thus seen as a risk. When hazards are 
categorised according to their potential impact, given their inherent operational 
nature, and associated loss form and what they impact, it can benefit risk 
analysis (Tweeddale, 2003). The range of hazards associated with offshore 
industry are categorised as follows (API 14J, 2007) : 
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 Blowouts  
 Process leaks 
 Riser/pipeline leaks 
 Non-process fires 
 Non-process spills 
 Structural collisions 
 Diving Accidents 
 Marine collisions 
 Marine events 
 Transport Accident 
 Construction accidents 
 Personal (or occupational) 
accidents 
 Attendant Vessel Accidents  
 
These possible failures are potential hazards sources which could impact the 
facilities, personnel and affect marine environment. Hence an understanding of 
their nature (e.g. inherent risk) is important (MacCollum, 2007). In the decades 
of existence of the offshore industry, several major accidents have been 
witnessed, some of which were with catastrophic consequence. Records of 
these incidents in general have been recorded (see (Cheremisinoff and 
Davletshin, 2010; Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012) and well control/BOP 
related incidents presented in chapter 1. Also, there is a rapid expansion in the 
offshore industry in terms of developments with the recent paradigm shift 
towards deep and ultra-deep waters, introducing more complexity and new 
challenges. These challenges present risks and also technology improvement 
efforts to close their gaps could also present new risk (as there is no experience 
with them). To enhance the overall understanding of the process conditions and 
design of critical technologies, operating modes and failures of equipment, 
structural condition and deterioration mechanisms, procedures and critical 
components/regions, risk analysis techniques are utilised. This in turn can 
inform a justification and plan for targeted risk reduction and even reliability 
improvement for specific new technologies and critical aspects of existing 
technologies. 
Risk associated with equipment has a direct influence on equipment operational 
reliability and uptime. Considering risk as a combination of two factors the 
frequency of an event occurring and its consequence (e.g. cost), if it occurs 
gives an insight. This suggests two possible risk reduction perspectives by way 
of consequence reduction (focuses on defect fixing, ease of executing 
maintenance, accepts failure and reacts to them) and reducing frequency of 
occurrence or reducing the probability or chance, thus number of failures 
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(preventive and proactive).  Reliability is defined as “the ability of an item to 
perform a required function without failure under stated conditions for a stated 
period of time” and as such the opposite of chance of failure -risk (Rausand and 
Høyland, 2004). Accordingly, addressing equipment risk informs/prioritises 
required reliability improvements hence most risk analysis techniques are also 
considered or used for reliability studies.  
Risk analysis is a process that involves the identification, assessment, risk 
management with monitoring and reviewing, and communication of the risk 
picture (Figure 2-1 shows a schematic of the process). However the context or 
basis of the assessment and the system description with specified boundaries 
has to be pre-defined or agreed before the initiation of the process. The risk 
management stage entails control by the reduction of risk to an acceptable 
level, or risk avoidance or prevention (depending on chosen alternative), the 
documentation, implementation and administering, and financing of the process 
and chosen alternatives. It can be seen that risk assessment is only an integral 
part of risk analysis which is a lifecycle activity. Hence some of the output 
documents of risk analysis are living documents that are constantly updated 
following the progress in the development stage and when modifications in 
designs and/or to the operation mode are made. 
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Figure 2-16 Risk Analysis Process Framework (Adapted from ABS, 2000) 
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There are a number of techniques being used in risk analysis to assess 
systems/products and events under certain conditions and following a failure, 
such as the failure modes effect and criticality analysis (FMEA/FMECA), and 
Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP). The wide use and gains of risk 
assessment cannot be over emphasised. While some developed techniques 
and approaches have been established, with new conceptual frameworks or 
variations considered the suitability to some bespoke need/event, it is still with 
some challenges which stems from its foundation as a science (Aven and Zio, 
2012). 
Risk assessment has seen many applications in the offshore industry and has 
come to stay as a veritable element for the cost effective and efficient way of 
assuring safety in the selection, design, use of different concept and systems as 
well interaction(s) amongst them. Scenarios of various stages in projects, 
equipment or system design and associated operational programs/applications 
have been reviewed (see Appendix E) with a view of inherent or introduced 
hazards/failures that poses risks in meeting defined objectives. Techniques 
used to assesses these risks and their benefits and limitation have also been 
highlighted. We have also seen the role played by experts and also the case of 
incomplete/ unavailable data or knowledge in the course of these assessments. 
The general knowledge of components or systems can be improved with 
knowledge of their failure phenomena (while some of these failure modes are 
known, others are not.), scenarios and improved standardisation of products 
and methods. Application of FMEA has been established in the offshore, 
marine, subsea industry as well. This is not surprising as the FMEA/FMECA 
technique has shown to be very useful as it is repeatable and applicable to 
concepts, detailed options and solution to validate requirements at higher level. 
While FMEA is a risk assessment techniques, it is also a reliability assessment 
technique, given the relationship between risk from failure and reliability. 
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2.14 Failure Modes Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)  
The rapid development of technologies with increasing complexity following 
tight constraints from the stakeholders’ requirements and usage of the 
environment has received extensive interest in the assessment of failure 
occurrence likelihood in engineered equipment. The effects of these failures are 
diverse and can be associated with catastrophic consequences, necessitating 
for a tool to allow understanding of the cause and consequences and prioritizing 
critical aspects requiring more attention or resources. The development of 
FMEA technique stemmed from the need for a reassurance that a systematic 
review of system failures have been carried out to understand their causes, 
effects and associated risk (Mohr, 2002). The Failure Mode Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) is that tool for identifying failure modes proactively and provides a basis 
for continuous improvement actions. In a system reliability study, the first step 
involves an FMEA as a qualitative analysis technique at a design stage of a 
project. It has been useful for reviewing safety critical systems to identify 
possible problems. This FMEA technique which is now relevant to most 
reliability engineers in many high consequence industries, i.e. food services 
(Sperber and Stier, 2009; Bertolini et al., 2004) and the medical industry (Shebl 
et al., 2012; Franklin et al., 2012; Vélez-Díaz-Pallarés et al., 2013; Thornton et 
al., 2011) attempts to addresses concepts that can impact on reliability 
improvement or realising set reliability goals and requirements. The current 
drive of exploiting reserves in greater water depths and in the artic regions 
presents new challenges and risks. Thus risk contributing factors need be 
understood by oil and gas activities-chain equipment/system manufacturers, in 
the course of product development to operations and monitoring. These factors 
can be addressed by an effective technique like the FMEA (Tiku et al., 2005); 
(Robert and Laing, 2002). To understand this technique, certain basic concepts 
are defined as follows (Carlson, 2012): 
a. Function and Failure: A function is the basic intended function of a 
component or process, typically to a given standard or requirement. An 
item could have several functions and a verbal-noun format is used to 
 70 
describe these functions. Failure is a state of not functioning or working. 
It could also be complete or partial seizure of functioning state. 
b. Failure modes: These are defects or errors in a component, process or 
design that affect the customers. This is also defined as the manner in 
which a component or operation fails in meeting or delivering intended 
functions or associated requirements. This may be presented in different 
forms namely: complete failure, inadequate delivery of function or poor 
performance, intermittent performance, spurious and or performing an 
undesired function. 
c. Mechanism and Cause: Mechanism is the process through which 
stresses (chemical, mechanical, electrical or physical) individually or in 
combination induce failure. The causes are the original stress types that 
initiates the failure which could be design, process or quality defect and 
even human related. Potential failure causes such as high temperature, 
relative humidity, thermal cycling, and sudden vibration can result to 
failure mechanism (e.g. corrosion, wear, fatigue, etc.) at component 
level. 
d. Effect and Severity: The failure’s consequence on the environment, end-
user, or system is known as the effect. There can be one or more levels 
of the effects in terms of description (e.g. local or global effect) or in 
terms of stage/phase based on the type of FMEA (e.g. assembly or 
manufacture level).  Severity is a measure of the effect for a given failure 
mode. This relative ranking within FMEA scope is ascribed without 
regard to the probability of occurrence of how considered failure mode 
can be detected. 
e.  Controls: This is a technique use to remove or reduce the risk of a 
potential cause of failure. These controls can be either preventive or 
corrective based on planned or recent actions. They are intended to 
reduce the probability of occurrence and increase the probability of these 
failures being detected respectively. 
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Once the failure modes and their effects have been identified, a criticality 
ranking can be carried out. When a criticality ranking is involved, the analysis is 
known as a failure modes and effects criticality analysis (FMECA), thus FMEA 
and FMECA should not be used interchangeably.  The criticality ranking can be 
qualitative or quantitative, depending on the requirement of the client and/or 
data available. The qualitative criticality analysis utilises descriptive groupings 
for the severity and failure likelihoods (refer to US Military 1998). Risk 
associated with identified potential failure modes or problems during the 
analysis can be evaluated using the Risk Priority Numbers or criticality analysis 
methods (Riplova, 2007). 
 Risk Priority Number: This entails the assigning of a value or rating 
(based on a defined scale of e.g. 1- 10) to the severity of each failure 
effect, likelihood of occurrence and likelihood of prior detection of each 
failure cause. Then the product of the three values gives the RPN as 
shown in Equation 2.2 
RPN = Severity x Occurrence x Detection 2.2 
The RPN can thus be used for ranking or comparing the failure modes to inform 
maintenance actions. Thus the RPN reflects the weightiness of the potential 
risks or failure mode critical to systems safety, reliability and robustness of the 
process. 
 Criticality Number: This implies computing criticality number (𝐶), used to 
depict the risk levels of failure modes, described in MIL-STD-1629A- 
“Procedures for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis”. Equation 2.3 shows how the criticality number for a specific 
failure mode (𝑖) is obtained. 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖  . 𝛽𝑖. 𝜆𝑐. 𝑡  2.3 
Where 𝛽  is the probability of the failure effect, 𝛼  failure mode ratio, at an 
operating time, 𝑡 and component failure rate 𝜆 .  
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2.14.1 Advantages and Drawback of the FMEA/FMECA 
Inherently, the design of the FMEA/FMECA methodology is structured to 
provide a documentation of identified failure modes, failure mechanisms, and 
their associated risk designed into a product or process. This risk can then be 
prioritized and followed up. In the light of these outcomes there are a number of 
benefits. The FMEA process can reveal weaknesses in the system design 
(revealed by designers) that were not obvious. This structured process can 
provide a rough picture of classes of system effects following failures. Thus 
informs requirements and criteria for planning and carrying-out testing, planning 
maintenance, reliability growth and other associated actions. Development of 
procedures and controls for monitoring, fault –detection, trouble-shooting could 
also benefit from the output of FMECA. Risk and resource minimisation and 
over designing efforts as a way of mitigation actions can be spotted and 
addressed collectively. Most important of all benefits is that the FMEA/FMECA 
process serves as more rigorous design review process, with less bias if well-
facilitated and output actions taken. The benefits are varied for the lifecycle of 
the product or process, e.g. at the early stage of product development, as cost 
of resolving improvements following an advance failure mode recognition, low 
cost savings could be achieved (Dunkle, 2005). Other benefits as identified in 
Mohr (2002) are its use to complement Preliminary hazard Analysis given 
corresponding hazards, ensuing from failures identified during the FMEA, can 
be updated to the Preliminary hazard List or Analysis, if they have not been 
previously registered. 
Despite the pros of FMEAs mentioned above orienting about its ability to 
evaluate and inform product integrity improvements, it is not without limitations. 
The most obvious drawback is the implementation of the FMEA process can be 
cumbersome and onerous, as conclusions for each failure mode has to be 
reached. Also system dependencies are usually not accounted for in FMEA 
analysis (Franceschini and Galetto, 2001; Lipol and Haq, 2011). Another 
disadvantage of the FMEA is handling the occurrence of a double jeopardy 
(multiple failures) or a case of the occurrence of a complex failure modes 
resulting from multiple failures, FMEA Is not able to uncover it directly. An 
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important issue of concern is why the beneficiary needs such analysis (scope of 
the analysis) and how the analysis outcome would be utilised. It is important to 
understand the rationale, as FMEA/FMECA requires enormous effort and 
resources, if it is safety need driven or altruistic (Mohr, 2002). Also given that 
system vulnerability to single point failures (SPFs) are identified by this 
technique an obsessive fear for SPFs can be created by a facility holder and 
thus directs attention to critical failure mode/component lists and 
implementation of redundancy. This misdirected fear could shift focus on other 
possible threats to systems’ demand/functionality. FMEA/FMECA requires a 
multidisciplinary team to provide better coverage, which could be challenging to 
assemble subject experts at a spot, especially in dealing with complex 
equipment. The exposure and experience of the committee members involved 
in the FMEA workshop determines the quality of the output. The complexity of 
the problem (system and failures) is a determinant for difficulty or rigorousness 
of the approach (from an implementation perspective) and thus the number of 
experts in the FMEA team can vary (Scipioni et al., 2002). 
Different group of personnel can carry out an FMECA on the components of a 
particular system and identify failure modes with a small degree of similarity. 
Only three factors are considered by the RPN and they are essentially safety 
related. While it avoids relative importance of the three factors, given they are 
assigned same importance, which is not always the case practically; there are 
concerns of subjectivity with the FMECA technique in representing associated 
risk from identified failure modes. The computed RPNs for the overlapping 
failure modes might be causing a different failure mode prioritization, suggesting 
the need for further analysis and verification.  Similarly rank reversals may 
occur, and failure modes differently ranked. 
Also different failure modes identified in an FMECA study may have the same 
RPN, from different set of scores assigned to severity, occurrence and 
detection, of which their individual risk implication may also be different (Pillay 
and Wang, 2003). This means failure modes with similar RPN values, could 
have different impact on the system. Also a failure mode that would in reality be 
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considered more critical (e.g. from a severity perspective) than another could 
have a lesser RPN and consequently a lower rank. This is as a result of ordinal 
scale numbers used for the ranking that only interprets one failure mode to be 
worse or better than the other, and does not say to what extent. Thus as a 
standing rule, regardless of the demarcation for criticality of failure modes, 
failure modes with high severity would always be addressed or looked-up for 
corrective actions (Gouyet et al., 2011) & (Carlson, 2012). In addition to the 
already mentioned shortcomings, (Liu et al., 2013) also observed that while the 
precise evaluation of the three risk factors is difficult (Liu et al., (2011); Liu et al., 
2012; Yang, J., Huang, H.-Z., He, L.-P., Zhu, S.-P., Wen, D., (2011)) the RPN 
mathematical representation is questionable (Kutlu and Ekmekçioǧlu, 2012; 
Gargama, H., Chaturvedi, S.K., (2011)) and sensitive to risk factor computations 
variations (Chin et al., 2009). 
 
2.15 Application of MCDA to Risk Analysis/FMECA 
The benefits of the integration of Multi-criteria decision-making analysis (MCDA) 
technique to risk analysis can be extended to address the gaps or weakness 
identified with the FMECA process and outcome. Several studies have 
highlighted the gains of integrating multi-criteria decision making techniques 
to/for risk analysis for/towards an improved decision making  (Georgekutty et 
al., 2012; Heller, 2005). One of such gains is the presentation of an evaluation 
with preferences for combined risk and benefit as against traditional balance of 
risk. (Catrinu, 2010) states that the integration of these two approaches is 
promising as it provides a good understanding of the problem and the 
contributions of judgements made by decision makers. While this integrated 
approach is not a replacement for the traditional techniques, it suggests 
opportunities for an improved analysis and even more conservative approach in 
the analysis (Georgekutty et al., 2012). The five categories were popular MCDM 
(e.g. AHP, TOPSIS), artificial intelligence (e.g. Rule based and Fuzzy rule 
based), mathematical programming (e.g. DEA), integrated (e.g. TOPSIS Grey 
theory, Fuzzy AHP-fuzzy TOPSIS) and other approaches (e.g. Cost based 
model, Quality function deployment, minimal cut sets theory).   
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To obtain an informed and realistic ranking of system associated risks (a 
criticality order for identified risks-failure modes), MCDA applications can entail 
using multiple criteria (rather than 3 in conventional FMECA) and a particular 
MCDA analysis, or strictly prioritising failure modes identified from an FMECA. 
This creates room for other factors with varied level of importance to be 
considered, and also a targeted use of expert elicitation to rank the risks. More 
specific analysis based on a hierarchy of criteria (failure driving factors or/and 
cause) can be applied to a select failure mode of interest. Another dimension to 
this is the use of fuzzy set representation of expert information or available data 
set type for weights of criteria (for conventional 3 criteria FMECA or more than 
three criteria) for each failure mode. 
 
2.16 Summary 
The role of the drilling activity is pivotal to the success of the offshore oil and 
gas industry and characterised with lots of risk, which includes blowout, and 
uncertainty compounded by harsh environment and increasing water depth. The 
subsea blowout preventer identified to be the last line of defence for preventing 
blowouts has been associated with failures, incidents, uncertainties associated 
with its functionality. This informs the need to assess the failure risk using a 
structured framework to better understand its criticality. Academic interests 
have attempted to use Bayesian and Markov chain techniques for reliability 
analysis with very obvious outcomes. There has also been an attempt to 
improve the estimation of probability of failure on demand as seen in (Klakegg, 
2012) with a couple of works on the fault tree analysis model of the BOP system 
and functions. The control system failure modes have been identified to offer 
the greatest contributions to the BOP system unreliability. Critical components 
and failure modes have also been identified from these works with concerns 
identified and improvement options suggested aftermath of the Macondo 
incident such as shift in attention to the shearing ram (specification and 
performance) and need for redundant ram to improve redundancy. 
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The aforesaid shows that there is a dire need for a robust and accurate 
approach for estimating reliability of the BOP system as much as understanding 
the system failures and their criticality; given some dangerous failures may go 
undetected during functional testing. 
The main previous works on BOP system entailed operational failure data 
analysis, fault tree analysis and the FMEA/FMECA. It is established that while 
there are several risk and reliability techniques which complement the 
attainment of goals (e.g. reliability target or risk acceptance goals), the FMECA 
has been seen to be very central in the activities cycle and its outcome feeds 
into design improvement, supports other analysis techniques (e.g. FTA), 
planning for mitigations and other general management decisions. This informs 
the aim of this work to apply another dimension in understanding BOP system 
failures criticality and their criticality importance to inform reliability level 
improvement decisions. This new approach would be stemmed on 
understanding the BOP system criticality, based on a fundamental FMECA 
outcome and then applying multi-criteria analysis techniques to assess the 
different failure modes against a set of defined criteria. 
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3 Multi Criteria Decision Analysis Methodology 
A multi criteria decision analysis is a decision support technique for assessing 
risks and their consequences with respect to different factors. This approach 
does its evaluation of consequence or failure risk or alternatives using the 
different attributes features independently rather than transforming all into 
comparable units (e.g. monetary units as in a cost benefit analysis). 
There are different associated criteria and/or dimensions of decision support 
problems which includes number of goal (single or multiple), decision maker 
type, problem structure (well-structured or ill-structured), problem character 
(threat, or opportunity, design or choice) and degree of difficulty (simple or 
complex), and ease of consequence prediction (Grunig and Kuhn, 2013). The 
two major classes of decision making problems in decision science are namely 
the multi-objective decision making (MODM) and multi criteria decision making 
(MCDM). The existence of a predetermined alternative is what constitutes the 
major difference, which is absent in the former as it constitutes mostly 
optimization problems with several objective functions to satisfy (Yoon and 
Hwang, 1995). The MCDM is also known as Multi attribute decision making 
(MADM) or multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). While there have been 
attempts to distinguish between MCDA and MCDM, the former being developed 
by Americans and later by European schools, in this thesis, they are used 
interchangeably. Managers and decision makers are faced with a number of 
challenges ranging from effective use of resources in projects, from concept 
defining phase to managing assets phase, to making concrete decision on tasks 
such as assessment, prioritization or even selection amidst constraints (Dashti 
et al., 2010).  
These challenges often entail making preference decisions relative to multiple 
criteria/information which often are conflicting and subject to varying forms of 
uncertainty and risk. Expert opinions and best engineering judgements are 
integrated in these decision problems, thus requiring a systematic framework for 
representation of all information (Bolar, et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2011). A 
chance is thus given to the decision maker by the MCDM techniques to better 
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structure the decision making process such that all information that are relevant 
and available are utilised and integrated in obtaining the preference order of the 
alternatives (Koele, 1997). MCDM have been used in solving many real world 
problems such as risk and safety analysis of systems and products (e.g. 
Offshore structures, Airport Sea port, Nuclear Plant, Container ship, and Roll-on 
Roll-off ferry problems) (Kabir et al., 2014; Alias et al., 2008).  
A model for MCDM execution as shown in Figure 3-1 is described before the 
different techniques are discussed.  The MCDM process typically arises with a 
decision issue of concern, necessitating a thorough investigation and change 
with an obvious need for a preference. The next stage is about structuring the 
problem: defining the problem, choose the attributes/criteria to measure the 
objectives, and alternatives are specified.  
 
Figure 3-1: Multi Criteria decision Analysis Model (Yang, 2008). 
A model is built for estimating the parameters and scales defined for measuring 
the criterion scales in comparable units. Weights are assigned to the 
attribute/criteria to reproduce their relative importance.  A mathematical 
algorithm for ranking alternatives is selected and applied, and then an 
alternative is chosen. However, in the presence of some sort of superior detail, 
external preference can be applied at the investigative and problem structuring 
stage or even in the final decision level. There are different situations in which 
the goal of making a decision is required, thus “different kind of decisions”.  The 
objective of the decision could be a case of ranking or risk prioritization and 
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make a comparison of alternatives decision, a selection of a single alternative 
decision, or even to assess extent of contributing factor to the objective based 
on certain defined criteria. A reflection of performance in meeting the set 
objective must be seen in the chosen criteria (Saaty and Vargas, 2006). 
For a set of feasible alternative, the best alternative can be obtained using the 
MCDM procedure. A matrix format for representing the MCDM problem is 
shown as follows, for a case of 𝑚 alternatives (𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3,  …,  𝐴𝑚)  and 𝑛 criteria 
𝐶1,  𝐶2,  𝐶3,  …,𝐶𝑛) (Zeleny, 1982): 
                    
𝑤1    𝑤2  . . .  𝑤𝑛
𝐶1     𝐶2 . . .  𝐶𝑛
 
              𝑀 = [
𝐴1
𝐴2
…
𝐴𝑛
] [
 𝑥11  𝑥12 …  𝑥1𝑛
 𝑥21  𝑥22 …  𝑥1𝑛
… … … . . .
 𝑥𝑚1  𝑥𝑚2 …  𝑥𝑚𝑛
] 
 
3.1 
Where the performance rating of an alternative, 𝐴𝑖   under criterion 𝐶𝑗   is denoted 
as 𝑥𝑖𝑗 and the weight of criterion 𝐶𝑗 is 𝑤𝑗.  
While often decision making is seen as an outcome, (Zeleny, 2008) postulates 
that it is the selection and determination of criteria and alternatives, through 
information collection, evaluation and processing to result in a measurable 
action. These intermediate steps that are interrelated are repeated until the 
results is actionable, i.e. a decision is reached. 
Once the criteria are chosen, they must be assessed using a set of qualities 
(Dodgson et al., 2009): 
 Completeness: this entails all possible criteria would have been 
considered and that capture vital aspects of the objectives sought 
through MCDM 
 Redundancy: this entails ensuring that no redundant or similar criteria 
have been chosen 
 Operability: the criteria should be explicit enough and applicable to the 
alternatives relative to the objective. Also clearly the weight or scale of 
measurement should be commonly shared amongst the criteria. 
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 Mutual Independence: the chosen criteria should be independent, 
meaning a decision maker should be able to allocate a score or weight to 
a criterion without consideration for the score for other criteria. 
However some MCDM techniques do have unique features that can assess 
related criteria as long as definitions can be provided for weights to be provided 
independently. From earlier discussion it can be deduced that elicited 
preference information or weights can be obtained by direct assignment, 
Eigenvector approach. Other approach includes the entropy method, Kano’s 
model, distance-target model, and Simple Multi Attribute Rating Technique 
(SMART).  
3.1 Decision makers Scores and Normalisation techniques in 
MCDA 
The essence of the normalisation is to transform the different dimensional 
attributes to non-dimensional attributes to permit comparison across criteria. 
There are different approaches, which are presented below (Yoon and Hwang, 
1995): 
3.1.1 Vector normalisation 
(a) Weights are transformed to comparable scales using Equation 3.2. 
𝑟𝑖𝑗  = 
𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
2𝑚
𝑖
,   𝑖 =  1, … ,𝑚;   𝑗 =  1, … , 𝑛 
  3.2 
 
(b) When considering attributes as either benefit (positive) or cost 
(negative), a similar form of normalisation to be used is shown below: 
𝑟𝑖𝑗  =
{
 
 
 
                   
𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
2𝑚
𝑖
,               𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 
1 𝑥𝑖𝑗⁄
1 √(∑ (1 𝑥𝑖𝑗⁄ )
2𝑚
𝑖=1 )⁄
 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑥𝑖𝑗 ,   𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒
 
3.3 
3.1.2 Linear normalisation 
There are different types of linear normalisation which can be in the 
representations in Equation 3.4 to Equation 3.6 as follows: 
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𝑟𝑖𝑗  = 
𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖
 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚  ; 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚        3.4 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑗 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑗
^
 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚  ; 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚  ; 𝑥𝑗
^ = max
𝑖
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 
𝑥𝑗
~
𝑥𝑖𝑗
 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚  ; 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚  ; 𝑥𝑗
~ = min
𝑖
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑥𝑖𝑗 ,   𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒
 
 
 3.5 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑗= {      
      
𝑥𝑖𝑗−𝑥𝑗
~
𝑥𝑗
^−𝑥𝑗
~   , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠
𝑥𝑗
^− 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑗
^−𝑥𝑗
~   , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠
 
 
      3.6 
 
Regarding decision makers score of importance on criteria an indirect means of 
obtaining such weights is presented in the next section. 
3.1.3 Entropy Method (Pomerol, J. 2000) 
The weights, 𝑤𝑗  , of the criteria 𝑗, to be used for a multi criteria analysis can be 
obtained indirectly, as opposed to the traditional notion of asking decision 
makers for weights of importance ascribed to the criteria. This method is 
founded on the belief that a criterion’s importance is a direct function of the 
information it conveys relative to the set of alternatives (failure modes).  The 
entropy method takes out the decision maker’s subjectivity in weights 
determination and can address a scenario of conflicting evaluations of criteria 
weight. Also in the event the outcomes are unreal, then a decision maker can 
be consulted to improve the weights by a factor. The entropy method is 
described as follows: 
 An estimate value 𝑒𝑖𝑗  is obtained by normalising the decision matrix for 
each alternative 
𝑒𝑖𝑗  = 
𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.7 
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Where 𝑖 ∈ {1,… ,𝑚}, 𝑗  ∈  {1, … , 𝑛},  and 𝑥𝑖𝑗  represents valuation of an 
alternative 𝑖, relative to criterion 𝑗. 
 The Entropy of each criterion is evaluated using the equation below, with 
𝑘 = 1 ln (𝑚)⁄  
𝐸𝑛𝑗 = −𝑘∑𝑝𝑖𝑗ln (
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖𝑗) 3.8 
 
 Measure of Dispersion 𝑀𝐷𝑗   of the intrinsic information for each criterion 
can be obtained from Equation 3.9. It entails the inherent contrast 
intensity of a criterion, and a higher value will mean the criterion is of 
more importance to the problem. 
𝑀𝐷𝑗 = 1 − 𝐸𝑛𝑗 
 
3.9 
 
 The objective weight, 𝑤𝑗  , of each attribute can be obtained using the 
Equation 3.10 below: 
𝑤𝑗  = 
𝑀𝐷𝑗
∑ 𝑀𝐷𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.10 
 
In the following sub-section different MCDM approaches of interest will be 
discussed briefly with some elaboration where needed.  
3.2 Brief Review of Different MCDA techniques 
There are several techniques proposed to solve the MCDM problems, which 
have been applied in a variety of fields.  These MCDM methods have been 
classified in diverse ways by different researchers based on theory, method, 
approaches etc. and no consistency has been identified in the grouping, given 
some are extended forms of others. Based on the type of the alternatives being 
evaluated, the MCDM methods were categorised into continuous (i.e. identified 
optimal value can vary infinitely- Linear Programming, goal programming and 
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aspiration based models) and discrete (those with a finite number of 
alternatives, given a set of objectives and criteria) (Janssen, 1992; Ananda and 
Herath, 2009). (Nijkamp et al., 1990) further classified the discrete methods into 
weighting and ranking methods.  
These methods could be qualitative (uses ordinal scales), quantitative (cardinal 
or ratio scales) and mixed methods (Ananda and Herath, 2009). The application 
of the last class is dependent on accessible data type. (Wang et al., 2009) 
identified the different multi criteria decision making methods into elementary 
methods (e.g. weighted sum and weighed product methods), Unique 
synthesizing criteria methods (e.g. Analytical hierarchy process-AHP, 
Technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution- TOPSIS, Grey 
relation methods and integrated approaches such as MCDA combined with 
fuzzy method) and outranking methods e.g. (Elimination et choice translating 
reality- ELECTRE and Preference ranking organization method for enrichment 
evaluation-PROMETHEE). MCDA have been classified into compensatory 
(AHP, TOPSIS, PROMETHEE, Multi Attribute Utility Theory, Expected Utility 
Theory, Simple and multiplicative weighting methods) and Non compensatory 
methods such as Dominance, Elimination by expert, Conjunctive and 
Disjunctive, Maximin, Maximax and ELECTRE methods. Non-compensatory 
methods are considered simple and do not allow trade-off amongst criteria and 
the contrary is the case of compensatory method. These techniques have been 
approached from either a probabilistic or deterministic or fuzzy approach. While 
it is not intended to review all of the different MCDMs, a general description of 
the techniques of interest and where necessary greater detail is presented. 
Also, given the main focus in this work is on the application of selected 
techniques for ranking alternatives, of which in this work- it is for the 
improvement of rankings of failure modes provided by the FMEA, thus a 
concise review will be presented later on the application of these techniques to 
improve FMECA RPN ranking outcome. 
While MCDA is useful, its limitations besides availability of data and competent 
decision makers, includes conflicting rankings of the alternatives can be 
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generated by the various MCDA models for a common set of decision matrix 
even under states of certainty, difficulty faced by analyst in selecting appropriate 
technique and also interpreting the results appropriately (Coman and Ronen, 
2009; Kujawski, 2003). Decision makers may consider the process to be clumsy 
and time-consuming or drawn to focus more on the process than how justified 
the outcome is (Zeleny, 2008). However the decision maker’s ability to facilitate 
the application of the approach effectively without turning into specialists in the 
techniques is what constitutes a success in the use of MCDM technique. 
3.2.1 The technique for order of Preference for similarity to the Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS) 
TOPSIS was developed by Huang and Yoon (1981) and has become a widely 
used MCDA technique to select the best alternative given a finite number of 
criteria. Its original structure is drawn on the shortest distance of a compromise 
solution from a displaced ideal solution.  The best alternative is known to have 
the shortest distance from the positive ideal solution and the farthest distance 
from the negative ideal solution.  
Problems with multiple alternatives and multiple criteria have been analysed 
and solved using TOPSIS, via alternatives comparisons and rankings. The 
alternative rankings are cardinal and attribute preferences do not need to be 
independent (Yoon and Hwang, 1995).  Its applicability is based on values of 
attributes with commensurable units and that are monotonically decreasing or 
increasing. Euclidean distance metric is used for obtaining the separation fro 
the ideal solution. The logic in TOPSIS is sound as it denotes basis for human 
choice. Also its practicality with computer support by way of easy computation 
process makes it a preferable technique for handling problems MCDA 
(Behzadian, M. et al., 2012; Kim G. et al, 2009.).  
The variations in the TOPSIS extension or proposed modified models have 
been effected in varying the defining rationale or/and computation for the 
distance from the ideal positive and negative solutions, the input data 
representation and handling, weights generation techniques, and also of 
interest is in relation to the calculation of the relative closeness coefficient. The 
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successful application of the TOPSIS method for solving diverse nature of real 
world problems multi criteria problems, given the advantages mentioned has 
been demonstrated by a State of the Art review by Behzadian, M. et al., (2012). 
The traditional approach of this technique can be administered in eight simple 
steps (described in Equation 3-11 to Equation 3-19). While the extensions 
comprise variants of some of the steps or additional steps added to the stages 
for identifying the preferred option or in the case of the system of interest the 
most critical failure mode. 
The following assumptions are made relative to the equations in the traditional 
TOPSIS technique steps described in Figure 3-2: 
 Let us assume an MCDA problem with n-attributes/criteria and m failure 
modes and that a score can be obtained for each failure mode with 
respect to each criterion. 
 Let  𝑥𝑖𝑗 be the priority score of failure mode 𝑖 with respect to criterion 𝑗 
 Let 𝑷 and 𝑵 be the set of positive (i.e. benefit) and negative (i.e. cost) 
criteria. Benefit criteria is that which an improvement in its potential or it 
be of higher weight will result in achieving the decision problem goal, 
while the contrary is known as the negative criteria, which is desirable to 
be reduced. These conventions depend on the nature of the MCDM goal.  
 
Step 1: A matrix of priority scores ascribed to each failure mode relative to a 
particular criterion represented as  𝑋 = (𝑥𝑖𝑗)𝑛 x 𝑚 is constructed. 
Step 2: Obtain a set of weights 𝑤𝑗, , of importance for each criterion such that: 
∑𝑤𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
= 1 ,    𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚 
   3.11 
Step 3:  Obtain the normalised decision matrix (𝑟𝑖𝑗) using an ideal equation as 
described in Equation 3.3. 
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Define Failure Modes and Criteria
Relative Closeness Coefficient of each 
Failure Mode 
Obtain weighted Normalised Decision Matrix
Obtain Normalised Decision Matrix 
Obtain Design Matrix and Weight vector from 
Questionnaires
Obtain the Ideal Positive and Negative Solution
Generate Ranking of Failure Mode(s )
Obtain the Separation measure from the Ideal 
Positive and Negative Solution
 
Figure 3-2: Flowchart of the TOPSIS methodology 
Step 4: Normalised weighted decision matrix  (𝑉𝑖𝑗) is obtained by multiplying 
each column of the normalised decision matrix (𝑟𝑖𝑗) by the associated weight, 𝑤𝑗 
of each criterion: 
𝑽𝒊𝒋 = 𝒘𝒋𝒓𝒊𝒋     3.12 
Step 5: The Positive ideal solution (PIS) and negative Ideal solutions (NIS) are 
determined  
𝑨+ = (𝒗𝟏
+, 𝒗𝟐
+, … , 𝒗𝒏
+) = {(𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝒊
{𝒗𝒊𝒋}| 𝒋 ∈ 𝑷) , (𝐦𝐢𝐧
𝒊
{𝒗𝒊𝒋}| 𝒋 ∈ 𝑵)} 
3.13a 
𝑨− = (𝒗𝟏
−, 𝒗𝟐
−, … , 𝒗𝒏
−) = {(𝐦𝐢𝐧
𝒊
{𝒗𝒊𝒋}| 𝒋 ∈ 𝑷) , (𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝒊
{𝒗𝒊𝒋}| 𝒋 ∈ 𝑵)} 
3.13b 
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Step 6: Separation measures for each alternative failure mode 𝒊 , is determined. 
The separation from the positive ideal solution (PIS) 𝑺𝒊
+, and negative ideal 
solution (NIS) 𝑺𝒊
−, is obtained in the traditional TOPSIS by the Euclidean 
distance: 
𝑺𝒊
+ =       √{∑(𝒗𝒊𝒋 − 𝒗𝒋
+)
𝟐
𝒎
𝒋=𝟏
} , 𝒊 = 𝟏,… ,𝒎 ;  𝒋 = 𝟏,… , 𝒏 
3.14a 
𝑺𝒊
− =      √∑(𝒗𝒊𝒋 − 𝒗𝒋
−)
𝟐
𝒎
𝒋=𝟏
,               𝒊 = 𝟏,… ,𝒎 ; 𝒋 = 𝟏,… , 𝒏 
3.14b 
The greater the degree of influence by way of closeness of the ideal solution 
translates to the failure mode for which an improvement action should be more 
priority. 
Step 7: For each particular failure mode, the degree of closeness  𝑅𝐶𝑖,  to the 
ideal solution is calculated in this step using Equation 3.15. 
𝑹𝑪𝒊 =
𝑺−
𝑺+ + 𝑺−
  ;     𝒊 = 𝟏,… ,𝒎  
3.15 
Step 8: Rank the failure modes in descending order based on comparison of 
the 𝑅𝐶𝑖  values, with the most critical one being with the highest value. 
There are a number of extensions for the TOPSIS method with variations in the 
approach used to adapt some of the steps in the traditional method described 
above. These extensions have presented claims for better rank outcomes or 
suitability for available data, problem type and context surrounding the 
administration of the process (e.g. Interval data, fuzzy data/method, separation 
distance-Euclidean/Minkowski/Manhattan, extension by combination with other 
methods). See (Izadikhah, 2009; Tu et al., 2011; Song et al., 2013; Martin et al., 
2013; Zamri and Abdulla, 2014) and some of the published works on improving 
TOPSIS using fuzzy numbers are discussed in section 3.4.  
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3.2.2 PROMETHEE 
J. P. Brans developed the Preference Ranking Organisation method for 
Enrichment Evaluations (PROMETHEE) approach which was first presented at 
a conference in the Université of Laval, Québec, Canada (Brans and Vincke, 
1985). Following several successful application of this methodology, over the 
years Brans and Mareschal further developed a number of variations namely 
PROMETHEE II, PROMETHEE III (ranking based on intervals), PROMETHEE 
IV (continues case), PROMETHEE V (MCDA including segmentation 
constrains) PROMETHEE VI (human brain representation). A visual 
PROMETHEE GAIA (interactive model) was developed in 1988 by Brans and 
Mareschal which it utilises the PROMETHEE approach to create the graphical 
representation. In the most recent Visual PROMETHEE version there are 
roughly 16 display formats. Several successful application of the method to 
solving different problems have been published (Behzadian et al., 2010; Cinelli 
et al., 2014; Veza et al., 2015; Veza et al., 2015). Amongst the several 
extensions, the most commonly used is the PROMETHEE I and II. 
PROMETHEE as a MCDA method make use of information between criteria 
and within each criterion.  The weights or the relevant importance of the criteria 
sums to 1. Considering information within criteria, a preference function for each 
criterion which expresses the difference in performance of one alternative over 
another is required. It is worth noting that PROMETHEE preference structure is 
based on pairwise comparison. 
One of the goals of PROMETHEE approach is to allow more transparency in 
the decision process by putting a structure to it, and to deal with criteria and 
decision maker preferences which can be different and vague respectively. In 
order to obtain a compromised solution decision maker can use weights and 
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other preference data to guide the process. Though assigning weights or 
preference value for criteria can be difficult when there exists more than two or 
three criteria in a decision problem. Inputs for the PROMETHEE methodology 
consists a matrix of selective actions (alternatives, or failure modes in this 
work).  
Given A is a set of n possible alternatives (a1, a2, … , ai, … , an), and a criteria 
evaluation set   (g1(∗), g2(∗) , … , gj(∗),… , gk(∗)) , an MCDA problem, 
max {{g1(a), g2(a),… , gj(a),… , gk(a)|a ∈ A}}  can be defined depicting the 
decision makers goal of identifying an alternative while optimising the criteria 
set (i.e. minimising some criteria and maximising others is not objected). The 
steps to follow using the PROMETHEE technique are described in Figure 3-3 
and thereafter. 
Define Failure Modes and Criteria
Evaluation of the net outranking flows
Evaluation or choose criterion preference function 
type, indifference and/or preference threshold 
values for each criterion.  
Calculation of deviation values of failure modes for 
each criterion 
Obtain fuzzy design matrix and weight vector from 
questionnaires
Aggregation of degree of preference
Generate ranking of Failure Mode(s )
Obtain outranking flows
 
Figure 3-3: Flowchart of PROMETHEE-2 methodology 
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3.2.2.1 Calculation of deviation 
For a pair of evaluation of a criterion j for alternatives a and b,  gj(a), and  gj(b),  
their difference or deviation between them is expressed as: 
𝑑𝑗(𝑎, 𝑏) =   𝑔𝑗(𝑎) − 𝑔𝑗(𝑏) 3.21 
3.2.2.2 Preference function Evaluation 
PJ(a, b) is considered the preference degree of a criterion j for two alternatives a 
and b. Preferences can be considered as real numbers ranging from 0 to 1, 
hence the definition of preference functions used to estimate the degrees of 
preference: 
𝑃𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝐹 ( 𝑑𝑗(𝑎, 𝑏)) ;    ∀ 𝑥 ∈ [−∞,∞], 0 ≤  𝐹( 𝑥) ≤ 1 ; 3.22 
Three possible dominance relations are a case of one alternative is preferred 
over the other, they are indifferent or incomparable. Thus, if an alternative is 
preferred over the other on a criterion and the contrary on another criterion, it 
constitutes a concern.  In choosing the compromised solution, additional 
information is required to define or represent these preferences. Such 
information includes trade-offs between criteria, weights for relative importance 
of the criteria, an evaluation function that aggregates all the single preference 
function into one to obtain a solution that is optimal. Six different types of 
preference functions (see Table 3-1) have been identified which can be 
ascribed to each criterion (Brans and Mareschal, 2005). 
3.2.2.3 Aggregation of degree of Preference 
A global preferential index, 𝜋 can be generated for each pair of alternative by 
aggregating the preference degrees of all criteria for each pair of alternatives. 
{
 
 
 
 𝜋(𝑎 , 𝑏) =∑𝑤𝑗 × 𝑃𝑗(𝑎, 𝑏)
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝜋(𝑏 , 𝑎) =∑𝑤𝑗 × 𝑃𝑗(𝑏, 𝑎)
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
 
 
 
3.23 
 
 91 
The outranking graph is shown in Figure 3-4 to depict the global preference 
index calculated for a pair of alternatives with the arcs depicting the outranking 
and outranked character. 
Table 3-1: PROMETHEE generalised Preference function of Criteria (Brans & 
Mareschal, 2005) 
 
Parameter to fix as expressed in the Table 3-1 above refers to the thresholds. 
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Figure 3-4: Valued out ranking graph (Brans & Mareschal, 2005) 
3.2.2.4 Out ranking flows 
The outranking flows can be obtained from equations (X) and (X), where 𝜙+ (𝑎) 
is the positive outranking flows and 𝜙− (𝑎) is the negative outranking flows of 
failure modes (alternatives). In some literature they are represented as  
𝑃ℎ𝑖+ (𝑎)  and  𝑃ℎ𝑖− (𝑎) respectively. 
𝜙+ (𝑎) =
1
𝑛 − 1
 ∑𝜋(𝑎, 𝑥)
𝑥𝜖𝐴
 
3.24a 
 
𝜙− (𝑎) =
1
𝑛 − 1
 ∑𝜋(𝑥, 𝑎)
𝑥𝜖𝐴
 
3.24b 
 
Figure 3-5 depicts the outranking flows diagramatically. The left box (i.e the 
positive outranking flow) depicts an alternative, 𝑎 is outranking others and the 
right box depicts an alternative 𝑎 outranked by others. The greater the value  
𝜙+ , the more preferred the alternative is and likewise for the contrary. 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-5 : PROMETHEE outranking flows:  𝝓+ (𝒂)  on the left and   𝝓− (𝒂)  on 
the right (Brans & Mareschal, 2005) 
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The positive outranking flow is also known as leaving flow and the negative as 
the entering flow. These are partial pre-order for alternatives which is the goal of 
PROMETHEE I, while ranks from total pre-order for alternatives (net outranking 
flow) consists the PROMETHEE II technique (Brans et al., 1984). 
3.2.2.5 Evaluation of the net outranking flows 
This measure depicts which alternative (failure mode) is better (more critical), is 
the balance between the positive and negative outranking flows. The greater 
the net outranking flow value, the more preferred will the alternative be 
compared to others. 
𝜙(𝑎)  =  𝜙+ (𝑎)  − 𝜙− (𝑎) 3.25 
In the context of this thesis, a preferred alternative i.e. failure mode would be 
more critical than others would as it maximises the net outranking flows. This 
analysis can be performed for several scenarios depending on the decision 
problem being analysed (Veza et al., 2015). Scenarios could consist of different 
set of criteria weight or different analyst viewpoint for criteria weights and 
relative weight of criteria considering alternatives. 
3.2.3 Fuzzy Theorem and Fuzzy MCDA 
Given MCDA analysis utilises input from experts, which are often vague and 
expressed in linguistic terms, the concept of fuzzy set was introduced. Hence 
the fuzzification of MCDA approaches as seen in literature. Considering expert’s 
imprecise judgement or scales, fuzzy set theory enables analysts to describe 
and represent expert’s preference in a more flexible manner. In this section, the 
fuzzy set theory is introduced briefly and then fuzzy MCDA approaches 
discussed. 
3.2.3.1 Fuzzy Set Theory  
A fuzzy number expresses the relationship between a quantity, 𝑥  that is 
uncertain, and a membership function, 𝜇  ranging from 0 to 1. A fuzzy set is an 
extension of traditional set theory such that 𝑥 is a member of set 𝐴 possessing a 
membership degree 𝜇. Fuzzy sets can be represented in several ways such as 
triangular, trapezoidal or Gaussian. In this thesis, the triangular fuzzy set 
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representation is used given their ease of computation and convenience in 
fuzzy representation and information processing (Balli and Korukoglu, 2009). 
Triangular Membership Function:  
A fuzzy number with Triangular membership function ?̅?  is characterised by 
(𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1),   𝑎1 < 𝑏1 < 𝑐1  as shown in Figure 3-6. Its membership function 
features are presented in Table 3.2. 
                       𝜇𝑥 
                        1                       ( 𝑏1 , 1) 
 
 
                                                                                         
                      0      𝑎1               𝑏1                            𝑐1       𝑥 
Figure 3-6: Fuzzy number ?̅? with triangular membership function. 
 
Table 3-2: Triangular membership function features 
 Membership function Ranges 
𝜇?̅?(𝑥) = 
0 𝑥 < 𝑎1 
(𝑥 − 𝑎1)
(𝑏1 − 𝑎1)
 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏1 
(𝑐1 − 𝑥)
(𝑐1 − 𝑏1)
 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐1 
0 𝑥 > 𝑐1 
 
Fuzzy numbers with triangular membership function can be subjected to a 
number of related arithmetic operations, some of which are listed below. If 
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?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1)  and ?̃? = (𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2)  are representations of Triangular fuzzy 
numbers (TFN), then: 
Addition: ?̃? +  ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1) + (𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2) = (𝑎1 + 𝑎2, 𝑏1 + 𝑏2, 𝑐1 + 𝑐2)  3.26 
 Multiplication:  ?̃?. ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1). (𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2) = (𝑎1𝑎2, 𝑏1𝑏2, 𝑐1𝑐2)  3.27 
3.2.3.2 Defuzzification 
This process transforms a fuzzy number into a crisp number. There are a 
number of defuzzification methods for transform Triangular fuzzy numbers into 
crisp numbers. Three of which includes (Ganesh, 2006): 
 
𝑎𝑚 + 𝑏𝑚 + 𝑐𝑚
3
 3.28 
𝑎𝑚 + 𝑏𝑚 + 𝑐𝑚
4
 3.29 
𝑎𝑚 + 𝑏𝑚 + 𝑐𝑚
6
 3.30 
 Another unique operation is the product of a fuzzy number and a crisp number. 
If 𝑤𝑗  is a weight of criteria and ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1)  is a TFN, the weighted fuzzy 
number, which is their product, can be expressed as  𝐴 ̃ = (𝑤𝑗 𝑎1, 𝑤𝑗  𝑏1, 𝑤𝑗  𝑐1) 
and also considered as a TFN. 
𝛼 −cuts of a fuzzy number can be characterised as 𝐴𝛼 = {𝑥|𝜇𝐴(𝑥) ≥ 𝛼}, 𝛼 ∈
[0, 1] , where 𝐴𝛼  can be represented denoted by [𝐴𝑙
𝛼 ,   𝐴𝑢
𝛼]  as a non empty 
limited closed interval with 𝐴𝑢
𝛼  as the upper limit and 𝐴𝑙
𝛼  , lower limit. The 𝛼 −cuts 
of a triangular fuzzy number 𝐴 = (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) is expressed as: 
𝐴𝛼 = [𝐴𝑙
𝛼 ,   𝐴𝑢
𝛼] = [(𝑏 − 𝑎)𝛼 + 𝑎 , (𝑐 − 𝑑)𝛼 + 𝑐]  3.31 
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For a value of 𝛼 = 0, the left and right spreads of the triangular fuzzy number 
are identified, and for 𝛼 = 1, the central value is identified.  
The fuzzy theorem described establishes its utility for handling complex real 
world problems often characterised by conflicting interest/variables, vagueness 
in decision makers viewpoint and representation, and imprecision. Given this 
standpoint for a long period, an increasing attention has been placed on the 
application of fuzzy set theory in MCDA (Figueira et al., 2005; Lai and Hwang, 
1996) Several publications have been seen on the application of fuzzy theorem 
to different MCDA techniques.  To limit this review to a few, in this work 
application to TOPSIS technique would be used, hence in the next subsection a 
brief review and description of Fuzzy TOPSIS  and a Fuzzy TOPSIS using 
interval data is presented. 
3.2.4 Fuzzy TOPSIS 
This is an extension of the TOPSIS method with adaptation to adequately 
represent real world scenarios using fuzzy data set rather than crisp data as in 
conventional TOPSIS. Initial works processed the fuzzy problem information 
and then converted it crisp (non-fuzzy detail) by way of defuzzification and solve 
the problem to reach a solution. These includes the works of (Chen, 2000)  
converting TFN from group decision and obtaining crisp distance (Euclidean) 
between two TFNs, and also (Chu and Lin, 2003; Chen and Bi, 2010)). In a 
group decision environment also intuitionist fuzzy set was combined with 
TOPSIS by (Boran et al., 2009). (Ye, 2010) presented a fuzzy TOPSIS 
approach (Atanassov’s interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy numbers) for group 
decision making selection problem given incomplete and uncertain information 
environment . (Jahanshahloo et al., 2006) and (Wang and Elhag, 2006) 
proposed fuzzy TOPSIS approach applying the alpha-cut set concept in their 
fuzzy number representation. 
Currently there are viewpoints suggesting to retain the fuzy interval property 
throughout most of eight TOPSIS method steps, rather than an initial 
conversion of fuzzy detail to crisp before or early in the analysis. Also of interest 
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is the combination of fuzzy TOPSIS in hybrid with other MCDA technique such 
as fuzzy AHP (Kutlu and Ekmekçioǧlu, 2012). (Secme et al., 2009) presented 
an integrated fuzzyAHP and TOPSIS to solve an MCDA problem. 
An interval valued fuzzy set was introduced by Zadeh as a fuzzy set 
generalisation (Zadeh, 1975b; Zadeh, 1976; Zadeh, 1975a). The relevance of 
this concept was made more meaningful from the contributions of (Biswas, 
1994; Deschrijver and Kerre, 2003) interval-valued fuzzy relations and 
implication (Gorzalczany, 1987)  approximate reasoning of interval-valued fuzzy 
set. The degree of certainty of fuzzy data can be expressed as an interval [0, 1]. 
This representation can be used to complement the limitation of expert’s ability 
to quantify their evaluations or opinion as a number or exact value. This 
informed the need to emphasise the interval property of decision variables 
which was termed interval valued fuzzy sets. (Turksen, 1996) and (Cornelis et 
al., 2006) did express strong views of ordinary fuzzy set form representation 
was not enough, rather the interval property should be emphasised in the 
linguistic variable. 
Recent works with applications of interval data concept to represent fuzzy 
information with application to MCDA includes (Zamri and Abdulla, 2014; 
Jahanshahloo et al., 2006; Jahanshahloo et al., 2009). A fuzzy TOPSIS 
methodology is described in Figure 3-7 which retains the fuzzy property of the 
alternatives evaluation. 
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Define Failure Modes and Criteria
Relative Closeness Coefficient of each 
Failure Mode 
Obtain weighted Fuzzy Normalised Decision Matrix
Obtain Fuzzy Normalised Decision Matrix 
Obtain Fuzzy Design Matrix and Weight vector from 
Questionnaires
Obtain the Ideal Positive and Negative Solution
Generate Ranking of Failure Mode(s )
Obtain the Separation measure from the Ideal 
Positive and Negative Solution
 
Figure 3-7: Flowchart of the Fuzzy TOPSIS methodology 
For a set of 𝑚 alternatives 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑚  for which experts would have to select 
or prioritise using a set of criteria 𝐶1, 𝐶2, … , 𝐶𝑛 , suppose 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is an evaluation of 
alternative 𝐴𝑖 with respect to criterion 𝐶𝑗 , an MCDA problem can be formulated 
with interval data converting the triangular fuzzy number representation to a set 
of alpha cuts 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = [𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑢
𝛼 ]. 
Table 3-3: Interval data Multi criteria Decision Making matrix format 
 Criterion 1 Criterion 2 … Criterion n 
Alternative 1 [𝑋11𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋11𝑢
𝛼 ] [𝑋12𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋12𝑢
𝛼 ] … [𝑋1𝑛𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋1𝑛𝑢
𝛼 ] 
Alternative 2 [𝑋21𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋21𝑢
𝛼 ] [𝑋22𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋22𝑢
𝛼 ] … [𝑋2𝑛𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋2𝑛𝑢
𝛼 ] 
⋮   …  
Alternative m [𝑋𝑚1𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋𝑚1𝑢
𝛼 ] [𝑋𝑚2𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋𝑚2𝑢
𝛼 ] … [𝑋𝑚𝑛𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋𝑚𝑛𝑢
𝛼 ] 
 
Also let 𝑊 = [𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑚 ] be the weights of the criteria, with 𝑤𝑗  as the weight 
of criterion 𝐶𝑗 .  
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The normalised fuzzy decision matrix is genreated with the normalised values 
calculated as follows: 
𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼 =
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼
∑ [(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼)
2
+ (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑢
𝛼)
2
] 𝑚𝑖=1
⁄  ; 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 
 
 
3.32a 
𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑢
𝛼 =
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼
∑ [(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼)
2
+ (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑢
𝛼)
2
] 𝑚𝑖=1
⁄  ; 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 
 
3.32b 
 
Thus [𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼, 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑢
𝛼]  is the normalised form of the interval [𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑢
𝛼  ]. 
The weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix , with consideration of the 
importance of each individual criterion, is generated as follows: 
  
?̅?𝑖𝑗,𝑙 = 𝑤𝑗 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝛼   ; 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑚,   𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛  3.33a 
  
?̅?𝑖𝑗,𝑢 = 𝑤𝑗 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑢
𝛼   ; 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑚,   𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛  
 
3.33b 
 
 
The fuzzy positive ideal solution and negative ideal solution is defined as 
follows: 
  
𝐴+̅̅ ̅̅ =  {?̅?1
+, ?̅?2
+, … , ?̅?𝑚
+}= {(max𝑖 ?̅?𝑖𝑗,𝑢 /𝑗 ∈ 𝐼), (min𝑖 ?̅?𝑖𝑗,𝑙 /𝑗 ∈ 𝐽)} 3.34a 
  
𝐴−̅̅ ̅̅ =  {?̅?1
−, ?̅?2
−, … , ?̅?𝑚
−}= {(min𝑖 ?̅?𝑖𝑗,𝑙 /𝑗 ∈ 𝐼), (max𝑖 ?̅?𝑖𝑗,𝑢 /𝑗 ∈ 𝐽)} 3.34b 
 
Where   ?̅?𝑖
+ = (1, 1, 1 )  and ?̅?𝑖
− = (0,0,0),  𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 the  for each benefit or 
cost criteria. 
The distance of separation of each of the alternative from the calculated fuzzy 
positive ideal solution and negative ideal solution is obtained as follows: 
  
𝑑𝑖
− =∑𝑑(
𝑛
𝑗=1
?̅?𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖
+)  𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑚 
 
3.35a 
  
 100 
𝑑𝑖
− =∑𝑑(
𝑛
𝑗=1
?̅?𝑖𝑗 , ?̅?𝑖
+)  𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑚 
 
3.35b 
 
The relative closeness coefficient  for obtaining the ranking order of all 
alternatives is calculated (using the distance of seperations from the previous) 
as follow: 
  
𝑅𝐶 = 
𝑑𝑖
−
𝑑𝑖
+ + 𝑑𝑖
−⁄               ; 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑚 
3.36 
The set of theoretical foundations required for the development of an MCDA 
framework given the choice of the FMECA as an assessment technique, and 
discussion of the applications of MCDM to risk analysis (Chapter 2) has been 
presented. 
3.2.5 Elicited Weights Definitions 
Based on the definitions below, experts are able to provide a scaling 
factor/weight for the importance of each criterion in assessing the BOP System 
design (failure modes) and also a relative scale for the impact of a criterion on a 
selected failure mode of the BOP System. There are two types of weights to be 
elicited from experts for the analysis. The Weights of importance or relevance of 
the criteria list (wj ) is a scaling weight of the relevance of the criterion with 
respect to the BOP System delivering its required functions as specified 
towards assuring well control or preventing a loss of well control. Weights of the 
relative importance of a failure mode 𝑖 relative to each of the criterion  j, (xi,j) is a 
measure of the criticality or preference intensity for a failure mode to be more 
critical over others with regards to the contribution or relationship with a 
criterion. The criticality measure is with respect to a potential loss of well control 
due to BOP failure (ranging from a loss of partial function to a complete loss of 
well control following a component failure mode occurrence).  
In this thesis, relative weights are assigned to individual evaluation criterion to 
describe the experts' preference information. The weights are based on the 
experts' preferences and experiences and it was initially proposed to use a 
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subjective scale of 0 to 10 recommended by Yoon and Hwang, (1995), with 
calibration that 10 stands for very important while 0 represent for very 
unimportant. However experts preferred to use linguistic scale for assigning 
weights. The weighting of the importance was done by linguistic variable 
measure, and the representative triangular fuzzy numbers (TrFN) are shown in 
the Table 3-4. The choice of the different weight variables was majorly informed 
by Expert 10 wealth of experience and Expert 6 who had some background 
knowledge about MCDA. 
Table 3-4: Linguistic variables for importance of failure modes with respect to a criterion 
Linguistic Variable Abbreviation TrFN 
Absolutely High AH (0, 0.1, 0.2) 
Very High VH (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) 
Fairly High FH ( 0.2, 0.3, 0.4) 
Slightly High SH (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) 
Medium High MH (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) 
Medium M (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) 
Medium Low ML (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) 
Low L (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) 
Very Low VL (0.8, 0.9, 1) 
 
A sample expert decision datasheet for the failure modes against the risk 
criteria used for the assessment is shown in Table 4-7. It depicts the use the 
Linguistic variables described in Table 3-4. 
3.3 Development of MCDA Risk assessment framework 
The set of functions for which the BOP System is expected to deliver is in 
preventing a potential loss of well control. Hence all components have their 
functions that are critical to achieving the overall system goal. It is intended to 
understand the criticality of a complex system in delivering a set of required 
function. Hence the need to rank a select set of 𝑗 representative failure modes 
(alternatives) of the system using a set of 𝑖 criteria (which can be used to 
describe or assess the inherent design of the system, e.g. design assurance, 
testing, etc.).  
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A Multi criteria decision making analysis framework for the assessment of the 
Subsea BOP system, using selected critical failure modes identified from the 
FMECA analysis (Chapter 4), is presented in Figure 3-3. This framework 
describes how the elicitation process was carried out, generation of decision 
matrix, data post processing and application to selected MCDA techniques for 
obtaining the criticality of the selected failure modes (by way of ranking). These 
are further explained in the associated subsections. Experts were contacted 
and elicited to support the framework development and the provision of weights 
for the actual assessment of the BOP System. The elicitation process helped 
defined and refined the selection of the criteria to be used for the assessment, 
the suitability/representativeness of the select critical failure modes, and how 
and the form/nature of the elicited weights (fuzzy linguistic). The methods 
considered for the MCDM analysis in this thesis are influenced by the nature of 
the data collected and guided by the findings on suitability of methods identified 
earlier in this chapter.  
The questionnaire was developed and then administered with n decision matrix 
obtained. These are then processed and aggregated for input to the MCDM 
analysis. The expert decision matrix can take the form of a fuzzy or crisp or 
interval-data, form depending on the respective MCDA technique applied. In 
this thesis, fuzzy approach combined with TOPSIS (using normal, de-fuzzified, 
and interval fuzzy data inputs) and PROMETHEE are used to analyse the select 
list of critical failure modes based on the defined criteria. 
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Figure 3-8: MCDM Risk Assessment Framework 
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3.3.1 Expert Elicitation 
Experts are elicited to ascertain weights for criteria and failure modes relative to 
a criterion. This could be as a group or individually, depending on availability. 
An expert is considered as one with requisite drilling knowledge and 
competency in subsea well control. A competence yardstick would be years of 
experience with well controls-BOP and possession of an International Well 
Control (IWCF) certification as a requirement. This certification is the industry 
benchmark for supervisors of well control operations, and establishes 
understanding of the BOPS System functionality and associated attributes such 
as the criteria to be used for the MCDA analysis. 
The process began in March, 2013 with identification of potential experts 
through LinkedIn and by searching for experts on google using buzz words 
“Subsea BOP Supervisor”, “Drilling Engineer+ Subsea BOP “, “Senior Subsea 
Engineer”, and “Subsea Drilling Engineer”. Over 40 experts were contacted, out 
of which 10 returned with response “Not an expert enough to contribute to 
assessment” and 30 responded with request for questionnaires and the 
remainder failed to respond. Amongst the interested experts, 12 of them 
requested for further clarification and definitions of terminologies upon 
introduction of the thesis aim. These questions initiated a dialogue process 
which helped the refinement of the criteria definition, criteria selection, data form 
(crisp or linguistic), and completeness/ appropriateness of the failure modes to 
be assessed. 
In the process 3 of the12 declined to contribute to the assessment on the basis 
that it was time consuming and one expert requested not to be contacted again. 
Consequently, 26 experts were administered the final questionnaire to obtain 
decision matrix and only 10 experts responded completely.  
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3.3.2 Elicited Experts 
A summary of experts (all IWCF Certified) elicited for this research is presented 
below: 
Expert 1: Deepwater Drilling Engineer with an Operator for over 7 years 
experience working in the offshore industry. Experience spans involvement in 
different drilling and completion campaigns in various fields in the North Sea, 
West Africa, and GOM. 
Expert 2: A Subsea Engineer with 12 years’ experience entailing the planning 
supervising and executing various well control equipment maintenance in Brazil, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Congo, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. He has grown through 
the ranks from a well control technician to Supervisor with a wealth of 
experience diagnosing faults, investigating malfunctions and breakdowns, 
disassembling and repairing various BOP systems on different drilling rigs. This 
expert has experience developing preventive maintenance strategies and 
responsible for decision tree for BOP and its control system. 
Expert 3: Subsea Engineer with 5 years’ experience with an OEM as a package 
engineer for drilling control systems. Prior to being Package engineer, he was 
an assistant driller for 3 years with an Operator. 
Expert 4: Subsea Engineer with just over 10 years of experience in maintaining 
the BOP and associated equipment in relation to Preventive Maintenance 
System. This expert had spent three years in total as a mechanic and 
technician, before taking the Accelerated Rig Training (ART) course. Expert 4 
had passed all the Subsea modules and became an Engineer, spending the last 
4 years as a Subsea well control supervisor with a drilling contractor. 
Expert 5: Subsea Drilling engineer with a Danish operator spanning over four 
years’ experience on various campaigns in the North Sea (UK/Norway). He has 
had extensive training and supervision in the area of well control. 
Expert 6: A Wells and intervention Engineer with an Operator in Nigeria. This 
expert has been involved in various Subsea drilling operations. This expert has 
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completed most of the requisite subsea equipment trainings and is a chartered 
engineer. 
Expert 7: Senior Subsea Engineer with over ten (10) years experience working 
in the subsea industry. This expert has a good understanding of subsea BOP 
mechanical systems as well as developing and implementing maintenance 
requirements/ programs .This expert has spent the last five years as a specialist 
in subsea electro-hydraulics BOP control systems in GOM.  
Expert 8: Subsea Supervisor/ MUX BOP Surveyor with eight years’ experience 
working on offshore deep water drilling rigs. This expert has solid experience in 
maintaining and operating BOP stack and controls as well as associated 
equipments. Expert 8 also has a working knowledge with sixth and seventh 
Generation Deepwater Drill-ships in West Africa and Brazil.  
Expert 9: Well control instructor in a training school with prior working 
experience, as a Subsea Engineer, with a drilling contractor spanning 8 years in 
total. Most of which were on 5th and 6th Generation Drill-ships. He has been an 
instructor for the last 5years. 
Expert 10: Well control equipment superintendent (subsea engineer) with over 
twenty years’ experience. This expert has been responsible for various new 
build BOP systems on various jack-up, semi-sub rigs, and drill ships in water 
depth ranging from 450 to 10,000 feet. In the last five years this expert has 
been a trainer and involved in inspection, surveying, and commissioning of well 
control equipment, on various engineering projects globally. 
The elicitation process was implemented in three stages: 
 Introduction of the thesis aim and objectives to the Experts – this was to 
provide them both a high-level viewpoint of the research, to emphasise 
the importance the work, and how it can also systematically improve their 
understanding of the BOP system (which they have been working with 
for years). The introduction raised a number of questions and concerns 
which informed how best information will be collated and conditions for 
weights to be assigned. Some of these includes: 
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 An assumption on the BOP system type and Boundary. 
 Agreement on the criteria which saw the splitting of improper 
maintenance criterion into two types as seen in the list of criteria. 
 Their preference for linguistic representation for weights 
 Lastly screening of failure modes credibility. 
 
This process with the different experts also shaped the final version of 
the questionnaire (see Appendix) and rationale for chosen criteria used. 
 Distribution and successive engagement of Experts with the assessment 
– distant experts were emailed the questionnaires and followed up with 
an initial average of 30 minutes Phone call each. Follow-up 
conversations to address questions and concerns (earlier mentioned) 
were done with Skype calls and questionnaire was administered to one 
expert in person over a period of 3 days in Denmark. 
 Collation of all 10 experts’ data into a single sheet and the combination of 
respective weights considering each criterion against corresponding 
failure modes  (see Appendix for raw data). 
 
3.3.3 Risk Criteria selection rationale and definition  
The identification of criteria was initially informed by a derivation of sub-criteria, 
following the review of the BOP system technology, which could drive the three 
criteria that FMECA considers (occurrence, severity and detectability) 
individually. This is to account for the potential of experts to see each of them 
from different perspective, influenced by their experience and knowledge. A set 
of 14 general criteria /factors were initially identified(See Appendix D), However 
there was need to ascertain that no causality exists amongst them (see 
Appendix for a hierarchy diagram of initial sub-criteria). However, upon careful 
inspection of the initial criteria against the set of qualities specified by Dodgson 
et al., (2009) required for a criteria to be used in an MCDM assessment, there 
was some disagreement on the independence of some criterion (e.g. personnel 
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competence could impact maintainability, Age could be correlated with failure 
mechanism, spare parts can be correlated with maintainability)  
The set of criteria also needed refinement to reduce them to a sizeable number 
for easy questionnaire administering and lesser computational cost which is 
dependent on the amount of information obtainable however, and they have to 
be relevant. The selected set of criteria used for the MCDA analysis in this 
thesis was informed by experts, upon refinement of the initial set through series 
of discussions. The selection was an iterative process to capture the opinion of 
the ten different experts and that they align to the overarching goal of the 
analysis. The criteria agreed to be used for the analysis are as follows: 
Improper maintenance 1 (C1): This measures the chances for an inability to 
restore the system to a functional state (i.e. the failure mode condition effected) 
with contribution from a lack of supervision (Maintenance includes spares and 
consumables replacement). 
Improper maintenance 2 (C2): The chances for an inability to restore the system 
to a functional state but with contributions from a lack of competence by 
management (Maintenance includes spares and consumables replacement). 
Management captures all the personnel related profiling such as trainings 
received, job/shift factors etc.) 
Occurrence due to Inspection/testing ineffectiveness (C3): This refers to the 
ability for the system to be tested or inspected effectively and assure perform its 
function as intended (this includes the testing interval contribution to 
effectiveness). This criterion is a positive variable, thus a lower score or weight 
would be assigned should a testing effectiveness most likely prevent failure 
mode occurrence and the contrary, would be a higher weight. 
System or Component Complexity (C4): This measures the level of 
complication in the system due to increased interaction from more components, 
or combination of components from different manufacturers and its effect on the 
proper functioning of the equipment. E.g. more hydraulic supply routes, more 
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tubing or complex stacking of hydraulic pipes from a multi shuttle valve 
assembly- which can create more leak paths. 
Detectability (C5): This implies the ease of detecting a failure without it being 
hidden, i.e. the likelihood of a component or system functional state (working or 
not faulty) being noticed by a detection mechanism following an identified failure 
mode occurring. It is a negative variable. 
Safeguards from Redundancy (C6): This is a measure of the system ability to 
recover from the occurrence of a fault or have alternative means or medium to 
ensure a fired function towards achieving well control is executed, i.e. a 
likelihood of a component or system function  being safeguarded by redundancy 
following an identified failure mode occurring. This is a negative variable. 
Loss of a function (ANOTHER) (C7):  The potential for this failure mode to lead 
to loss of another function. 
Loss of Multiple functions (C8): The potential for this failure mode to lead to loss 
of more than one function. 
Loss of all functions (C9): The potential for this failure mode to lead to a 
complete loss of well control system function. 
All of these criteria are positive parameters (higher weights are required to 
establish criticality) except C5 and C6 which are negative parameters (higher 
weight establishes lesser criticality and conversely). 
3.4 The Subsea BOP System Failure modes under Assessment 
The failure modes selected for the assessment are generated from an all-
inclusive evaluation of the Subsea BOP system failure modes identified through 
the FMECA in chapter 4. The select list is presented in Section 4.5. 
3.4.1 Input data interpretation for assessment 
The collated decision matrix with linguistic inputs from different experts was 
converted into triangular fuzzy numbers, and aggregated in triangular fuzzy 
number form as shown in Table 4-8, and de-fuzzified into crisp values in Table 
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4-9. The crisp weights were then normalised as shown in Table 4-10. 
Considering the fact that most of the experts stated all criteria were important 
and declined to provide weights for the criteria importance, entropy method was 
introduced to derive the weights of importance for each criteria. These 
processed data was then used as input into the different MCDA techniques 
depending on the data forms required. 
3.4.2 BOP System Failure mode ranking Using Conventional 
TOPSIS 
The normal TOPSIS technique was applied using the crisp weights (de-fuzzified 
expert decision matrix), and criteria weights from entropy method. Outcomes 
from the different process stages, which include normalised decision matrix, 
weighted normalised decision matrix, the distance measures and failure modes 
rankings was obtained. 
3.4.3 BOP System Failure mode ranking Using Fuzzy TOPSIS 
The fuzzy TOPSIS technique was applied to analyse the BOP System using the 
fuzzy data with criteria importance weight. The fuzzy expert decision matrix is 
normalised while retaining its fuzzy form and then further weighted using the 
weight of the criteria. The fuzzy information was used to calculate the distance 
of separation and consequently the failure modes ranking. 
3.4.4 BOP System Failure mode ranking Using Fuzzy TOPSIS -
Interval method  
This approach is similar to the previously applied technique but it considers the 
data in interval form showing the lower and upper values. In this instance the 
lower value of the lowest linguistic weight from the expert decision set, for a 
particular failure mode with respect to a criteria, is used and the upper value of 
the highest linguistic weight is used. The interval decision matrix and the 
weighted expert interval decision matrix were obtained using criteria weights. 
Then distance measures and ranking outcomes, from the relative closeness 
coefficient, for the different failure modes are obtained.  
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3.4.5 BOP System Failure mode ranking Using PROMETHEE 
Crisp aggregate matrix data was used as inputted to Palisade Visual 
PROMETHEE software to generate ranks. Result were generated and exported 
out to an excel file. Visual depiction of results was not suitable as the number of 
actions (failure modes) analysed is high, as evident in the matrix. The weights 
of the criteria used are those generated from the entropy analysis.  
 
3.5 Summary 
The framework developed in this chapter would be implemented in chapter 4 
using critical failure modes from FMECA analysis.  
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4 Failure Mode Identification and Prioritisation of a 
Subsea BOP System 
This chapter presents the stem of the research in this thesis as it underscores 
the application of the FMECA technique to reveal weaknesses (as well as 
unique features) in the Subsea BOP system. System Functional and 
hierarchical tree diagrams were presented with boundaries defined. In this 
Chapter the FMECA analysis is presented with critical failure modes and 
deducible critical components identified. Thereafter a select critical list from the 
FMECA failure modes is then assessed using MCDA techniques (as presented 
in the developed framework in Chapter 3) with the failure mode criticality 
ranking outcome presented.  
4.1 BOP System Model and Boundaries 
The Subsea BOP system control functional diagram is depicted in Figure 4-1 
and a high level system model of the subsea BOP system with representations 
of general function components and associated interfaces required to meet the 
overall goal of isolating a well to assure well control is depicted in Figure 4-2. 
The figure consist a representation of the system of interest with a demarcation 
line, the top section to mean Topsides or surface and the lower section  
referring to functions or items subsea. Also around the system (confined in a 
dashed external line) are the interfaces to the BOP System which includes 
emergency systems which unique functions are shown on the upper right and 
connection interfaces with the BOP system are shown on the lower left. The 
MCDA analysis in this thesis is focused on the items Subsea and the related 
components to the lower left-interfaces (blue demarcation in Figure 4-2). The 
transmission of signals and supply of power and hydraulics to fire a function is 
depicted in Figure 4-3. Figure 4-2 is illustrative to show different BOP function to 
be effected, however subsea BOP types and other main items can take different 
forms depending on the component whose function can be to open or close on 
an open hole or shear/seal on around a drill pipe. The presence of these 
various function was what is intended to be shown in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-1: Functional Diagram of a Subsea Controls System 
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Figure 4-2: A high-level subsea BOP system model with interfaces and 
boundary  
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Figure 4-3: A functional flow to activate valves and component functions. 
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4.2 Subsea BOP System FMECA  
The FMECA of the Subsea BOP system was carried to understand the BOP 
system and provide a yardstick for measuring criticality of the failure modes of 
its components. The elicitation process, underlying assumptions and limitations 
are discussed below. 
4.2.1 FMECA Expert Elicitation Process 
The FMECA analysis is heavily dependent on expert knowledge to assess the 
validity of a system design and then understand design weakness through the 
structured process of the FMECA. This FMECA utilised the knowledge of 
Subsea Engineering experts with a bias for drilling, well controls and controls in 
general. A quality benchmark which defined who an expert was is the 
possession of an International Well Controls Forum (IWCF) certificate and years 
of experience with working on drilling rigs. These experts have been identified in 
the previous chapter. The experts contributed to the development of the 
analysis worksheet and also informed the selection of a critical list to further 
investigate. The FMECA process started with a scoping of system analysis and 
desktop review using general assembly drawings, piping and instrument 
diagrams, and existing literature. This pre-filled worksheet was then used to 
consult with experts by way of interviews. The data sheet was thereafter 
aggregated and cleaned up while outstanding items were followed-up over time. 
4.2.2 Assumptions/Limitations 
Assumptions made for the study and also limitations that may have some 
influence on the analysis are stated below: 
 Redundancy is taken into consideration, meaning in case of a 
component failure, an alternative component would provide that function 
 The Fixed Pipe Ram was considered equivalent to Variable Bore Ram 
for this analysis (This is based on similarity of purpose except of variable 
bore capability to handle different pipe size)  
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 Single point failure modes are considered only. 
 Only criticality with respect to a loss from well control (from a kick) during 
drilling and disconnecting is considered. 
 Emergency systems are not considered are not considered within the 
scope of this thesis. 
 Financial severity is not considered, as the cost of a BOP failure leading 
a loss of well control is established already and directly related to the 
technical function which is considered only for this analysis.  
 Software aspects of the BOP System are considered in this analysis. 
4.2.3 Analysis Approach 
A system level approach was considered for the analysis and the safety-critical 
nature of the BOP system suggests most components have to be functional all 
times. Identified failure modes were evaluated using weights based on three 
factors (severity, occurrence and detectability) on a scale of 1-10. 
Corresponding Risk priority numbers (RPN), which is a product of the weights of 
the three factors, and risk value based on the classical risk definition (product of 
the severity and likelihood), were also calculated. The following columns are 
included in the FMECA worksheets shown in Table 4-4. 
 Sub-System 
 Component  
 Main function of component  
 Failure mode identification number  
 Failure mode –Lists relevant failure modes for the component  
 Failure mechanism and causes- List relevant failure causes  
 Local effects -  Local effects of failure modes 
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 Detection method- What could detect the failure modes ( e.g. alarms, 
testing, procedures) 
 Criticality ranking- these are risk scores for severity, occurrence and 
ease of detection with a calculation for RPN risk scoring for each 
failure mode. 
 Barrier/Safeguards – What can prevent or lower the frequency or 
severity of a failure mode. 
The sequence of steps for collecting failure information on components to be 
evaluated is as shown in the column headings (listed above from subsystem to 
barriers consecutively). This is repeated for each component until the defined 
system is analysed. The three FMECA criteria and their corresponding rating 
scales or classes used in this analysis are shown in the Table 4-1 to Table 4-3. 
Table 4-1: Occurrence of the failure mode (Adapted from Wisconsin, 2013) 
Occurrence Ranking Description of Occurrence 
1 Nearly impossible occurrence 
2 Very low occurrence 
3 Low occurrence 
4 Relatively Low occurrence 
5 Moderate occurrence 
6 Moderately high 
7 Fairly high/ frequent occurrence 
8 High occurrence 
9 Very high occurrence 
10 Extremely high occurrence 
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Table 4-2: Severity ranking 
 
Severity Class Description 
 
 
1 
No impact on BOP functionality and no associated 
downtime with drilling operations.   
 
2 
No impact on BOP functionality and no associated 
downtime, however required maintenance can be done 
when BOP is pulled to rig floor. 
  
 
3 
Partial loss on BOP functionality and very minor 
associated downtime of less than a day.   
 
4 
Partial loss on BOP functionality and minor associated 
downtime in the order of say 1 to 7 days.   
 
5 
Partial loss on BOP functionality and minor associated 
downtime in the order of say 8 to 14 days.   
 
6 
Partial loss on BOP functionality with potential for 
additional issues and considerable associated downtime in 
the order of 2 to 4 weeks. 
  
 
7 
Loss of BOP function resulting in suspending drilling 
operation, pulling of LMRP/stack, or with potential to lead 
to loss of well control and significant  leak or pulling 
LMRP. 
  
 
8 
Loss of BOP function resulting in suspending drilling 
operation, pulling of LMRP/stack, or with potential to lead 
to loss of well control and major leak.   
 
9 
Loss of well control resulting in a drilling operation halted 
with associated downtime impacting greatly on drilling 
campaign for months.    
 
10 
Loss of well control resulting in a drilling operation halted 
with associated catastrophic consequences such as loss 
of asset, loss of lives, and extreme oil spill to the 
environment. 
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Table 4-3: Likelihood of detection ranking (Adapted from Carlson, 2012) 
Severity Class Likelihood of Detection Description 
1 Almost certain 
Failure will almost certainly be 
detected with a probability of greater 
than 95% through specific monitoring/ 
detection or self-diagnostic / 
annunciation systems (e.g. alarms). 
2 Very High 
Failure will almost certainly be 
detected with a probability of 70% to 
95% through specific monitoring/ 
detection or self-diagnostic / 
annunciation systems. 
3 High 
There is a good chance to detect 
failure with a probability of greater than 
50% through specific monitoring/ 
detection or self-diagnostic / 
annunciation systems. 
4 Moderately High 
Failure can be detected through 
weekly testing or inspection. 
5 Moderately 
Failure may be detected through 
weekly testing or inspection. 
6 Low 
Failure detection only possible when 
BOP is pulled from the well. 
7 Very Low 
There is a poor chance to detect 
failure when BOP is pulled from the 
well. 
8 Remote 
Failure can probably detect during a 
general preventive maintenance. 
9 Very Remote 
Failure would only be detected during 
a major overhaul. 
10 Absolutely Uncertain Absolute certainty of non-detection. 
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4.3 FMECA Analysis Result 
A system FMECA has been performed for the subsea BOP system and a total 
of ninety-five failure modes entries are recorded in the FMECA study. These are 
summarized in Table 4-4
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Table 4-4: Subsea BOP FMECA Worksheet 
BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS 
  
LOCAL 
EFFECTS 
GLOBAL 
EFFECTS 
S O D RPN 
  
BOP STACK 
Fixed Pipe/Test 
Ram 
Seal well around 
a drill pipe of fixed 
diameter 
F1 Fails to open 
Hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks) 
or Mechanical 
failures  
Human error 
Affected ram 
not able to 
function.  
No global effect.  
Loss time in 
drilling 
operation. 
BOP visual 
indicator, 
pressure gauges/ 
testing, hydraulic 
system feedback, 
flow meter 
3 4 2 24 
Maintenance, testing 
and inspections, use 
of well trained and 
competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
  
BOP STACK Fixed Pipe RAM 
Seal well around 
a drill pipe of fixed 
diameter 
F2 Fails to close 
Hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks)  
Insufficient closing 
pressure 
Mechanical failures 
(Damaged rubber 
seal) 
Plug formation 
between the drill 
string and BOP  
Inability to test 
or fire a closing 
function 
or full closure 
restricted from 
hydrate plug. 
loss of 
containment 
and potential 
well control loss 
if redundancy 
fails. 
Function and 
Pressure testing 
of the BOP 
9 5 2 90 
Maintenance, testing 
and inspections, use 
of well trained and 
competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
  
BOP STACK Fixed Pipe RAM 
Seal well around 
a drill pipe of fixed 
diameter 
F3 
Fails to fully 
open 
Mechanical or 
hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks) 
The presence of 
hydrate plug formed 
in the ram cavity 
(e.g from water-
based muds used to 
test or flush) 
Slow activation 
of opening 
function. 
Downtime - 
delay to 
operations 
Indications 
through 
obstruction in th e 
bore passage 
during operations 
after running pipe. 
3 4 2 24 
Maintenance, testing 
and inspectionuse of 
well trained and 
competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
  
BOP STACK Fixed Pipe RAM 
Seal well around 
a drill pipe of fixed 
diameter 
F4 
External 
leakage 
Hydraulic failure or 
Mechanical failures 
(Damaged ram body 
bonnet seals, and 
ram packing rubber, 
gaskets and springs, 
damaged piston 
seat.) 
Control or 
wellbore fluid 
leak 
inability to 
maintain 
wellbore or 
around pipe 
sealing. 
Loss of 
containment 
and potential 
well control loss 
if redundancy 
fails 
Active mud pit 
tank volume 
checks for 
missing fluid 
10 6 3 180 
Routine 
maintenance, 
Complete Pressure 
testing - at surface, 
during installation, 
periodical while on 
wellhead. 
 Use of well trained 
and competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
Redundant 
preventers being 
available. 
 
Pump rate reduction 
(to cool fluids before 
reaching surface) 
when temperatures   
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BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
reach a specified 
maximum for 
elastomers to be in-
form 
BOP STACK Fixed Pipe RAM 
Seal well around 
a  drill pipe of 
fixed diameter 
F5 
Internal 
Leakage 
Damaged bonnet 
seals, ram packing 
runners and top 
seats 
control or 
wellbore fluid 
leak 
inability to 
maintain 
wellbore or 
around pipe 
sealing. 
No immediate 
effect  
potential to 
worsen well 
control 
operation 
During pressure 
testing- 
installation, on the 
rig testing 
(opportunistic 
testing  during 
repairs and 
scheduled testing) 
Shut in Pressure 
variation; 
potentially an 
increase in trip 
tank volume 
7 3 2 42 
Routine 
maintenance,  
Complete Pressure 
testing - at surface, 
during installation, 
periodical while on 
wellhead. 
 Use of well trained 
and competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
Redundant 
preventers being 
available. 
 
Pump rate reduction 
(to cool fluids before 
reaching surface) 
when temperatures 
reach a specified 
maximum for 
elastomers to be in-
form   
BOP STACK 
Variable Bore 
RAM 
Seal well around 
pipe for a range of 
diameter (small) 
F6 Fails to Open 
Hydraulic failure  
(shuttle valve leaks) 
or Mechanical 
failures  
Human error 
Affected ram 
not able to 
function.  
No global effect.  
downtime - 
delay to 
operations 
BOP visual 
indicator, 
pressure gauges/ 
testing ,  hydraulic 
system feedback , 
flow meter 
3 4 2 24 
Routine maintenance 
and inspection 
Ensure operators are 
well trained to 
understand and 
ensure compliance.   
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BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
BOP STACK 
Variable Bore 
RAM 
Seal well around 
pipe for a range of 
diameter (small) 
F7 Fail to Close 
Hydraulic failure  
(shuttle valve leaks)  
Insufficient closing 
pressure 
Mechanical failures 
(Damaged rubber 
seal) 
Plug formation 
between the drill 
string and BOP  
Affected ram 
not able to 
function. (not 
holding 
pressure) 
Erosion of pipe 
in the well 
Potential 
continuous flow 
of fluid to 
surface 
Well control 
operation 
delayed  
During pressure 
testing- 
installation, on the 
rig testing 
(opportunistic 
testing  during 
repairs and 
scheduled 
testing)- 
Shut in Pressure( 
shut-in drill pipe 
pressure/stand-
pipe  or shut in 
casing pressure 
variation; 
During Well 
control scenario 
potentially an 
increase in trip 
tank volume or pit 
gain/  
9 5 2 90 
Maintenance, testing 
and inspections,  use 
of well trained and 
competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
  
BOP STACK 
Variable Bore 
RAM 
Seal well around 
pipe for a range of 
diameter (small) 
F8 
Fails to fully 
Open 
Mechanical or 
hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks) 
When running 
a pipe, the pipe 
can potentially 
damage the 
ram body 
downtime - 
delay to 
operations 
During well 
control 
operation ram is 
damaged and 
leakage will 
ensue. 
Flow meter 
(flowrate of fluid 
through flowline to 
shale shaker 
before mud pit. 
3 4 2 24 
Maintenance, testing 
and inspections,  use 
of well trained and 
competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
  
BOP STACK 
Variable Bore 
RAM 
Seal well around 
pipe for a range of 
diameter (small) 
F9 
Internal 
leakage 
Damaged bonnet 
seals, ram packing 
runners and top 
seats 
Inability to seal 
off the well 
resulting in 
leakages 
Worst case:  
fluid influx gets 
to surface. 
However, 
quantity 
depends on the 
time span taken 
to close the 
VBR till th enext 
preventer is 
closed. 
Shut in Pressure 
variation; 
potentially an 
increase in trip 
tank volume 
10 6 3 180 
Maintenance, testing 
and inspections,  use 
of well trained and 
competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
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BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
BOP STACK 
Variable Bore 
RAM 
Seal well around 
pipe for a range of 
diameter (small) 
F10 
External 
leakage 
Hydraulic failure or 
Mechanical failures 
(Damaged ram body 
bonnet seals, and 
ram packing rubber,  
slack ram housing 
flange, Damaged 
gaskets and springs, 
damaged piston 
seat.) 
Leakage to the 
environment 
Further 
deterioration of 
seals and bolts 
with potential of 
causing 
excessive spill 
to environment. 
Reduction in 
hydraulic 
pressure 
7 3 2 42 
Routine 
maintenance, 
Complete Pressure  
testing  - at surface, 
during installation, 
periodical while on 
wellhead. 
 Use of well trained 
and competent 
personnel, BOP 
function testing every 
week 
Redundant 
preventers being 
available. 
Pump rate reduction 
(to cool fluids before 
reaching surface) 
when temperatures 
reach a specified 
maximum for 
elastomers to be in-
form   
BOP STACK 
Blind Shear 
Ram 
Cuts through 
specified drill pipe 
(but not tool joint) 
and extends to 
seal wellbore.  
Also capable of 
sealing an open 
wellbore without a 
drill-pipe. 
F11 
Fails to 
Shear and 
close 
Mechanical (shear 
blade failure, bonnet 
door failure) or 
hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks 
or insufficient 
pressure) 
Different material 
class of Drill string- 
Ram not qualified to 
shear that 
dimension or size of 
drill string. 
Drillstring not 
centred in position 
Function 
activates but 
not complete 
Leak of fluid 
from wellbore 
to topside and 
environment 
Potentially result 
in a blowout in 
the event of a 
Kick 
loss of life, 
asset and  
Detectable only 
upon activation 
based on 
indicators.  
10 3 2 60 
None 
Proper qualification 
to be carried out for 
attaining required 
functions (e.g. 
shearability) under 
condition of use as 
stated in the spec, 
scope of work or as 
prescribed in 
guidelines. 
  
BOP STACK 
Blind Shear 
Ram  
Cuts through 
specified drill pipe 
(but not tool joint) 
and extends to 
seal wellbore. 
Also capable of 
sealing an open 
wellbore without a 
drill-pipe. 
F12 
Fails to close 
(seal open-
hole) 
Mechanical (shear 
blade failure, bonnet 
door failure) or 
hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks 
or insufficient 
pressure)Plug 
formation between 
the drillstring and 
BOP  
Inability to seal 
well in the 
event of Kick 
Escalation of a 
well control 
event that could 
be a risk the 
asset and 
personnel 
Easily detected 
during Function 
testingDuring 
operation, easily 
detectable as pipe 
to be sheared 
does not shear.  
10 3 4 120 
Routine 
maintenance,Comple
te Pressure  testing  - 
at surface, during 
installation, periodical 
while on wellhead. 
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BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
BOP STACK 
Blind Shear 
Ram 
Cuts through 
specified drill pipe 
(but not tool joint) 
and extends to 
seal wellbore.  
Also capable of 
sealing an open 
wellbore without a 
drill-pipe. 
F13 Fails to Open 
Mechanical or 
hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks) 
The presence of 
hydrate plug formed 
in the ram cavity 
(e.g from water-
based muds used to 
test or flush) 
Affected ram 
not able to 
function and 
presents delay 
to maintenance 
or operations 
program 
No Global effect 
BOP visual 
indicator, 
pressure guages/ 
testing ,  hydraulic 
system feedback , 
flow meter 
3 4 2 24 
Routine 
maintenance, 
Complete Pressure  
testing  - at surface, 
during installation, 
periodical while on 
wellhead. 
  
BOP STACK 
Blind Shear 
Ram 
Cuts through 
specified drill pipe 
(but not tool joint) 
and extends to 
seal wellbore.  
Also capable of 
sealing an open 
wellbore without a 
drill-pipe. 
F14 
Fails to fully 
open 
Mechanical or 
hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks) 
The presence of 
hydrate plug formed 
in the ram cavity 
(e.g. from water-
based muds used to 
test or flush) 
Affected ram 
not able to 
function and 
presents delay 
to maintenance 
or operations 
program 
No Global effect 
BOP visual 
indicator, 
pressure guages/ 
testing ,  hydraulic 
system feedback , 
flow meter 
3 4 2 24 
Routine 
maintenance, 
Complete Pressure  
testing  - at surface, 
during installation, 
periodical while on 
wellhead. 
  
BOP STACK 
Blind Shear 
Ram 
Cuts through 
specified drill pipe 
(but not tool joint) 
and extends to 
seal wellbore.  
Also capable of 
sealing an open 
wellbore without a 
drill-pipe. 
F15 
Internal 
Leakage (via 
a closed ram) 
Mechanical related 
failures- Damaged 
bonnet seals, ram 
packing runners and 
top seats. 
improper 
maintenance-
missing seals 
over pressure during 
testing 
Depending on 
the size of the 
leak, it can 
potentially 
expose the rig 
floor to 
maximum 
anticipated 
surface 
pressure 
(MASP) of the 
well. 
 
Inability to pass 
pressure 
testing during 
testing 
Delay in 
Operation ( If 
this is implies  
loss of a 
secondary 
barrier) 
 
Worse case: 
potential loss of 
well control 
During a PT/FT it 
would not hold 
pressure SICP 
dropping or 
wellhead fluid 
dropping out of 
surface. 
8 4 3 96 
Routine 
maintenance, 
Complete Pressure  
testing  - at surface, 
during installation, 
periodical while on 
wellhead. 
Note: It is expected 
that during testing 
the sealing 
performance must 
pass the low 
pressure test and 
high pressure test. 
This is less likely to 
occur, however 
recorded for 
completion.   
BOP STACK 
Blind Shear 
Ram 
Cuts through 
specified drill pipe 
(but not tool joint) 
and extends to 
seal wellbore.  
Also capable of 
sealing an open 
wellbore without a 
drill-pipe. 
F16 
External 
leakage 
worn sealing 
elements, human 
factor, mechanical 
failures damaged 
gasket connections, 
or damaged body 
bonnet, 
misalignment 
leakage to 
environment of 
control and/or 
wellbore fluid 
Failure of ram to 
seal wellbore 
with pipe in hole 
or close open 
hole. 
Loss of 
containment 
 Pressure guages, 
hydraulic system 
feedback, 
flowmeter, 
Visual 
9 5 2 90   
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BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
BOP STACK 
Casing Shear 
Ram 
Cuts through 
casing and 
extends to seal 
wellbore.  
Also capable of 
sealing an open 
wellbore without a 
drill-pipe. (in this 
thesis it is 
assumed all shear 
rams should be 
able to shear and 
seal) 
F17 
Fails to close 
(seal open-
hole) 
Mechanical or 
hydraulic failure 
(shuttle valve leaks) 
Human error (e.g. 
ram closed on a tool 
joint) 
  
The formation 
will be exposed 
to excessive 
pressure during 
testing ram- if 
the testing 
pressure is 
above the 
fracture 
pressure (from 
leak-off test) 
This constitutes 
bigger issue of 
losing mud to 
the well- 
formation fluid 
flows to the well 
and loose 
hydrostatic and 
thus fracture 
needs to be 
healed 
  9 3 2 54 
Routine 
maintenance, 
Complete Pressure  
testing  - at surface, 
during installation, 
periodical while on 
wellhead. 
  
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
SYSTEM 
CHOKE AND 
KILL LINES  
(flex, vertical-
flex loop, 
horizontal flex 
loop)- BOP 
attached line 
To circulate Kicks 
To inject fluid into 
the BOP 
F18 
External 
Leakage  
mechanical 
deformation/damage 
(at coflex hose and 
jumper hose line) 
External Shock (e.g. 
bad weather) 
Over pressure 
Damaged or bad 
packing 
Leakage of 
fluid 
 Down time in 
drilling process 
ROV detection 
function and 
installation testing 
During 
maintenance on 
rig 
6 6 4 144 Redundant lines 
  
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
SYSTEM 
CHOKE AND 
KILL LINES 
(flex, vertical-
flex loop, 
horizontal flex 
loop)- BOP 
attached line 
To circulate Kicks 
To inject fluid into 
the BOP 
F19 Plugged  line hydrate blockage or  
Inability to 
carry out choke 
and kill valve 
testing 
Inability to 
circulate fluid 
during a Kick 
 Down time in 
drilling process- 
if observed 
during a test 
e.g. when 
running the 
BOP delay in 
well control 
procedure-given 
the presence of 
a redundant line 
Potential 
tendency  to 
worsen control 
effort 
Function and 
installation testing 
Pressure gauges 
7 3 4 84 
Cooling or adding 
chemical inhibitors to 
circulation fluids , 
and/or increasing 
mud weight for 
stabilization 
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BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
SYSTEM 
CHOKE AND 
KILL LINES 
(flex, vertical-
flex loop, 
horizontal flex 
loop)- BOP 
attached line 
To circulate Kicks 
To inject fluid into 
the BOP 
F20 Burst Line 
Over pressure, 
Improper material 
qualification 
External destructive 
force/shock 
Leakage of 
fluid to 
environment 
Potential delay 
in well control 
procedure 
Loss of 
redundancy 
given second 
line available 
ROV detection 
Pressure and 
installation testing 
7 3 4 84 Redundant lines 
  
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
SYSTEM 
Choke and Kill 
Line  
Jumper hose-
line 
To circulate Kicks 
To inject fluid into 
the BOP 
F21 
External 
leakage 
Damaged or bad 
acting seals 
over pressure 
External shock 
induced damage 
Inability to test 
choke and kill 
line 
Loss of 
redundancy 
given second 
line available 
ROV detection  
Pressure testing 
Visible inspection 
6 6 4 144   
  
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
SYSTEM 
Choke and Kill 
Line  
Riser Attached 
line 
To circulate Kicks 
To inject fluid into 
the BOP 
F22 
External 
leakge 
Mechanical 
deformation/damage 
(at coflex hose and 
jumper hose line) 
Damaged or bad 
packing seals, ring 
gaskets, line seals 
at riser joints 
Damaged hub on 
the kill line 
over pressure 
External Shock (bad 
weather) 
Leakage of 
circulation fluid 
to the 
environment 
Inability to hold 
pressure and 
even test  
choke and kill 
valves 
delay in 
operations and 
potentially 
drilling 
programme 
No effect on 
well control 
Potential for 
additional 
problems in 
circulating kick 
out of well-
should a kick 
occurs 
During testing 
(installation, while 
running BOP 
pressure gauges 
ROV detection 
6 6 4 144   
  
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
ISOLATION 
VALVES 
CHOKE AND 
KILL VALVES 
(Upper and 
lower- inner and 
outer choke/kill 
valve) 
Regulates the 
flow of fluid 
between the 
choke & Kill lines 
and the BOP 
F23 Fails to Open Debris on seats, 
During drilling 
fail safe valves 
are closed and 
riser is used to 
communicate 
between the 
surface and 
well control… 
riser 
disconnected 
(no 
communication 
to riser when 
BOP closed 
and) and the 
C&K should be 
able to flow all 
the way 
downInability to 
Kill well 
Gas migration 
can occur 
overtime can 
occur and high 
pressure builds 
up at surface 
and formation 
(MAASP 
exceeded, 
fracture the 
shoe) if surface 
pressure greater 
than the 
MASSP)Not 
sure of actual 
volume of fluid 
required to 
pump 
Pressure Gauges 8 3 3 72 
more than one choke 
line  
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BOP SYSTEM FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY  ANALYSIS  
BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
ISOLATION 
VALVES 
CHOKE AND 
KILL VALVES 
(Upper and 
lower- inner and 
outer choke/kill 
valve) 
Regulates the 
flow of fluid 
between the 
choke & Kill lines 
and the BOP 
F24 Fails to close   
Inability to 
shut-in the well 
  Pressure Gauges 8 3 2 48   
  
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
ISOLATION 
VALVES 
CHOKE AND 
KILL VALVES 
(Upper and 
lower- inner and 
outer choke/kill 
valve) 
Regulates the 
flow of fluid 
between the 
choke & Kill lines 
and the BOP 
F25 
Internal 
leakage 
(through a 
closed valve) 
 Mechanical failures- 
worn-out ring gasket 
Valve would 
not hold low 
pressure  
Inability to test 
or have a good 
test 
No global effect- 
operation can 
continue and 
problem fixed 
when BOP 
pulled 
Pressure Gauges 
Test during 
installation and 
running of the 
BOP 
8 6 4 192 
Presence of 
redundancy in lines 
each having two 
valves in series 
Flushing and 
greasing of valve   
CHOKE AND 
KILL 
ISOLATION 
VALVES 
CHOKE AND 
KILL VALVES 
(Upper and 
lower- inner and 
outer choke/kill 
valve) 
Regulates the 
flow of fluid 
between the 
choke & Kill lines 
and the BOP 
F26 
External 
leakage 
 worn-out ring 
gasket 
leakage at the 
flange, 
connections or 
ring gasket 
between the 
valve and BOP 
body 
External 
leakage to 
environment, if 
below LPR- the 
BOP will leak 
should during a 
well lick, a 
closure of the 
BOP is 
attempted 
  9 4 3 108 
Presence of 
redundancy in lines 
each having two 
valves in series 
  
LMRP 
Annular 
Preventers 
Seals the annulus 
around a drill pipe 
(different 
diameters) or tool 
going through the 
BOP 
F27 
Fails to close/ 
Seal 
Closing pressure not 
maintained, 
Worn parts (sealing 
elements) 
The  
This can lead to 
extended 
leakage during 
a loss of well 
control with fluid  
Pressure gauges, 
hydraulic system 
feedback, 
flowmeter, 
Pressure and 
function testing 
on-board rig 
8 3 2 48 
Presence of 
redundancy 
Routine Functional 
and Pressure Testing 
Good choice of 
sealing element 
Maintenance by way 
of repair or 
replacement 
Flushing through kill 
line, increasing the 
closing pressure to 
attempt closing   
LMRP 
Annular 
Preventers 
Seals the annulus 
around a drill pipe 
(different 
diameters) or tool 
going through the 
BOP 
F28 
Internal 
Leakage 
(Hydraulic- 
control fluid 
section) 
mechanical failures 
Worn-out sealing 
elements, 
Human factor 
Leak at weep 
hole,  
unable to close 
chamber 
pressure 
Potential 
increase in loss 
time 
Not critical to 
blowout hazard 
Pressure and 
function testing 
on-board rig 
5 1 2 10 
Presence of 
redundancy 
Routine Functional 
and Pressure Testing 
Good choice of 
sealing element 
Maintenance by way 
of repair or 
replacement   
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BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
LMRP 
Annular 
Preventers 
Seals the annulus 
around a drill pipe 
(different 
diameters) or tool 
going through the 
BOP 
F29 
Internal 
Leakage (via 
a closed 
annular) 
mechanical failures 
Worn-out sealing 
elements ( of piston, 
body), annular pack 
Pitting corrosion 
Human factor 
Annular 
preventer 
unable to pass 
test on-board 
rig and during 
installation  
Inability to 
execute 
annular sealing 
function during 
normal 
operation 
Potential 
increase in loss 
time 
Not critical to 
blowout hazard 
 Pressure gauges, 
hydraulic system 
feedback, 
flowmeter, 
Pressure and 
function testing 
on-board rig 
8 4 5 160 
Presence of 
redundancy 
Routine Functional 
and Pressure Testing 
Good choice of 
sealing element 
Maintenance by way 
of repair or 
replacement 
  
LMRP 
Annular 
Preventers 
Seals the annulus 
around a drill pipe 
(different 
diameters) or tool 
going through the 
BOP 
F30 Fail to Open 
mechanical failures 
Worn-out sealing 
elements ( of piston, 
body), annular pack 
Pitting corrosion 
Human factor 
Potential 
increase in rig 
downtime  
 
If during real 
well control 
situation and 
well has  been 
killed and the 
annular is 
being opened 
to move the 
string and pipe 
will be stucked. 
This is a more 
catastrophic 
event from a 
financial point 
of well as the 
well will be lost, 
given the well 
will be side-
tracked. 
 
Not critical to 
blowout hazard 
Pressure gauges, 
hydraulic system 
feedback, 
flowmeter, 
Observation of 
restriction in 
running a tool  
(usually large 
diameter tools) 
through annular- 
signals retracted 
sealing elements 
Pressure and 
function testing 
on-board rig 
5 1 1 5 
Presence of 
redundancy 
Routine Functional 
and Pressure Testing 
Good choice of 
sealing element 
Maintenance by way 
of repair or 
replacement 
  
LMRP 
Annular 
Preventers 
Seals the annulus 
around a drill pipe 
(different 
diameters) or tool 
going through the 
BOP 
F31 
Fail to fully 
open 
Slow relaxation of 
the annular rubber 
Rig not perfectly 
positioned above 
the well 
Inability to 
execute some 
operations 
(due to 
restriction) e.g. 
changing drill 
bit, running test 
assembly  
Potential 
increase in rig 
downtime 
Not critical to 
blowout hazard 
Pressure gauges, 
hydraulic system 
feedback, 
flowmeter, 
Observation of 
restriction in 
running a tool 
through it 
Pressure and 
function testing 
on-board rig 
5 1 1 5 
Presence of 
redundancy 
Routine Functional 
and Pressure Testing 
Good choice of 
sealing element 
Maintenance by way 
of repair or 
replacement 
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BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
LMRP 
Annular 
Preventers 
Seals the annulus 
around a drill pipe 
(different 
diameters) or tool 
going through the 
BOP 
F32 
External 
leakage 
worn sealing 
elements, human 
factor, mechanical 
failures damaged 
gasket connections, 
or damaged body 
bonnet, 
misalignment. 
Leakage to 
environment of 
control and  
wellbore fluid 
Loss of use of 
annular rams.  
 Pressure guages, 
hydraulic system 
feedback, 
flowmeter, 
Visual 
9 3 2 54   
  
LMRP Joint (Flexible ) 
To enable relative 
movement 
between BOP & 
Riser 
F33 
External 
leakage 
Bad heat treatment 
resulting in a 
welding error 
loss of fluid in 
the riser to the 
sea 
environment. 
loss of 
hydrostatic 
control and 
then 
influx of kick  
worst case 
scenario: kick 
not well 
managed could 
result in a 
Blowout with 
potential for 
fatalities and 
loss of asset. 
inspection  7 5 2 70 
Routine maintenance 
and inspection 
Ensure operators are 
well trained to 
understand and 
ensure compliance. 
  
LMRP 
Hydraulic 
Connectors 
Enables 
connection and 
disconnection of 
the LMRP, BOP 
an wellhead 
F34 Fails to latch 
Misalignment in the 
locking mechanism 
mechanical damage 
at the connection 
affecting lock 
mechanism e.g. 
damaged locking 
mechanism 
LMRP or BOP 
stack fails to 
latch 
No global effect 
No hydraulic 
response 
Testing of BOP 
5 2 1     
  
LMRP 
Hydraulic 
Connectors 
Enables 
connection and 
disconnection of 
the LMRP, BOP 
an wellhead 
F35 
Fails to 
unlatch 
Failed Hydraulic 
system (e.g. 
solenoid valve 
failure) 
stuck connector 
Disconnect at 
connection 
point  
extended 
damage to 
connector after 
a drive off 
Leakage to the 
environment 
When drifting 
off, either due to 
bad weather or 
the occurrence 
of a black-out, 
when drilling 
from a DP 
vessel. Damage 
to riser 
considerable rig 
downtime, 
which is costly 
No hydraulic 
response 
Testing of BOP 
sealing elements 
Only detectable 
in-use 
7 3 2 42 
Good maintenance 
practice is 
recommended 
Duly qualified 
materials and 
components be used. 
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BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
LMRP 
Hydraulic 
Connectors 
Enables 
connection and 
disconnection of 
the LMRP, BOP 
an wellhead 
F36 
Spurious 
unlatching 
Failed Hydraulic 
systems stuck 
connectorA 
combination of 
factors- POCV in the 
locking circuit of the  
LMRP leaks and 
damaged wire linked 
with the lock 
mechanism of the 
connector.  
Disconnect at 
connection 
point extended 
damage to 
connector after 
a drive off 
Leakage to the 
environmentWh
en drifting off, 
either due to 
bad weather or 
the occurrence 
of a black-out, 
when drilling 
from a DP 
vessel. Damage 
to riser 
considerable rig 
downtime, 
which is 
costlyThis could 
result in a 
blowout 
potentially if it 
occurred during 
drilling-without a 
riser margin 
No hydraulic 
responseTesting 
of BOPFunction 
activation 
indicator 
10 4 2 80   
  
LMRP 
Hydraulic 
Connectors 
Enables 
connection and 
disconnection of 
the LMRP, BOP 
an wellhead 
F37 
External 
leakage 
washed ring gasket 
seals 
Leakage 
through the 
connector to 
the 
environment 
Delay in drilling 
operation 
requiring a 
retrieval of BOP 
Stack or LMRP 
Potential loss of 
well control due 
to inability to 
control kick 
occurrence-if 
BOP on 
wellhead 
Pressure testing  
No hydraulic 
response 
ROV inspection 
7 3 2 42 
correct rating of the 
connector during 
qualification and 
manufacture 
  
TOPSIDES 
Pod Selector 
Valve 
(Manipulator 
valve) 
Selects a subsea 
pod to be flowed 
at a point in time. 
Given only one of 
the two subsea 
pods is required 
to be flowed with 
hydraulic fluid for 
BOP function. 
F38 
Fail to move 
(Inability to 
change 
position i.e. 
stuck open 
/closed) 
Solenoid valve 
failure, mechanical 
failure, corrosion, 
stuck (too high 
friction), obstruction, 
fatigue 
No hydraulic 
fluid transfer 
Hydraulic fluid 
cannot be 
transmitted into 
another subsea 
pod,  should 
one of the pods 
fail. This would 
prevent the 
BOP from 
functioning with 
a potential for 
blowout as an 
outcome. 
Visual monitoring 
of pressure 
transmitter and 
flowmeter. 
Valve position 
indicator lights. 
2 4 2 16 
Inspection, testing 
and maintenance be 
planned regularly 
and manual 
intervention. 
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BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
TOPSIDES 
Accumulator 
isolator valve 
(inside HPU) 
Isolates hydraulic 
fluid from 
accumulator 
F39 Fails to close 
Mechanical failures, 
Corrosion, Wear 
No significant 
effect as flow 
can still be 
stopped with 
isolator pilot 
valve. 
No global effect 
Monitoring of flow 
meter and 
pressure 
transmitter. 
2 6 2 24 
Routine maintenance 
and testing 
Valve redundancy 
  
TOPSIDES 
Accumulator 
isolator valve 
(inside HPU) 
Isolates hydraulic 
fluid from 
accumulator 
F40 Fails to open 
Mechanical failures, 
Corrosion, Wear 
No hydraulic 
fluid 
transferred 
through valve 
No 
consequence 
owing to 
redundancy 
Monitoring of flow 
meter and 
pressure 
transmitter. 
2 6 2 24 
Routine maintenance 
and testing 
Valve redundancy 
  
TOPSIDES 
Accumulator 
isolator valve 
(inside control 
manifold) 
Isolates hydraulic 
fluid from 
accumulator 
F41 
Fails to 
open/close 
Mechanical failures, 
Corrosion, Wear 
Stuck and no pilot 
supply 
No hydraulic 
fluid 
transferred 
through valve 
No 
consequence 
owing to 
redundancy 
Monitoring of flow 
meter and 
pressure 
transmitter. 
2 6 2 24 
Routine maintenance 
and testing 
Valve redundancy 
  
TOPSIDES 
Hydraulic 
Power Unit 
(HPU) 
Provide and 
control pilot and  
power hydraulic 
fluid  
F42 
External 
leakage of 
hydraulic fluid 
External damage, 
Material failure, 
component failure 
Leakage of 
control fluid to 
the 
environment 
Loss of 
redundancy 
No immediate 
consequence 
(besides these 
can be fixed as 
on the deck) 
Visual detection, 
Alarm and 
monitoring in the 
topsides CCU. 
2 6 2 24 
Redundancy exists 
as a safeguard 
  
TOPSIDES 
Hydraulic 
Power Unit 
(HPU) 
Provide and 
control pilot and  
power hydraulic 
fluid  
F43 
Blockage of 
hydraulic 
Dirts, debris,  
Inability to 
supply 
hydraulic 
Loss of 
redundancy 
No immediate 
consequence 
(besides these 
can be fixed as 
on the deck) 
Visual detection, 
Alarm and 
monitoring in the 
topsides CCU. 
2 6 2 24 
Redundancy exists 
as a safeguard 
  
TOPSIDES 
Hydraulic 
Power Unit 
(HPU) 
Communication of 
control and 
monitoring 
function between 
HPU and  
F44 
Loss of 
communicati
on 
Loss of 
power supply 
External damage, 
Material failure, 
component failure 
Loss of one 
communication 
line  
Loss of 
redundant 
power supply 
Loss of 
redundancy 
No immediate 
consequence 
(besides these 
can be fixed as 
on the deck) 
Visual detection, 
Alarm and 
monitoring in the 
topsides CCU. 
2 6 2 24 
Redundancy exists 
as a safeguard 
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SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
TOPSIDES 
Hydraulic 
Jumper (HPU to 
reel) and 
couplings (inlet 
and outlet) 
To transport and 
distribute 
hydraulic fluid 
through reel 
/subsea junction 
box to subsea 
F45 
Fluid leakage 
to sea 
Coupling seal or 
tubing leak 
Net loss of 
hydraulic fluid 
No impact on 
operation 
Loss of 
redundancy 
Fluid spill: HPU 
reservoir make-up 
rate 
Net loss of fluid in 
the system 
Increased pump 
cycle 
2 6 2 24   
  
TOPSIDES 
Hydraulic 
Jumper (HPU to 
reel) and 
couplings (inlet 
and outlet) 
To transport and 
distribute 
hydraulic fluid 
through reel 
/subsea junction 
box to subsea 
F46 Blockage 
Dirts, manufacturing 
error 
Reduced or no 
flow of fluids to 
end users 
Hydraulic 
pressure build 
up & loss of 
supply to reach 
End Users.  
Impact on 
Operation 
Comparison of 
Subsea & supply 
system pressures;  
Reduced or No 
flow 
No or slow end 
user operation 
3 4 2 24   
  
TOPSIDES 
Electrical Power 
and Signal 
Jumper (from 
topsides to reel) 
receptacle /plug 
connectors P/S 
To maintain the 
separation of the 
Power and signal 
cable and to 
channel these 
from and to their 
appropriate 
connection points. 
F47 
Power/Signal 
channel 
supply failure 
Corrosion, Short 
circuit, open circuit 
Loss of power/ 
signal supply 
train to subsea 
end users 
No effect on 
well control 
operations as 
the system will 
continue in a 
degrade mode 
Loss of 
redundancy 
Power/Signal 
Monitoring system 
3 4 2 24 
Redundant path 
available 
  
TOPSIDES 
Electrical Power 
and Signal 
Jumper 
Power/signal 
line (P/S A) 
To maintain the 
separation of the 
Power and signal 
cable and to 
channel these 
from and to their 
appropriate 
connection points. 
F48 
Power/Signal 
channel 
supply failure 
Corrosion, Short 
circuit, open circuit 
Loss of power/ 
signal supply 
train to subsea 
end users 
No effect on 
well control 
operations as 
the system will 
continue in a 
degrade mode 
Loss of 
redundancy 
Power/Signal 
Monitoring system 
3 4 2 24 
Redundant path 
available 
  
TOPSIDES 
Control Panels 
(Drillers and 
Tool Pushers) 
To monitor 
operations 
(pressure, BOP 
functions) and 
with push buttons 
to command a 
function. 
F49 
Panel not 
working 
Electrical fault. 
Manufacturing fault 
or otherwise. 
Loss of power/ 
signal supply 
train to subsea 
end users 
No effect on 
well control 
operations as 
the system will 
continue in a 
degrade 
modeLoss of 
redundancy 
Power/Signal 
Monitoring system 
3 4 1 12 
Redundant path 
available 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Shuttle valve 
To supply 
hydraulic from 
whichever source 
to the valve has a 
higher pressure to 
activate 
associated 
equipment 
function (e.g. ram 
opening) 
F50 
Fails to 
isolate/Stuck 
Wear on slide, 
causing jam, Seized  
Delay in fluid 
transfer 
No hydraulic 
fluid supply. 
Loss of 
pressure & flow 
if usable supply 
line fails to 
supply resulting 
in loss of  
function (e.g 
Shearing, 
Shearing and 
sealing function 
not possible- 
Pressure Indicator 
functions for 
shuttle valve and 
Preventer 
functions 
Hydraulic flow 
measurements 
10 2 4 80 
Accumulator Bank 
(Fails as is and fail 
safe close) 
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COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
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FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
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DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
loss of well 
barrier  
Potential loss of 
well control 
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Shuttle valve 
To supply 
hydraulic from 
whichever source 
to the valve has a 
higher pressure to 
activate 
associated 
equipment 
function (e.g ram 
opening) 
F51 
External 
Leakage  
mechanical damage 
No Hydraulic 
fluid transfer 
Shearing and 
sealing function 
not possible- 
loss of barrier  
Potential loss of 
well control 
Indicator functions 
for shuttle valve 
and Preventer 
functions 
9 4 2 72   
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Hydraulic 
Distribution 
Shuttle valve 
(Coupling + 
Tubing)  
To contain and 
transport LP 
hydraulic fluid 
from the Shuttle 
Valve to a 
function 
F52 
Fluid leakage 
to sea 
Coupling Seal or 
tube leak 
Mechanical failures- 
thermal fatigue, 
failures in gaskets, 
fittings, etc., 
vibration effects, 
inadequate support 
or external force not 
sufficient. 
Fluid spill into 
sea (Poss. 
Environmental 
issues) 
Loss of LP 
supply to a 
function. 
Impact on 
Drilling 
Operation 
Loss of  BOP 
activation 
function 
 
Hyd. Flow 
measurement 
9 5 3 135 
None; 
Accumulator Bank 
(Fail As Is and Fail 
Safe Close) in the 
first few hours before 
total system failure. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Hydraulic 
Distribution 
Shuttle valve 
(Coupling + 
Tubing)  
To contain and 
transport LP 
hydraulic fluid 
from the Shuttle 
Valve to a 
function 
F53 Blockage 
Dirt, manufacturing 
error 
Loss of LP 
supply for 
Activating a 
function 
Hydraulic 
pressure build 
up & loss of 
supply to reach 
End Users.  
Impact on 
Operation 
Comparison of 
Subsea & supply 
system pressures;  
Reduced or No 
flow 
No or slow end 
user operation 
7 5 3 105 
None; 
Accumulator Bank 
(Fail As Is and Fail 
Safe Close) in the 
first few hours before 
total system failure. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Manifold 
Hydraulic 
Pressure 
Regulator 
Regulates control 
fluid pressure 
which is supplied 
to all ram 
functions, BOP 
side outlets 
hydraulic Valves, 
hydraulic 
connectors, and 
also systems with 
locking 
mechanism e.g. 
Cameron's wedge 
F54 
Unstable 
output 
pressures 
Normal wear and 
tear on known low 
reliability component 
Out of spec 
output 
pressure (Low 
Pressure)  
No possibility of 
ultimate firing of 
specified ram 
and other 
associated 
function & 
activating valves 
and 
Potential loss of 
well control. 
Pressure gauges 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
10 6 2 120   
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BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
lock 
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Annular 
Hydraulic 
Pressure 
Regulator 
Regulates control 
fluid pressure 
which is supplied 
to the annular 
preventers only 
F55 
Unstable 
output 
pressures 
Normal wear and 
tear on known low 
reliability component 
Out of spec 
output 
pressure (Low 
Pressure)  
Inability to 
activate annular 
function & 
function valves  
Worst case: 
Well control 
operation 
hindered. 
Pressure gauges 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
9 5 2 90   
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Pod/Stack 
Mounted 
Accumulator 
Isolation valve  
Isolates hydraulic 
fluid in the 
Pod/Accumulator 
F56 
Fails to 
close/open 
Mechanical failures, 
Corrosion, Wear 
No hydraulic 
fluid 
transferred 
through valve 
No 
consequence 
owing to 
redundancy 
Monitoring of flow 
meter and 
pressure 
transmitter. 
2 6 2 24 
Routine maintenance 
and testing 
Valve redundancy 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B)  
(Pressure 
Vessel) 
To exclude water 
from electronics 
(nitrogen charge 
in pressure 
casing) 
F57 
Electrical 
short to 
circuit or 
earth 
Leak along cable 
access 
Loss of 
function of 
SEM.  
Potential loss 
of control of 
system 
pressure 
monitoring and 
flow 
parameters 
Loss of 
redundancy. No 
effect on BOP 
operation 
Potential for 
unintended 
operation such 
as closing or 
opening or 
sealing against 
an open hole or 
drill pipe. 
Alarm 2 1 1 2 
Initial fluid 
contamination should 
be by dielectric fluid 
from enclosure with 
no effect 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B)  
(Pressure 
Vessel) 
To exclude water 
from electronics 
(nitrogen charge 
in pressure 
casing) 
F58 
Electrical 
short to 
circuit or 
earth 
Leak along cable 
access 
Loss of 
function of 
SEM.  
Potential loss 
of control of 
system 
pressure 
monitoring and 
flow 
parameters 
Potential for 
unintended 
operation such 
as closing or 
opening or 
sealing against 
an open hole or 
drill pipe. 
Alarm 9 2 1 18 
Initial fluid 
contamination should 
be by dielectric fluid 
from enclosure with 
no effect 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B)  
To convert and 
regulate incoming 
supplies to 250V 
AC for input to the 
Rectifier and EMC 
F59 No output 
Transformer failure 
open circuit, earth 
fault 
Loss of one 
channel power 
to Rectifier and 
EMC Filter. 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
BOP operation 
Loss of channel 
output 
2 1 1 2 
Other Channel 
available 
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CRITICALITY 
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BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
(Transformer) Filter 
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Safety SEM 
A/B) 
(Transformer) 
To convert and 
regulate incoming 
supplies to 250V 
AC for input to the 
Rectifier and EMC 
Filter 
F60 
Incorrect 
voltage at 
output; 
Erratic 
voltage 
Transformer failure 
short circuit 
Overvoltage 
could cause 
damage to 
rectifier.  
No effect on 
BOP operations 
as the system 
will continue to 
run in a 
degraded mode 
for a period  
Loss of 
redundancy. 
Probable loss of 
channel output 
1 1 1 1 
Other Channel 
available 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B)  
(Rectifier for 
EMC Filter 
unit)) 
To rectify the 
supply 250V AC 
to a DC Output to 
the EMC Filter 
F61 
Loss of 
output 
Electronic fault; 
short circuit, open 
circuit 
Loss of one 
channel power 
of DC Voltage 
to EMC Filter. 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
operation 
None 2 1 1 2 
Other Transformer 
path and Rectifier will 
provide supply to the 
EMC Filter 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B)  
(DC EMC Filter) 
To smooth the 
rectified DC input 
supply to the 
Power Supply 
Board. 
F62 Fail to output 
Electronic fault; 
short circuit, open 
circuit 
Loss of supply 
to Power 
Supply Unit 
causing loss of 
DC - DC 
Converters 
Total loss of 
power supplies 
to 
Instrumentation 
SEM end users.  
Loss of 
redundancy  
No effect on 
operation 
No output to the 
Power Supply 
Board 
3 1 1 2 Other channel 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Subsea 
Electronics 
Module  A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B)  
(DC/DC 
Converter 5V) 
To convert 
incoming DC 
Voltage to 5V DC 
and distribute for 
use in Mode, 
Serial and 
Analogue cards, 
and the Stack 
F63 
Loss of 
output 
Short Circuit; open 
circuit 
Loss of end 
user functions 
Loss of 
Instrumentation 
SEM 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
operation 
Modem failure 
alarm  
System dynamic 
indications 
2 1 1 2 Other channel 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B)  
(DC/DC 
Converter 24V) 
To convert 
incoming DC 
Voltage to 24V 
DC (Main) and 
distribute for use 
in Modem, Serial 
and Analogue 
cards. 
F64 
Loss of 
output 
Short Circuit; open 
circuit 
Loss of end 
user functions 
Loss of 
Instrumentation 
SEM 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
operation 
Modem failure 
alarm 
System dynamic 
indications 
2 1 1 2 Other channel 
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BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Subsea 
Electronics 
Module A/B 
(Instru. SEM 
A/B) (DC/DC 
Converter 24V 
Aux) 
To convert 
incoming DC 
Voltage to 24V 
DC (Aux) and 
distribute for use 
in Serial cards. 
F65 
Loss of 
output 
Short Circuit; open 
circuit 
Loss of limited 
functionality of 
Serial card end 
users 
Loss of 
redundancy. No 
effect on 
operation 
System dynamic 
indications 
2 1 1 2 Other channel 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Ethernet 
Modem)                    
To provide 
communication 
link with surface 
acting as a slave 
device to the 
surface controller 
F66 
Loss of 
function 
Data corrupt, 
electrical fault 
Fail to transmit 
command 
signal to 
PC104 stack. 
Command 
action failure. 
Loss of 
Instrumentation 
SEM Comms 
Channel. 
Loss of Comms 
redundancy. 
No effect on 
operation. 
Intermittent 
Comms. alarms, 
or alarm on 
Comms. line 
changeover 
2 1 1 2 
Alternate Ethernet 
modem available. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Ethernet 
Modem spec 
voltage DC-DC 
Converter) 
Provides spec 
voltage to the 
Ethernet Switch 
F67 
Loss of 
Function 
Internal Failure 
Loss of  power 
to the Ethernet 
Switch 
Loss of the 
ability to send 
and receive 
data to the 
SEM.  
Loss of 
redundancy. 
No effect on 
operation. 
Intermittent 
Comms alarms, 
or alarm on 
Comms line 
changeover 
2 1 1 2 
Alternate Ethernet 
modem available. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B) 
(Ethernet 
Switch) 
Connect all 
Ethernet enabled 
devices together 
to allow 
communications 
between them 
F68 
Loss of 
Function 
Internal Failure 
Loss of the 
ability to 
communicate 
to devices 
connected to 
the Ethernet 
Switch 
Loss of the 
ability to send 
and receive 
data to the 
SEM.  
Loss of 
redundancy. 
No effect on 
operation. 
Intermittent 
Comms alarms, 
or alarm on 
Comms line 
changeover 
2 1 1 2 
Alternate Ethernet 
modem available. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Instrumentation 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(PC Stack) 
To receive and 
monitor incoming 
parameter signals 
and forward to 
MCP. 
F69 
Loss of 
function 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error, 
incorrect address 
Failure of 
Instrumentation 
SEM Comms, 
control and 
monitoring 
No effect on 
operation. 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
Loss of 
Communication 
2 1 1 2 
Alternate PC104 
Stack available. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(PC Profibus) 
To transmit 
signals between 
PC Stack and 
Serial & Analogue 
cards 
F70 
Loss of 
function 
Failure to convert 
the surface to 
subsea protocol 
Fail to transmit 
command 
signal between 
the modem 
and the I/O 
devices. 
No effect on 
operation. 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
Communication 
error  
2 1 1 2 
Alternate PC104 
Profibus available. 
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BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Microcontroller) 
To receive and 
acknowledge 
incoming 
commands and 
direct power to 
appropriate 
devices. 
F71 
Loss of 
function 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error, 
incorrect address. 
Failure of 
Instrumentation 
SEM 
Communicatio
n, control and 
monitoring. 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
operation 
Loss of 
Communication 
2 1 1 2 
None 
 
Other Channel 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Serial Board 1 
& 2) 
To distribute 
appropriate power 
supply and 
monitor measured 
parameters for 
forwarding to the 
Modem 
F72 
Fail to 
validate 
command;  
Fail to 
forward 
power to 
designated 
sensor 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error 
Loss of end 
user functions 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
operation 
Loss of 
Communications. 
2 1 1 2 
None 
 
Other Channel 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Serial Boards) 
To distribute 
appropriate power 
supply and 
monitor measured 
parameters for 
forwarding to the 
Modem 
F73 
Spurious 
validation of 
command;  
Provision of 
inappropriate 
power supply 
to designated 
sensor 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error 
Inaccurate 
parameter 
reading 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
operation 
Communication 
error  
2 1 1 2 
 
Redundant 
Instrumentation 
SEM, Other Channel 
available 
 
 
 
 
   
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Analogue 
Boards ) 
To power, monitor 
and convert 
sensor output 
data for 
transmission to a 
remote station via 
the Modem. 
F74 
Failure of all 
Analogue 
Board 
functions 
Failure of ADC, 
Micro Com. or 
Profibus 
Loss of 
Analogue 
Board output to 
the PC 
Loss of all 
analogue 
derived 
indicators.  
Would 
potentially result 
in pod retrieval 
for repair 
No loss of 
operation (could 
continue 
through the 
mobilisation 
period) 
Alarm at the MCP 
Total loss of 
analogue derived 
indicators 
  2 1 2 
Redundant 
Instrumentation 
SEM, Other Channel 
available 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Analogue 
Boards ) 
To power, monitor 
and convert 
sensor output 
data for 
transmission to a 
remote station via 
the Modem. 
F75 
Fail to 
indicate 
individual 
channel 
parameter 
data value 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error 
Loss of 
parameter 
indication 
No effect on 
operation 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
Logical manual 
comparison with 
other instruments 
2 2 1 4 
Redundant 
Instrumentation 
SEM, Other Channel 
available 
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BOP 
SUBSYSTEM 
COMPONENT FUNCTION 
FM 
I.D 
FAILURE 
MODE 
FAILURE 
MECHANISM/ 
CAUSES 
CONSEQUENCES 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
CRITICALITY 
RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Analogue 
Boards ) 
To power, monitor 
and convert 
sensor output 
data for 
transmission to a 
remote station via 
the Modem. 
F76 
Erroneous 
indication of 
individual 
channel 
parameter 
data value 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error 
Confusing 
indication 
supplied which 
takes operator 
time to confirm 
authenticity 
No effect on 
operation 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
Alarm 'instrument 
signal difference', 
not confirmed by 
manual 
comparison 
2 2 1 4 
Redundant 
Instrumentation 
SEM, Other Channel 
available 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(Analogue 
Boards ) 
To power, monitor 
and convert 
sensor output 
data for 
transmission to a 
remote station via 
the Modem. 
F77 
Fail to 
provide 
voltage & 
signal 
conditioning 
to P&T 
sensors 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error 
No power 
supply to third 
party 
instruments 
Loss of control 
data 
information 
No effect on 
operation 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No power output 
signal 
2 2 1 4 
Redundant 
Instrumentation 
SEM, Other Channel 
available 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Electronics 
Module (Instru. 
SEM A/B)  
(CANBus 1) 
To provide 
communications 
network that 
interconnects 
component, 
designed to allow 
microcontrollers 
and devices to 
communicate with 
each other. 
F78 
Fail to 
validate 
command;  
Fail to 
communicate 
with 
microcontroll
er 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
software 
architecture error 
Loss of end 
user functions 
Loss of 
redundancy.  
No effect on 
operation 
Loss of 
Communication 
2 2 1 4 
None 
 
Other Channel 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Safety Subsea 
Electronics 
Module  (Safety 
SEM A/B)  
(Time Critical 
Modem)                    
To provide 
communication 
link with surface 
acting as a slave 
device to the 
surface controller 
F79 
Loss of 
function 
Data corrupt, 
electrical fault 
Fail to transmit 
command 
signal to 
solenoids valve 
via the 
Ethernet 
Switch. 
Command 
action failure. 
Loss of Safety 
SEM Comms 
Channel. 
Loss of Comms 
redundancy. 
No effect on 
operation. 
Intermittent 
Communication 
alarms, or alarm 
on 
Communication 
line changeover 
2 2 1 4 
Alternate Time 
Critical Modem 
available. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Safety Subsea 
Electronics 
Module  (Safety 
SEM A/B)  
(Time Critical 
Modem spec 
voltage DC-DC 
Converter) 
Provides spec 
voltage to the 
Ethernet Switch 
F80 
Loss of 
Function 
Internal Failure 
Loss of 3.3V 
power to the 
Ethernet 
Switch 
Loss of the 
ability to send 
and receive 
data to the 
Safety SEM.  
Loss of 
redundancy. 
No effect on 
operation. 
Intermittent 
Communication 
alarms, or alarm 
on 
Communication  
line changeover 
2 2 1 4 
Alternate Time 
Critical Modem 
available. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Safety Subsea 
Electronics 
Module  (Safety 
SEM A/B) 
(Ethernet 
Switch) 
Connect all 
Ethernet enabled 
devices together 
to allow 
communications 
between them 
F81 
Loss of 
Function 
Internal Failure 
Loss of the 
ability to 
communicate 
to devices 
(solenoids) 
connected to 
the Ethernet 
Switch. 
Loss of the 
ability to send 
and receive 
data to the 
Safety SEM.  
Loss of 
redundancy. 
No effect on 
Intermittent 
Communication 
alarms, or alarm 
on 
Communication 
line changeover 
2 2 1 4 
Alternate Ethernet 
Switch available. 
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RANKING  
BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
operation. 
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Safety Subsea 
Electronics 
Module  (Safety 
SEM A/B) 
(Solenoid 
Control Boards) 
To provide the 
facility to control 
solenoids on 
demand via an 
electrical interface 
F82 
Fail to drive 
solenoid on 
demand 
Short Circuit;  
Open circuit 
Individual 
Solenoid coil 
fail to respond.  
Desired 
outcome not 
achieved 
No effect on 
BOP operations 
as the system 
will continue to 
run in a 
degraded mode 
for a period  
Loss of 
redundancy. 
Valve fails to 
respond 
2 2 1 4 
None 
 
Other Channel 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Safety Subsea 
Electronics 
Module  (Safety 
SEM 
A/B)(Solenoid 
Control Boards) 
To provide the 
facility to control 
solenoids on 
demand via an 
electrical interface 
F83 
Selection of 
wrong 
solenoid 
Electronic failure; 
software error; 
incorrect address 
Operation set-
up does not 
change as 
required. 
Potential loss of 
well controlIf 
verification fails 
to detect error 
then incorrect 
valves could be 
operated 
resulting in 
abnormal 
operations 
Verification 
mechanism 
2 2 1 4 
Robust 
Communication 
protocol  
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea Pod 
battery 
Provides signal 
and electric power 
to the subsea 
solenoid valve for 
BOP functions 
activation during 
emergency. 
 
 When there is no 
communication 
(hydraulic and 
electric)from 
surface, the 
batteries will 
function with the 
aid of the PLC. 
F84 
Inability to 
supply 
required 
voltage 
Thermal variation, 
corrosion, obsolete 
battery 
 Inability to 
function control 
valve (i.e. 
solenoid) with 
battery. 
The Blind shear 
ram function 
would not be 
activated by the 
AMF in the 
event of an 
emergency well 
shut in. This 
presents a high 
probability of a 
blowout. 
Redundancy 
capability is thus 
reduced. 
Following an 
emergency well 
shut in situation, 
and there is no 
sign of influx 
contained by BOP 
sealing. Thus this 
signals no 
communication 
from the surface. 
2 5 2 20 
Frequent scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection . 
 
Introducing blind 
shear ram function 
initiation redundancy 
by having a n 
acoustic intervention 
system for the BOP. 
 
Redundancy 
architecture of 
possible usage of 
batteries from other 
pods. (The system 
effect from the 
complexity of this 
structure needs 
investigation).   
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Small bore 
hydraulic tubing  
Conduit system 
for pressurised 
hydraulic fluid for 
subsea control 
F85 
Leakage to 
ambient 
Environment- 
corrosion, External 
damage, Material 
failure 
loss of 
hydraulic 
supply 
leakage of fluid 
to environment 
Potential loss of 
redundancy to 
relevant service 
Potential loss of 
function(s) 
Pressure Testing 
/Function Testing 
7 5 3 105   
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BARRIERS /SAFE 
GUARDS   
Potential loss of 
well control 
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Accumulators 
Maintain stored 
volume of 
pressurised 
hydraulic fluid for 
valve controls, 
rams, and other 
functions 
F86 
Loss of gas 
pre-charge or 
hydraulic 
leakage) 
 
Leakage through 
the endcaps, and 
fittings 
Galvanic corrosion 
Seal damage 
Gradual loss of 
stored energy 
(gas leak case)  
Inability to 
supply 
hydraulic in the 
event   
Fired function 
(e.g. sealing, 
latching or 
locking) not 
activated. 
Inability to 
control well 
operation 
Potential 
instability during 
well control 
operations via 
affected function 
to be supplied 
hydraulic 
Pre-charge Panel 
pressure indicator 
Possible 
noticeable HPU 
HP Pump short 
cycling. 
8 3 5 150 
Piston Accumulators 
have been selected, 
plus ability to connect 
in a back-up 
accumulator has 
been provided. 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Subsea 
Accumulators 
Maintain stored 
volume of 
pressurised 
hydraulic fluid for 
valve controls, 
rams, and other 
functions 
F87 
Loss of 
accumulation 
( Escape of 
hydraulic fluid 
Damage to Piston, 
or bladder  
Connection or 
Accumulator leak 
Loss of 
hydraulic fluid 
to sea.  
If undetected, 
eventual loss 
of pressure 
Loss of BOP 
operation/functi
on 
Loss of subsea 
fluid 
replenishment 
HPU Reservoir 
fluid make-up rate 
(but failure could 
be hidden unless 
a loss of topsides 
LP supply 
occurs). 
8 3 7 126   
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Solenoid valve 
Receives 
electrical signal 
and supply 
hydraulic fluid to 
SPM Valves 
F88 
Fail to 
operate 
Failure of coils 
(broken or burnt)  
Wire break or loss of 
air, Mechanical 
failure-low cycle 
fatigue 
Transmission 
of pilot 
hydraulic fluid 
would not be 
effected. 
Regulated fluid 
from regulator 
would not be 
transmitted 
through the 
SPM valve 
Delay in well 
control 
operations  
Potential loss of 
control with 
hydrocarbon 
release. 
Downtime to 
drilling 
programme 
Valve position 
indicator (light) on 
the remote panels 
Alarm from PLC 
usage for 
solenoid 
monitoring. 
 
Monitoring of 
flowmeter and 
pressure 
transmitter 
10 5 3 150   
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SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Solenoid valve 
Receives 
electrical signal 
and supply 
hydraulic fluid to 
SPM Valves 
F89 
Fail to 
operate 
Low voltage 
Plunger does 
not move 
Transmission 
of pilot 
hydraulic fluid 
would not be 
effected. 
Inability of SPM 
to supply 
regulated fluid 
for firing 
function such 
as: 
Closing or 
opening 
ram/annular on 
open hole 
Sealing around 
drill pipe 
Alarms 
Functional test 
10 5 2 100 
Redundant SPM and 
control fluid supply 
options 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Double Acting 
SPM Valve 
Supplies 
Hydraulic control 
power fluid to to 
function ram 
F90 
Internal 
leakage 
Rupture of part 
Mechanical failure 
Slow 
transmission of 
hydraulic 
power fluid.  
Failure to 
maintain 
adequate 
sealing 
pressure on 
preventer/ram 
BOP function 
(Sealing, 
shearing, 
connect or 
disconnect) not 
attained 
Potential Loss 
of well control. 
Low Pressure 
Alarms 
Flow meters 
readings 
Pressure 
Test/Function 
Test 
10 4 6 240 
Redundant Pod 
Supply 
Function Test 
(Weekly) 
ROV intervention if 
required 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Double Acting 
SPM Valve 
Supplies 
Hydraulic control 
power fluid to to 
function ram 
F91 
External 
leakage 
General Mechanical 
failure (Spring 
failure, electrical 
failure, faulty 
solenoid, corrosion, 
solenoid valve 
failure 
Transmission 
of hydraulic 
power fluid 
would not be 
effected. 
Failure to 
maintain 
adequate 
sealing 
pressure on 
preventer/ram 
BOP function 
(Sealing, 
shearing, 
connect or 
disconnect) not 
attained 
Potential Loss 
of well control. 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Flow meters 
readings 
Pressure and 
Function Test 
10 4 6 240 
Redundant Pod 
Supply 
Function Test 
(Weekly) 
ROV intervention if 
required 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Single Acting 
SPM Valve 
Supplies 
Hydraulic control 
power fluid to to 
function ram 
F92 
Internal 
leakage 
Rupture of part or  
General Mechanical 
failure 
Slow 
transmission of 
hydraulic 
power fluid.  
Failure to 
maintain 
adequate 
sealing 
pressure on 
preventer/ram 
BOP function 
(Sealing, 
shearing, 
connect or 
disconnect) not 
attained 
Potential Loss 
of well control. 
Low Pressure 
Alarms 
Flow meters 
readings 
Pressure 
Test/Function 
Test 
9 6 2 108 
Redundant Pod 
Supply 
Function Test 
(Weekly) 
ROV intervention if 
required 
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
Single Acting 
SPM Valve 
Supplies 
Hydraulic control 
power fluid to to 
function ram 
F93 
External 
leakage 
loss of pressure, 
electrical failure, 
faulty solenoid, 
corrosion, 
solenoid valve 
failure 
Transmission 
of hydraulic 
power fluid 
would not be 
effected. 
Failure to 
maintain 
BOP function 
(Sealing, 
shearing, 
connect or 
disconnect) not 
attained 
Potential Loss 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Flow meters 
readings 
Pressure 
Test/Function 
Test 
9 6 2 108 
Redundant Pod 
Supply 
Function Test 
(Weekly) 
ROV intervention if 
required 
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adequate 
sealing 
pressure on 
preventer/ram 
of well control. 
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Check Valve 
conduit through 
which pilot 
pressure from the 
accumulator is 
supplied to the 
regulators 
F94 
Internal 
leakage 
Worn or damaged 
valve internals. 
  
No immediate 
effect on 
operation 
Potential for 
valves to result 
in BOP function 
fail to operate 
on demand. 
Hidden failure 8 3 2 48   
  
SUBSEA 
CONTROLS 
 Check Valve 
conduit through 
which pilot 
pressure from the 
accumulator is 
supplied to the 
regulators 
F95 Plugged  
Dirty seat; 
Debris, 
Contamination, 
Stiction 
Check valve 
does not open 
on demand ; 
No hydraulic 
flow through to 
the pressure 
regulators 
Possible Supply 
blockage results 
in no flow to 
Solenoid 
Valves. 
Well control 
operation 
hindered. 
Pressure gauges 
and Transmitters 
8 3 2 48   
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4.3.1 Failure Mode Identification 
The different potential failure modes of the BOP system identified in Table 4-4 
are analysed in this section. Why it is important to identify component failures 
and the modes in which they can occur becomes obvious due to the criticality of 
the component and working towards an optimized drilling operation. 
Identification of failure can be achieved during testing prior to deployment or 
during operation via detection means, however during a design process failure 
identification can be attained from assessing a loss of function or dependency. 
The failure modes identified entailed component-related loss of a function, 
physical or chemical quantity, inability or failure to activate a function. The 
failure modes associated with the BOP components which are mainly similar 
and common modes include failure of a component to open or close, internal or 
external leakages, failure to lock/latch or unlock/unlatch failure to shear or seal, 
etc.  
The output from the analysis also shows the prevalent failure mechanisms 
identified were corrosion and mechanical failures (wear, misalignment, brittle, 
deformation and fracture). The corrosion effect from the presence of 
hydrocarbons and seawater could affect the system in various ways e.g. 
leakage. The transition of the Subsea BOP operation from deepwater to dry 
dock could result in thermal expansions of the seals if the dry dock condition is 
hot. The hydraulic line can also experience thermal related failures. The poppet 
spring assembly of an accumulator can be fatigued from an excessive pre-
charge which can result in bladder been pushed towards the poppet. Other 
mechanical related mechanisms include too high friction, severed part, galling, 
and vibration. Process related cause includes over pressure, plugged line, loss 
of supply (e.g. air), contamination, and leakage. Manufacturing and installation 
related causes like insufficient heat treatment, faulty connections, poor 
materials, wrong dimensions specified. Others include external causes such as 
shocks and human factors. An understanding of these mechanism constitutes 
the fundamental aspect of developing a risk and reliability model for 
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improvement in designs (e.g. for mechanical systems, fault-tolerant, fail-safe or 
damage-tolerant designs approach can be employed), assessment of the 
system performance (e.g. availability) or identification of safe guards.  
The effect of each failure mode following its occurrence was assessed with 
respect to the component itself (local), which majorly constitutes the direct effect 
of the function loss and the entire BOP system (global). Global failure modes 
effects range from no system effect to complete system failure resulting in kick 
not well managed could result in a blowout with potential for fatalities and loss 
of asset.  Other global effects include delay in well control operation, potential 
damage to risers, when drilling from a DP vessel, downtime in drilling process, 
ram shearing and sealing function impossible; inability to supply hydraulic fluid, 
inability to maintain pressure, loss of hydraulic, flow cannot be isolated, minor or 
major leakage to the environment and also venting to sea. Some local effects 
could potentially affect the system over a time span e.g. loss of hydraulic 
pressure. Considering the similar nature of some components material 
composition and the environment, being subsea, it is not surprising a specific 
failure mode/cause can be associated with different components. However, 
such failure modes will result in likely different local effects unique to the 
component function and different failure modes could result in similar system 
effect.  
Collectively, the inputs of experts in a failure assessment workshop could be 
affected by the breadth and depth of their experience, considering factors such 
as application system type, operating region and conditions, together with 
lessons learnt from documented reports which could have been potentially 
plagued with failure reporting limitations.  
4.3.2 Evaluation of Failure modes through FMECA 
Critical failure mode ranking from the analysis based on RPN is shown in Table 
4-6. In addition to rankings based on RPN values, on the side was also 
presented rankings based on risk values (as a product of severity and 
occurrence). Critical failure modes were selected as a set with RPN values 
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greater than 72 (Top 40%, highest RPNs) observed. The Pareto rule also 
known as the 80/20 rule (20% of causes generate 80% of the most benefit) has 
been established as a good preliminary approach to prioritisation (Lipol and 
Haq, 2011). In terms of failure criticality, the top 20% failures (Top 20% RPN-
scores failure modes) should be a good reference point for prioritisation. 
However, considering the Pareto sample was small and the weakness of the 
FMECA-RPNs rankings, failure modes with severity values of 7 and above was 
included to the list. The list consists of the select 34 most critical failure modes 
in decreasing order upon processing the values from the FMECA worksheet. A 
list of fifteen (15) critical components was further derived from the select failure 
mode list and presented in decreasing order of criticality for each ranking metric 
in Table 4-5.  
The failure mode of the Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator giving unstable 
output pressure (F54) was the most critical based on the Risk value however, it 
was on the 10th rank for the RPN ranking as it had lower weight assigned for its 
detectability, meaning it could easily be detected. While the Double Acting SPM 
valve external leakage failure mode (F91) which was the most critical based on 
the RPN ranking was in the 6th rank for the risk based value, with a little higher 
weight assigned as it can be detected from a routine function testing or 
inspection while  the BOP is being pulled (at worst case). 
Considering both ranking schemes failure modes which standout to be very 
critical include the Fixed Pipe ram external leakage (F4), Choke and Kill Valve 
internal leakage (F25), Solenoid Valve Fails to Close (F88), Shuttle valve 
coupling and tubing external leakage (F52), Leakages associated with the 
Double acting SPM Valve (F90 & F91) and external leakages associated with 
Choke and Kill lines (F21 & F22). Also the predominant failure mode type in 
Table 4-6 is associated with leakage and a minority mechanical (inability to 
latch or function- close/open) and blockage related failure modes. The root 
cause/mechanisms of leakage are associated with material quality for tubing, 
body parts, or coils/wires, poor welds, if any, or improper alignment of 
connections, improper installation or fault arising from maintenance actions, 
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especially with consumables like seals, gaskets and/with retainers. Others 
causes could be external such as impact from subsea equipment/tool and 
possible environmental induced stressors like temperature cycle, vibration for 
pipes, and most frequently corrosion for metallic items.  These mechanisms 
inform the areas of focus when carrying out maintenance and also in future 
designs via of qualification or for existing design areas to be managed properly 
by way of inspection, testing and maintenance (see further discussed in 
Chapter 5). 
It is also interesting to note that with respect to the potential of a risk of a loss of 
well control, critical component failure modes to bear in mind include the Blind 
shear ram fails to shear and seal wellbore (F11), Blind shear ram fails to close 
on open hole (F12), External Leakage of the Riser Flexible Joint (F33), 
Spurious unlatching of the hydraulic connectors for LMRP and wellhead (F36), 
the failure to isolate (F50) and the external leakage of the shuttle Valve (F51). A 
lot of the failure modes could cause a delay in well control operation with 
potential to lead to a loss of well control, if other redundant functions or 
hydraulic supply for example are also not available. If the Choke and Kill line is 
below the lower pipe ram, and there is a defect on that line or associated fail 
safe valve, the BOP will leak to the environment, should during a well kick, a 
closure of the BOP be attempted. If the valves fail to close then the surface 
would be exposed to wellbore pressure. During drilling fail safe valves are 
closed and the riser is used to communicate between the surface and well. If 
the riser is disconnected (no communication to riser when BOP closed) the 
Choke and Kill valves should be able to allow flow all the way down and if these 
valves fail to open, it presents an inability to shut-in well.  
It is worth mentioning that the casing shear ram was not listed in the FMECA 
worksheet, this was because the experts assumed it to have similar failure 
modes with the blind shear ram. While there exist a difference in the type of 
tubulars they shear, experts agreed that for this assessment, any shear ram 
must be able to shear and seal. The failure of a Casing shear ram to close on 
an open hole could cause the formation to be exposed to excessive pressure 
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during testing of ram. If the testing pressure is above the fracture pressure (from 
leak-off test), this will result in a loss of mud to the well formation fluid flows to 
the well, a loss of hydrostatic and thus fracture will need to be healed.  
 
Table 4-5: Critical Components based on RPN and Risk Values (Main 
Analysis) 
Rank 
Critical Components Identified 
Based on Risk Value (Product of S and 
O) 
Based on RPN (product of S, O, and 
D) 
1 Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Double Acting SPM 
2 Fixed Pipe Ram  Choke and Kill Valve 
3 Single Acting SPM Valve Fixed Pipe Ram  
4 Solenoid Valve  Annular Preventer 
5 Choke and Kill Valve Subsea Accumulator 
6 Blind Shear Ram Solenoid Valve  
7 Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator  Choke and Kill Line 
8 Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing 
9 Hydraulic Connectors Blind Shear Ram 
10 Double Acting SPM 
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure 
Regulator 
11 Choke and Kill Line Single Acting SPM Valve 
12 Shuttle Valve Small Bore Hydraulic Tubing 
13 Riser BOP flexible Joint  Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator 
14 Small Bore Hydraulic Tubing Shuttle Valve 
15 Subsea Accumulator Riser BOP flexible Joint  
 148 
 
Table 4-6: Critical Failure Mode list and their ranks based on RPN and Risk Values (Main 
Analysis) 
 
Failure Modes Rank Failure Modes Rank
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure 1 Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage 1
Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage 1 Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage 1
Single Acting SPM Valve Leakage 2 Check Valve Internal Leakage 2
Single Acting SPM Valve Leakage 2 Choke and Kill Valve internal Leakage 3
Solenoid Valve Fail to Close 3 Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage 4
Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage 3 Annular Preventer Internal Leakage 5
Choke and Kill Valve internal Leakage 4 Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas 5
Blind Shear Ram External Leakage 5 Solenoid Valve Fail to Close 6
Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure 5 Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline  External leakage 7
Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close 5 Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line  External leakage 7
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage 5 Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line  External leakage 7
Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches 6 Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage 8
Double Acting SPM Valve Leakage 6 Subsea Accumulators Loss of Accumulation 9
Double Acting SPM Valve Leakage 6 Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) 10
Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline) External Leakage 7 Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator unstable output pressure 10
Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage 7 Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage 11
Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage 7 Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage 11
Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage 7 Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage 11
Shuttle Valve External Leakage 7 Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage 12
Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage 8 Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing Blockage 12
Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage 8 Solenoid Valve Fail to Operate-low voltage 13
Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage 8 Blind Shear Ram Internal Leakage 14
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage 9 Blind Shear Ram External Leakage 15
Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas 9 Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure 15
Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage 9 Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close 15
Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) 10 Choke and Kill External Leak 16
Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well 10 Choke and Kill Plug 16
Annular Preventer External Leakage 11 Hydraulic Connector Spuriously Unlatches 17
Check Valve Internal Leakage 12 Shuttle Valve Fails to Isolate 17
Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal 12 Shuttle Valve External Leakage 18
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close 12 Choke and Kill Line Valve Fails to Open 18
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open 12 Riser BOP flexible Joint External Leakage 19
Check Valve Stuck Closed 12 Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well 20
Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage 13 Annular Preventer External Leakage 21
Failure Mode Ranking from FMECA -Main Result
Based on Risk Value (product of S and O) Based on RPN (product of S, O, and D)
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Figure 4-4: Aggregated Failure Modes RPN distribution of BOP System- Main 
Analysis 
Common to the failure modes of the Annular preventer is that they could result in a 
potential increase in loss time.  Also an Inability to execute some operations (due to 
restriction) e.g. changing drill bit, running test assembly can arise from a failure of 
the annular preventer to fully open and not directly critical to a blowout hazard. The 
electronics or electrical related failure modes mostly tend to a loss of redundancy 
and their functional roles are effected via another channel.  Worthwhile to note that 
there exist unique features that prompts the thought to consider the Subsea 
electronic module as robust in ensuring system reliability and availability. This is 
supported by the elimination electronic-related single point failures in the 
architectural design via component selection and redundancy. Such features include 
interchangeability in modularity to aid replacement during maintenance, redundancy 
in power supplies and source to sink channels, a heat management system for the 
SEM that is passive, such that an alternative method for cooling is not required and it 
can function during testing at surface. 
Categorising the total failure modes RPN of key BOP system component shows the 
control system has the greater contribution (46%), as seen in Figure 4-4, hence the 
main subsystem with potential BOP System failure source. This is not surprising as 
20% 
46% 
6% 2% 
7% 
8% 
7% 4% 
Aggregated Component Failure Mode RPN     
Distribution- Main result 
Choke and kill system
Controls System
Annular BOP
Flexible Joint
Variable Bore Ram
Blind Shear Ram
Fixed Pipe Ram
Connectors
 150 
 
the annular BOPs and Rams depends on the controls to function. The highest single 
contributing components are the SPM Valves, Solenoid Valve, Accumulators and 
Manifold Pressure Regulator Valve. However, considering the safety critical nature of 
the BOP system, most of the components are important as mentioned earlier. The 
ranking outcome comparison showed some interesting observations, on the direction 
and importance of this study in understanding the BOP system to understand what 
component-based failure risk is worth looking at in a separate study or in-depth, 
improve the technical capability of the component and system ultimately towards 
protecting investment and environment. This explains why analysts have to be clear 
from the outset about what is expected from the failure modes and effect analysis 
and the need to be cautious in interpreting these ranking outcomes. Reliability 
practitioners and design engineers alike should understand what the output of the 
FMECA would feed into, and where necessary adjust or enhance their goals and/or 
requirements, so they can harness the full benefit of the analysis and resources 
spent.  
4.3.3 Effect of Detectability Scores on RPN rankings 
Detection of each of the identified component failure modes interestingly depicts that 
the majority of the failures would be easily detectible (as such had low weights), 
while the accumulators and double acting SPM valves related failure modes had 
moderately high values. The check valve internal leakage (F94) has the highest 
score for detectability as it can be hidden. The Blind shear ram fails to shear and 
close (F11) has a detectability score of 2 as it is detectible upon activation, however 
from a classical risk view, it would be a high risk. Similarly this observation applies to 
Riser joint external leakage (F33) and spurious unlatching of hydraulic connector 
(F36).  
4.4 FMECA Summary 
BOP system failure risk identification has been carried out in this section using the 
FMECA analysis technique and critical failure modes have been identified based on 
the RPN criticality ranking. Also for better context in understanding system 
weakness, critical failure modes based on the classical risk definition ranks have 
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been provided as well for completeness and demonstrate the need for a more robust 
risk assessment framework. Again focusing on the critical list may deviate attention 
from other relevant components (e.g. subsea pod battery, pod selector valve and 
choke and kill lines) which may need reviewing to understand various possible 
sources of failure that could arise from bad practices or negligence from the 
designers, manufacturers and during the operations (on and off site). 
A combination of interesting scenarios can be seen if detectability is improved or the 
likelihood is reduced. While it is not intended to directly compare the two ranking 
basis, it is desired to explore another perspective of failure mode importance, since 
the RPN rankings do not consider the relative importance of the three factors used to 
compute it. The variance in failure mode importance from both ranking basis is the 
result of the third factor detectability (a measure of failure mode not being detected). 
The three factors can be extended to include more factors to replicate system 
complexity or other distinct criteria can be introduced to assess the BOP system. 
Factors such as frequency of testing and inspection, personnel profile requirement, 
environment-depth, ease of restoration, nature of the field, failure mechanism rate or 
inspection effectiveness can be used to evaluate the failure modes associated with 
the BOP system. Hence a different approach to assess the subsea BOP system will 
be to apply a multi criteria decision making analysis technique. 
4.5 Multi Criteria Risk Assessment of a Subsea BOP 
The MCDA analysis presented in this section is a decision problem to rank failure 
modes (alternatives) using nine (9) criteria defined in the chapter 3. The selected 
failure modes under assessment are thirty-six (36) in number, generated from an all-
inclusive evaluation of the Subsea BOP system failure modes identified in the 
FMECA earlier in the chapter. The basis of selection was initially to have a critical 
select failure mode list, which informed the rational to use the conventional Pareto 
sample (20%), based on the RPN scores.  However, to provide a more 
representative picture of the system to be analysed in the MCDM analysis in 
consideration of the fact that a good proportion of the failure modes RPN scores 
were relatively low, 2 times the Pareto analysis was considered and in addition 
specific failure modes with higher scores for each of the three criteria (S, O, and D.). 
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The failure modes were also reviewed by experts as well for completeness or 
correctness as highlighted in Chapter 3. The failure modes assessed in this thesis 
are as follows: 
 Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure (F1) 
 Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage (F2) 
 Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage (F3) 
 Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage (F4) 
 Solenoid Valve Fail to Close (F5) 
 Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage (F6) 
 Choke and Kill Valve Internal Leakage (F7) 
 Blind Shear Ram External Leakage (F8) 
 Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure (F9) 
 Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close (F10) 
 Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage (F11) 
 Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing- Post SV to BOP External leakage (F12) 
 Wellhead Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches (F13) 
 Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches (F14) 
 Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage (F15) 
 Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage (F16) 
 Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hose line) External Leakage (F17) 
 Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage (F18) 
 Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage (F19) 
 Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage (F20) 
 Shuttle Valve External Leakage (F21) 
 Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage (F22) 
 Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage (F23) 
 Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage (F24) 
 Annular Preventer Internal Leakage (F25) 
 Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas (F26) 
 Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage (F27) 
 Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) (F28) 
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 Blind Shear Ram Fails to Shear and Close well (F29) 
 Annular Preventer External Leakage (F30) 
 Check Valve Internal Leakage (F31) 
 Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal (F32) 
 Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close (F33) 
 Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open (F34) 
 Check Valve Stuck Closed (F35) 
 Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage (F36) 
 
A sample expert decision data sheet with linguistic inputs from an expert is shown in 
Table 4-7 and the aggregated expert decision matrix in triangular fuzzy numbers are 
shown in Table 4-8. The de-fuzzified crisp aggregate expert decision matrix is shown 
as Table 4-9 and the normalised crisp aggregated weights obtained are shown in 
Table 4-10. Table 4-11 presents the criteria weights derived from the decision matrix 
using the entropy method. These processed data was then used as input into the 
different MCDA techniques depending on the data forms required. 
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Table 4-7: Sample Expert Decision Data sheet 
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Table 4-8: Aggregate Fuzzy Expert Decision Matrix 
 
Failure Modes
Failure 
Mode ID
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F1 (0.1, 0.31, 0.5) (0.2, 0.53, 1) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage F2 (0.4, 0.66, 0.8) (0.6, 0.85, 1) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F3 (0.2, 0.33, 0.5) (0.2, 0.56, 1) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F4 (0.2, 0.4, 0.6) (0.2, 0.34, 0.8) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Solenoid Valve Fail to Close F5 (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage F6 (0.4, 0.51, 0.7) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Choke and Kill Valve Internal Leakage F7 (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Blind Shear Ram External Leakage F8 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F9 (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close F10 (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage F11 (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.3, 0.42, 0.6) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing - Post SV to BOP External leakage F12 (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Welhead Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F13 (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.8, 0.9, 1)
Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F14 (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6)
Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F15 (0.1, 0.35, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F16 (0.1, 0.56, 0.8) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline) External Leakage F17 (0.2, 0.31, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage F18 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.36, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage F19 (0.1, 0.31, 0.5) (0.1, 0.37, 0.6) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage F20 (0.1, 0.35, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Shuttle Valve External Leakage F21 (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.5, 0.67, 0.9) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage F22 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage F23 (0, 0.17, 0.3) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage F24 (0.4, 0.68, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage F25 (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas F26 (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6)
Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage F27 (0.3, 0.45, 0.6) (0.3, 0.44, 0.8) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) F28 (0.1, 0.38, 0.8) (0.1, 0.29, 0.4) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well F29 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.23, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Annular Preventer External Leakage F30 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.27, 0.4) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Check Valve Internal Leakage F31 (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal F32 (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close F33 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open F34 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Check Valve Stuck Closed F35 (0, 0.13, 0.3) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0, 0.12, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage F36 (0.1, 0.36, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
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Table 4-9: Aggregate Crisp Expert Decision Matrix (Defuzzified Data) 
 
Failure Modes
Failure 
Mode ID
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F1 0.305 0.565 0.200 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.900 0.700 0.100
Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage F2 0.630 0.825 0.500 1.200 0.700 0.500 0.700 0.300 0.100
Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F3 0.340 0.580 0.400 1.200 0.800 0.200 0.800 0.200 0.100
Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F4 0.400 0.420 0.400 1.200 0.800 0.200 0.800 0.200 0.100
Solenoid Valve Fail to Close F5 0.400 0.500 0.400 0.800 0.900 0.900 0.400 0.100 0.100
Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage F6 0.530 0.400 0.400 0.800 0.700 0.900 0.400 0.100 0.100
Choke and Kill Valve Internal Leakage F7 0.600 0.700 0.200 1.200 0.600 0.800 0.100 0.100 0.100
Blind Shear Ram External Leakage F8 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.800 0.300 0.100 0.700 0.300 0.100
Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F9 0.100 0.500 0.200 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.900 0.700 0.100
Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close F10 0.700 0.700 0.200 0.800 0.300 0.500 0.100 0.100 0.100
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage F11 0.700 0.435 0.300 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.800 0.500 0.100
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing - Post SV to BOP External leakage F12 0.700 0.400 0.300 0.400 0.600 0.100 0.900 0.800 0.100
Welhead Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F13 0.900 0.700 0.600 2.000 0.900 0.100 0.900 0.800 0.900
Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F14 0.900 0.700 0.600 2.000 0.900 0.100 0.900 0.600 0.500
Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F15 0.325 0.400 0.700 2.400 0.300 0.500 0.800 0.400 0.100
Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F16 0.505 0.700 0.500 2.400 0.500 0.500 0.800 0.400 0.100
Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline) External Leakage F17 0.330 0.400 0.200 0.800 0.900 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.100
Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage F18 0.300 0.330 0.200 0.800 0.900 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.100
Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage F19 0.305 0.360 0.200 0.800 0.900 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.100
Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage F20 0.325 0.300 0.100 1.600 0.800 0.500 0.400 0.200 0.100
Shuttle Valve External Leakage F21 0.500 0.685 0.100 1.600 0.400 0.100 0.900 0.200 0.100
Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage F22 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.400 0.700 0.100 0.800 0.200 0.100
Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage F23 0.160 0.300 0.300 1.600 0.800 0.100 0.200 0.100 0.100
Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage F24 0.665 0.200 0.400 2.400 0.600 0.200 0.400 0.400 0.100
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage F25 0.500 0.300 0.200 2.000 0.700 0.900 0.200 0.200 0.100
Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas F26 0.100 0.100 0.400 1.600 0.800 0.800 0.900 0.800 0.500
Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage F27 0.450 0.495 0.200 2.000 0.800 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.100
Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) F28 0.415 0.270 0.200 2.000 0.800 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.100
Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well F29 0.300 0.265 0.200 2.000 0.800 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.100
Annular Preventer External Leakage F30 0.300 0.260 0.200 2.000 0.800 0.900 0.200 0.200 0.100
Check Valve Internal Leakage F31 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.800 0.400 0.700 0.500 0.200 0.100
Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal F32 0.700 0.700 0.200 2.000 0.800 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.100
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close F33 0.300 0.400 0.100 1.600 0.800 0.500 0.500 0.200 0.100
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open F34 0.300 0.400 0.100 1.600 0.800 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.100
Check Valve Stuck Closed F35 0.140 0.300 0.400 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.135 0.200 0.100
Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage F36 0.330 0.300 0.500 1.200 0.700 0.500 0.700 0.300 0.100
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Table 4-10: Normalised Crisp Expert Decision Matrix 
Failure Mode 
Failure 
Mode ID
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F1 0.1087 0.2011 0.1189 0.0906 0.1850 0.2310 0.2528 0.3112 0.0783
Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage F2 0.2246 0.2936 0.2525 0.1359 0.1619 0.1650 0.1966 0.1334 0.0783
Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F3 0.1212 0.2064 0.2020 0.1359 0.1850 0.0660 0.2247 0.0889 0.0783
Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F4 0.1426 0.1495 0.2020 0.1359 0.1850 0.0660 0.2247 0.0889 0.0783
Solenoid Valve Fail to Close F5 0.1426 0.1779 0.2020 0.0906 0.2081 0.2970 0.1123 0.0445 0.0783
Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage F6 0.1890 0.1424 0.2020 0.0906 0.1619 0.2970 0.1123 0.0445 0.0783
Choke and Kill Valve Internal Leakage F7 0.2139 0.2491 0.1010 0.1359 0.1387 0.2640 0.0281 0.0445 0.0783
Blind Shear Ram External Leakage F8 0.1070 0.0712 0.0505 0.0906 0.0694 0.0330 0.1966 0.1334 0.0783
Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F9 0.0357 0.1779 0.1010 0.0906 0.1850 0.2310 0.2528 0.3112 0.0783
Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close F10 0.2496 0.2491 0.1010 0.0906 0.0694 0.1650 0.0281 0.0445 0.0783
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage F11 0.2496 0.1548 0.1515 0.0453 0.1387 0.1980 0.2247 0.2223 0.0783
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing - Post SV to BOP External leakage F12 0.2496 0.1424 0.1515 0.0453 0.1387 0.0330 0.2528 0.3556 0.0783
Welhead Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F13 0.3209 0.2491 0.3030 0.2266 0.2081 0.0330 0.2528 0.3556 0.7049
Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F14 0.3209 0.2491 0.3030 0.2266 0.2081 0.0330 0.2528 0.2667 0.3916
Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F15 0.1159 0.1424 0.3536 0.2719 0.0694 0.1650 0.2247 0.1778 0.0783
Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F16 0.1800 0.2491 0.2525 0.2719 0.1156 0.1650 0.2247 0.1778 0.0783
Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline) External Leakage F17 0.1177 0.1424 0.1010 0.0906 0.2081 0.1320 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage F18 0.1070 0.1174 0.1010 0.0906 0.2081 0.1320 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage F19 0.1087 0.1281 0.1010 0.0906 0.2081 0.1320 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage F20 0.1159 0.1068 0.0505 0.1813 0.1850 0.1650 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
Shuttle Valve External Leakage F21 0.1783 0.2438 0.0505 0.1813 0.0925 0.0330 0.2528 0.0889 0.0783
Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage F22 0.1070 0.1068 0.1515 0.0453 0.1619 0.0330 0.2247 0.0889 0.0783
Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage F23 0.0570 0.1068 0.1515 0.1813 0.1850 0.0330 0.0562 0.0445 0.0783
Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage F24 0.2371 0.0712 0.2020 0.2719 0.1387 0.0660 0.1123 0.1778 0.0783
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage F25 0.1783 0.1068 0.1010 0.2266 0.1619 0.2970 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas F26 0.0357 0.0356 0.2020 0.1813 0.1850 0.2640 0.2528 0.3556 0.3916
Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage F27 0.1604 0.1762 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) F28 0.1480 0.0961 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well F29 0.1070 0.0943 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
Annular Preventer External Leakage F30 0.1070 0.0925 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.2970 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
Check Valve Internal Leakage F31 0.0713 0.1068 0.2020 0.0906 0.0925 0.2310 0.1404 0.0889 0.0783
Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal F32 0.2496 0.2491 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close F33 0.1070 0.1424 0.0505 0.1813 0.1850 0.1650 0.1404 0.0889 0.0783
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open F34 0.1070 0.1424 0.0505 0.1813 0.1850 0.1650 0.1404 0.1778 0.0783
Check Valve Stuck Closed F35 0.0596 0.1068 0.2020 0.0906 0.1850 0.1650 0.0379 0.0889 0.0783
Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage F36 0.1405 0.1068 0.2525 0.1359 0.1619 0.1650 0.1966 0.1334 0.0783
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Table 4-11: Criteria Weights derived from Expert Decision by Entropy Method 
 
The crisp weight as shown in Table 4-11 was inputted directly to different MCDA 
algorithms developed using excel with the exception of the PROMETHEE in which 
Palisade Visual PROMETHEE software was used to generate ranks. The weights 
were rounded off to 2 decimal places by the software as seen in the preferences in 
Table 4-12.  
Table 4-12: Preference functions and associated criteria parameters assigned.  
 
 
The unicriterion flows and multi criteria flows for the PROMETHEE analysis are 
shown in Appendix B. Also the distance measures, relative closeness coefficients 
used to generate the ranks of the different methods are shown in the Appendix B. 
4.6 MCDA Ranking outcomes 
A summary of the ranking outcomes from the different MCDA techniques applied is 
shown in Table 4-13. The rankings from the FMECA are also shown alongside for 
easy comparison. Details of the findings are discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
 
Weight
 Improper maintenance- LOCS C1 0.1020
Occurrence Inspection/testing ineffectivenes C2 0.1047
 Improper maintenance- LOCM C3 0.1077
System or Component Complexity C4 0.1088
Safeguards from Detectibility C5 0.1031
Safeguards from Redundancy C6 0.1213
 Loss of a function (ANOTHER) C7 0.1067
Loss of Multiple functions C8 0.1176
Loss of all functions C9 0.1281
Criteria
Preferences C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
active yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Min/Max max max max max min min max max max
Weight 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13
Preference function Usual Usual Usual Usual Usual Usual Usual Usual Usual
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Table 4-13: Failure Modes ranking outcomes from FMECA and MCDAs 
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5 DISCUSSION 
Following an initial failure modes and effect analysis of the BOP system in Chapter 
4, a further analysis was carried out using comparable MCDA methods, which 
include the conventional TOPSIS technique, Fuzzy-TOPSIS, Fuzzy-TOPSIS interval 
method and PROMETHEE technique. Table 4-13 shows the ranking outcomes for a 
select critical failure mode list using the previously mentioned methods. It is intended 
to discuss the overall results in general to present a holistic picture of research 
results. A collation of analysis outcomes from the failure identification and evaluation 
(in Section 4.1) and the MCDA analysis is discussed in this chapter. The advantage 
of MCDA assessment over the FMECA RPN rankings is made obvious in Table 4-
13, as there are no ties in the ranking outcomes given there is a clear preference 
(based on criticality from experts input) of one failure mode over another. The table 
is colour coded from red to dark green depicting more critical to less critical.  
Comparing the MCDA ranking outcomes indicates that there is some degree of 
similarity in the different technique’s outcome. The TOPSIS and the fuzzy-interval 
TOPSIS techniques give very close ranks with a given failure mode being a rank or 
two higher or lower. However, if the ranks were to be grouped as shown by the 
colour coding, it can be seen that the critical failure modes fall in nearly similar 
criticality bands with some exceptions. An example is F23 is ranked 36th and F36 is 
ranked 10th from the fuzzy TOPSIS and as such slightly higher band given they are 
at least above five ranks deviated from the ranks of other 3 techniques. The 
sensitivity of these failure modes is to be investigated later on this chapter. However, 
a discussion of the top critical failure modes relative to their root causes identified 
from the FMECA is presented to establish the importance of the criteria used for the 
assessment. While some discussion has been provided in chapter 4, this section 
would provide more general detail of critical component failures, as the cumulative 
picture is hereby presented. 
It can be deduced from Table that Wellhead connector failure (F13) and the LMRP 
connector failure (F14) are the top 2 critical failures from the MCDA analysis. These 
failures are associated with risk of a leakage to the environment with severe 
consequences. 
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The MCDA analysis shows the connector is the most component and this is also 
established in the sensitivity discussed later in the chapter upon inspection of the 
variation on the importance weights assigned to assessment criteria its failure mode 
relative to the used in this study. The connectors are known to have a much lower 
failure frequency but are also very critical to the overall performance of the BOP 
system and they do share similarities in the way they can be detected. While 
returning cuttings through wellhead to surface (rig), if there is small leakage/ 
seepages, it would not be detected except an ROV is hovering around the area. The 
other possible medium of detection is during a function test, however these tests are 
not directly meant to test the connectors directly. Since if a cup type tester is run in 
hole and installed in a profile in the Wellhead housing (sealing),  fluid can be pumped 
through the choke and kill lines to test each ram by closing the ram across the test 
pipe but there is no way to test the connection below the flex joint. The same applies 
to a wellhead connector as well. So in the event of a leak between at that point, even 
a pressure test would not detect it. What the operator would want to ascertain is that 
the BOP holds pressure (when sealing element is tested after installation or 
periodically) meaning the BOP can be used to isolate a well, thereafter the riser can 
be drained and any repair effected on the connection. 
The LMRP is tensioned hooked up and connected to a telescopic joint which allows 
it to balance out heave. So, if the LMRP connector disconnects the telescopic joint 
will retract and this should be easily known to the driller due to loss of weight on the 
tensioner. Also the fluid level will drop and consequently a drop in pressure. In 
addition if circulating fluid in the system, the stand pipe pressure will drop due to less 
friction in the system. This will easily be noticed and thus for the score thus the 
rationale for the low detection score in the FMECA. It is also not surprising that a 
spurious unlatching or parting of the LMRP from the BOP stack due to connector 
failure would lead to an environmental leakage of fluid to the environment. The 
consequence can be severe if it occurs during drilling and worst if in an overpressure 
zone or new reservoir. This is costly as it could result in a blowout potentially with 
often associated downtime and threat to personnel safety. A connector unlatch can 
be the result of a mechanical component (e.g. bolts, flanges, studs) failing due to 
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fatigue or corrosion. Chloride and hydrogen-induced Stress Corrosion Cracking have 
led to the fracturing of the installed bolts.  
Root-cause analysis from previous bolt related failures have shown that while the 
formation of a complete hermitic seal by paint coating on subsea structures is 
impossible, the impact of an absence of coating or paint on hydrogen generation on 
cathodically protected structures cannot be ignored. The hydrogen generation arising 
from an increase in current drawn from the CP anode system, due to unpainted 
segments on structures can contribute to hydrogen embrittlement corrosion. 
Hydrogen embrittlement can be influenced by type of alloy material is made of and 
its production method, method of heat treatment, discontinuities in the metal, 
temperature and pressure. Also when drilling through casing with bit going through 
the wellhead housing, it is standard practice for a wear bushing to be installed to 
avoid the rotating pipe wearing across the wellhead generating tiny metallic metals. 
This can cause wearing as it damages or can cause degradation of connector 
gaskets due to steel swarfs passing through the BOP. This is a potential leakage 
root cause. 
Another failure mode of the LMRP connector is a case of failure to unlatch (this was 
ranked same as the spuriously unlatching in the FMECA) especially when 
associated with a drift-off by vessel either due to bad weather or the occurrence of a 
black-out when drilling from a DP vessel. The consequence can be severe with 
considerable downtime as the risers can be damaged. A failure of hydraulic or 
control related system failure (e.g. solenoid valve failure) is a potential case of this 
failure mode. 
It is important for the connectors to be rated correctly during qualification and 
manufacture to the internal pressure and specified temperature envelope. This is to 
ensure extended life and reliability of sealing elements and the split ring retractors 
which pulls away the latching segments from the other connecting item (e.g. 
wellhead).  Quality assurance and control (QA/QC) in installation procedure is of 
importance and also Operators need to ensure all directly contracted and sub-
contracted equipment vendors QA/QC programs are routinely reviewed to ascertain 
conformance to specifications (e.g. material specification requirement such as 
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material hardness, and yield strength) and current standards. Also Drilling 
contractors to ensure due diligence during inspection, maintenance and testing BOP 
components. These are also confirmed in QC-FIT (2014) report which identified the 
following concerns (most of which mentioned already) to be contributing factors to 
the failure or threat on the integrity of connectors in general: bolt material hardness 
and strength; quality control systems/subcontractor controls; coatings; cathodic 
protection; paint coating; and installation torque procedures. 
The connectors failure modes was not ranked amongst the most critical failure mode 
in the chapter 4 FMECA RPN based analysis due to the low detection score but it 
had a low to moderate occurrence rating and was acknowledged to be critical as 
depicted given its the severity ranking. It was only the BSEE FMECA 1 report (ABS, 
2013b) that had a connector failure (corrosion/erosion and loss of general function) 
amongst the highest ranking failure modes.  
The next set of critical failures (failure modes of Accumulators, Double Acting SPM 
Valve, Shuttle Valve tubing and coupling, Shuttle Valve) are controls system related. 
The control system is central to the BOP system and its failure can lead to costly 
consequences as seen in the FMECA. The failure of a number of components that 
can lead to a loss of function at varying degrees (one or multiple functions to 
complete or partial loss (e.g. delay of a function) is what constitutes the majority of 
control system failures. 
The top critical control failure mode is the loss of a pre-charge of the subsea 
accumulator with identified possible cause such as a leakage through the end caps 
and fittings, seal damage, and corrosion for the piston type analysed. The 
consequence is a deviation in the available volume of hydraulic fluid to be supplied 
to activate a function which means the function activation and should the loss of pre-
charge continues, it could lead to the damage of piston or bladder for a bladder type 
accumulator. The seal material make-up of a piston accumulator are not compatible 
with some fluid, hence the need for corrosion-resistant materials to survive extreme 
environments and as also they have to be periodically replaced. It is essential for the 
accumulator to be pre-charged correctly to propel the hydraulic fluid and this is 
dependent on the equipment function to be operated and environment.  This failure 
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mode has a low probability of occurrence but can occur with the root cause traced to 
improper maintenance or low attentiveness of operating personnel. Its criticality was 
influenced by the scores for detection and severity assigned in the FMECA with 
worst case considered when associated with a failure to activate a shear ram or 
annular preventer 
The SPM valve external leakage is a critical failure with potential catastrophic 
consequence should power fluid not been available to the respective shuttle valve for 
supply to activate a function. The nature of cause of this failure would be mechanical 
damage to the valve body assembly and seals deterioration. The mechanisms 
associated with damage to the valve body assembly would be a less likely wear or 
the effect of corrosion. OEM would need to look at the material selection and 
operational conditions and environment of the valve should wear be the main reason 
for leaks. Also vibrational effect of operation could lead to valve seal failure and 
collapsing of connecting hose. Another failure cause is the separation of tubing 
connection. The requirement of the SPM to close and open in a quick manner for the 
delivery of fluid in a high pressure system often causes pressure surge, hydraulic 
shock or water hammer effect that can affect lines. These effects need be taken into 
consideration by OEMS and also operators need to be aware of these root causes 
when conducting/planning maintenance activities.  
The failure of the tubing or hose that connects or supply’s functional fluid to the 
shuttle valve was considered very critical. Failure of tubing/hoses have been 
mentioned already in the SPM discussion above, however it is important for stacking 
to be done properly with due consideration for usage condition and material selection 
(hard piping or hose). 
The shuttle valve external leakage was the next critical item and is known to be a 
single point failure with severe and potential catastrophic consequences depending 
on the associated function. Mechanical damage was known to be the main cause 
resulting to an external leak. The shuttle valve like any other valve would experience 
leakage through deteriorated or damaged seals. The fasteners of the shuttle valve 
connection can be loosened following vibration effect from the oscillation of the 
shuttle from on end to another when high flow fluid is been passed through it. The 
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FMECA shows a relatively low occurrence however it cannot be dismissed to be 
critical should the right valve sizing and selection be made. 
Fixed pipe ram external leakage failure was identified as the next critical failure 
mode and the associated causes are worn sealing elements (bonnet, top, door), 
damage to gaskets, pistons, ram packer element, ram body bonnet/housing and 
misalignment issues which are mostly mechanical failures. These identified possible 
damaged items need replacement when a leak is observed. These are easily 
noticeable when prior to normal drilling operation testing (stump or installation) is 
carried out and with the help an ROV inspection at any time. The consequence can 
be severe as seen in the FMECA severity ranking. These failure causes are common 
to other failure modes of the pipe ram and any other ram and the annular preventer 
Typical stressors or failures that can affect seals and gaskets are mechanical failure 
related (from compression or distortion of ring or bolting configuration), chemical 
(corrosion) and thermal (hardening and embrittlement for non-metal seals). It is 
expected that a proper pressure-tight seal between secured mating parts should be 
able to survive normal and possible emergency loads. However should an adjacent 
part loosen, giving way for an exposure to process fluid initiate corrosion can which 
damaging the sealing capability and consequently result into a leakage or parting of 
connection. Thermal cycling as well depending on the usage of the BOP can cause 
loosening of bolts. Intermediate flange can be damaged when replacing damaged 
seal, a case of improper maintenance and these procedures are usually stated in the 
Operating and maintenance manuals. In addition, it is important for BOP 
maintenance personnel to follow procedures for screwing the bolts, as these would 
contain the closing torque requirements in line with the lubricant used for the 
threads. However, the only test of seals/gaskets is to ascertain if they hold pressure 
that way it is considered functional. Januarilham, (2012) work reported the flange 
and gasket to be 4th most critical component of the BOP system 
Besides the ram connections, related aspects mentioned above potential causes 
responsible for a pipe ram failure to perform a closing or opening function would be a 
loss of supply of hydraulic to activate function.  
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The top set of critical failure modes as identified by the MCDA analysis have been 
discussed, however this is not mean the lower rank of critical failures are not 
important as well as they also do form part of the BOP system. The Blind shear ram 
related failure was not amongst the top 10 failures ranks based on the MCDA 
analysis in this work. No doubt the associated consequence of the Blind shear ram 
failure can be catastrophic, as seen in the very high severity ranking in the FMECA 
(though had a low detection score in this work) and the ranking assigned to the loss 
of function related criteria in the MCDA analysis. However, its final ranking from the 
MCDA considering all the assessment criteria saw other failures of more criticality in 
order of priority. While reviewing the results with experts who contributed to the 
study, they were not surprised given from their knowledge and experience the blind 
shear ram is very critical and important relative to prevention to a well control, 
however there are other components whose functionality are required to manage 
drilling scenarios prior to the need for the activation of a BSR. Also The BSEE 
FMECA 1(ABS, 2013b) report reported the Blind shear ram to be the most critical 
component based on the RPN score which was influenced by a high detection score. 
It is not wrong for “mechanical failure” as a failure mode (as identified in the BSEE 
FMECA) to be assumed hard to detect if it is having to do with microstructure of 
material of ram body or component, however it is open to varying 
possibilities/interpretations. In this thesis, failures considered are functional failures, 
hence low detection score (noticeable) and as such consistent with the other BSEE 
FMECA.  
Also the choke and kill line is another important component that was observed from 
the FMECA analysis that was not amongst the top failures in the MCDA analysis. 
The FMECA analysis shows the Choke and Kill lines to be more critical than the 
Choke and kill valves. The failure mode responsible for the high importance was the 
possibility of an external leakage, which is however with a low likelihood of 
occurrence. The potential cause of such a failure is majorly mechanical damage at 
the riser-attached, jumper-attached or BOP-attached line segment. Other possible 
causes are at connection points due to bad seals or packing elements, and possible 
external shock e.g. bad weather. The capability for both lines being interchangeable 
in terms of choking or killing function makes was responsible for the scores the 
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experts assigned. A possible worst case considered is if the kill line goes below the 
BOP, it cannot be used for choke function.  
Experts mentioned besides been able to detect a failure, of importance to better 
preventing incidents are the need to ensure procedures are followed accordingly, 
company polies are adhered to, maintenance, testing, and inspection are carried out 
effectively and the need for due-diligence in specification and managing BOP system 
during a drilling campaign. 
It is interesting to note how the criteria used in the MCDA assessment are relevant in 
the prior discussion of the failure causes associated with critical BOP components 
failure modes. Maintenance is of essence to improve and sustain the BOP System 
and its components performance, however it is important that they are executed 
effectively to assure they are fit for purpose, hence the criteria for assessment 
“improper Maintenance effectiveness”. There is need for company to have 
procedures and policies in place guiding well control with consideration for 
improvements following changes or updating of standards and recommended 
practice. There should be an in-house training assessment to ensure personnel are 
up to date with technology and best practice besides the statutory certifications 
specified as required by industry. This has a direct influence on the effectiveness of 
the maintenance practices and routine operational testing and inspections carried 
out on BOP system. This will help curtail unnecessary problems e.g.  Using another 
or a not verified supplier instead of OEM replacements parts such as elastomeric 
seals could result in costly problems when they are faced with special condition(s) 
they were not designed for. 
Inspection for wear and potential damage through close visual check should be 
carried out for BOP components as frequent as possible if weather permits. Proper 
maintenance is a recommended mitigation for corrosion prevention. Also seals and 
packing that have been damaged needs be replaced as soon as possible. In addition 
to good inspection, effective testing compliments is required e.g. testing of wellbore 
can also help detect cavity wear of rams in good time before it becomes 
catastrophic. While testing of the BOP System has been acknowledged as an option 
to improve safety and in turn reliability level of a safety critical system, it can also 
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impair reliability if too frequent than required. Regulatory standards or recommended 
practices and company policies can suffice for these concerns. Diagnostic 
capabilities improvement in the BOP system similar to those of the subsea 
production systems (e.g. valve signature, trend analysis) would help in early 
detection of incipient damage mechanisms and increase BOP system availability. As 
such unnecessary replacements can be done earlier making maintenance more 
effective. 
The root causes identifiable so far are as follows:  
 wrong specification (e.g. material) for a component in relation to operation 
condition or usage scenarios,  
 component usage outside of its operating envelope,  
 lack of standards or guidelines for some failure modes testing that could 
reveal the initiation or development of some failure mode mechanism, 
 faults from manufacturing process, and  
 possible lack of training of operators (given an inaction in terms of conducting 
maintenance/testing or operating nature/envelope an item is subjected to has 
been identified as a possible cause of a failure).  
5.1 Technology Qualification/Engineered component(s) to reduce 
Subsea BOP System’s risk and associated downtime. 
The recent calls for improvements in certain aspects of the BOP design as discussed 
earlier has seen informed OEMs new designs of engineered components or 
functions, in addition to their continuous product improvement and development 
plans. Technology qualification activities are intrinsic to the success of the design 
development outcome. (Rahimi and Rausand, 2015) stated that “A well-designed 
Technology Qualification Process (TQP) increases the probability of success and 
ensures the maturity and readiness of a new product/technology before it enters the 
operational phase” and this translates to reducing uncertainty in the development 
and use of new products. There are a number of TQP approaches proposed in 
literature with slight variants in their implementation or levels of maturity assessment. 
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Example guidelines for qualification process include the Det Norske Veritas (DNV, 
2008; DNV, 2011) and the subsea industry (API 17N, 2009). 
Qualification activities provide the opportunity to address design weakness at the 
parameter (e.g. temperature and pressure) level that are associated with the 
mechanisms and associated root cause of the component failure modes. It is 
important for suitable materials to be selected for specific components construction 
with clear reliability requirements with consideration of parameters such as 
associated fluid properties and contamination effects, temperature (inclusive of 
thermal shock) and pressure envelope, flow rate and  any erosion/turbulence effect. 
It is of essence to conduct the parameter testing/study individually and in 
combination with others.    Also considerations of mitigations for mechanisms that 
threat to the integrity of the component should be done during the design stage and 
in operation. A good example is protective coatings that wears off or damaged can 
cause corrosion which can initiate failure of a component (e.g. bolt) and the 
increased loading and bending moment on component due to say jarring operation 
can result in increased fracture. Another example is the effect of erosion on the 
elements (e.g. packers) which lead to an annular BOP failure and that of the bending 
of the drill pipe due to compressive forces that prevented hang-off of the pipe on the 
deepwater horizon BOP. Besides peculiar operation instances that can be 
considered during design, other aspects such as the swelling softening and 
brittleness of non-metallic seals that occurs over time which OEMs are familiar with 
also do need some consideration when addressing new requirements or during 
improvement opportunities. This can be carried out through or during a design 
review exercise as part of the qualification process.  
Design verification and validation are present in the qualification process of the API 
RP 17N with capabilities to highlight associated risk through the Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL) process. In addition, the qualification testing as part of the 
TQP can help to demonstrate functional requirement, screen out faults and 
manufacturing/assembly defects and improve robustness and reliability. There is a 
real need for the industry to develop a framework for qualification of subsea BOP 
system and components, especially with the new drilling limits for prospective wells 
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e.g. HPHT and Ultra-HPHT wells. These operating conditions would require a whole 
new elastomeric sealing technology given in current drilling BOP limits seals have to 
be replaced nearly every run. Electronics would need some revolution for reliable 
performance with increased reservoir temperature. In summary key aspects besides 
organisational and obsolescence issues which should be addressed through the 
qualification and improvement process are material properties (mostly mechanical), 
operating and environmental conditions, and maintenance and inspection practices. 
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis of the multi-criteria assessment of the Subsea BOP system by 
way of critical failure modes was carried out to see how the ranking outcome will 
vary. The analyses carried out are: 
 in consideration of the correlation of criteria (leave one criterion out and see 
the result) 
 sensitivity analysis of the effect of weights of each criterion (increase one 
criterion’s weight by 15%, leave the rest the same, compare with benchmark 
study) 
The first sensitivity (omit a criterion and observe the ranking outcome) was repeated 
for the various criteria and then for the two negative criteria (redundancy and 
detectability) used in the analysis. A sample raw TOPSIS and fuzzy TOPSIS 
methods ranking outcome using the following omission of one criteria is shown in 
Table_Apx C-1 and Table_Apx C-2. It can be observed in Table_Apx C-2 that 
without consideration for complexity and improper testing the Double SPM valve 
external leakage criticality ranking dropped from a more critical (4th place) to a lesser 
critical item (7th and 9th respectively), as these factors influence the scores. While the 
raw outcome are clear, it is of importance to understand what criteria dominates 
ranking outcomes for a particular failure mode or in general and as such the 
deviations rather would be used to describe the sensitivity outcome. 
Sensitivity analysis results carried out whereby a criterion is omitted from the 
analysis using the Fuzzy-Interval TOPSIS technique is shown in Figure 5-1 (see 
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Appendix C those of TOPSIS, Fuzzy TOPSIS). A comparison of the ranking 
outcomes of the three different techniques indicates all the criteria are sensitive and 
with relatively marginal importance for majority of the failure modes as seen in their 
degree of influence on the failure mode ranking.  The results indicates criteria C1 to 
C3 (maintenance and testing related) to be the most important or influencing factors 
for all three analysis approach. The fuzzy interval TOPSIS approach also had 
criterion C6 to be very important with the combination of C5 and C6 also showing an 
influence in the ranking outcome (this is driven by mostly C6, though the combination 
effect cannot be ignored).  However, for the fuzzy TOPSIS ranking sensitivity 
analysis criteria C5 and C6 and consequently their combination had little or no impact 
on the failure modes rankings. It is possible this outcome is due to the computational 
approach, but the ranking outcomes are relatively not far from the other techniques. 
It can be seen that the omission of any one of C1 to  C3 can influence the ranking 
outcome of the external leakage of the Blind shear ram i.e. F8 from an original rank 
to a lesser rank which means it becomes more critical . The implication of this is that 
testing and maintenance Is not a dominating criteria for improving the blind shear 
ram. While this can be arguable, the sensitivity also indicates redundancy C6 to be 
correlated, as its omission results in an increase in rank outcome, which can be 
interpreted as redundancy can contribute to the ram’s functionality improvement. The 
annular preventer external leakage (F32), choke and kill valve fails to close F33), 
choke and kill valves external leakage (F20), shuttle valve coupling and tubing 
external (F12), Fixed pipe ram fails to close (F10) failure mode shows an increase in 
ranking suggesting their becoming less critical upon omission of C1. This implies 
there is a correlation between the failure modes and the criteria a requirement or 
importance of C1 for an improved component associated with the failure mode.  
Failure modes F2, F6, F16, and F33 correlates with all C1 to C3 criteria and the 
sensitivity results show that the failure modes all marginally become less critical 
implying the requirement for testing and maintenance for improving function of BOP 
system components associated with the failure modes. Other deductions can be 
made from the analysis Figure 5-1. Figure 5-2 shows one of the results of the 
sensitivity analysis where specific criterion weight has been varied by way of a 
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percentage increase to understand the impact on the ranking outcome.  The ranking 
outcome in general indicates that was little or no effect observed for a 15% increase 
in weight of a criterion in several instances. This can be associated with the very 
small range of the set of criteria weights presenting a view that all criteria are 
important. This informed the decision to further increase the weight by 30%, 50% 
and 100% respectively. The external leakage of the blind shear ram (F8), fixed pipe 
ram fails to close (F10) and internal leakage of the fails safe check valves (F31) 
ranking outcome are correlated with criteria C5. This correlation is seen for all four 
different weight increases (ranging from 15% to 100% in) as depicted in Figure 5-3. 
The increase in weight of C5 results in these failure modes becoming more critical, 
implying the requirement for proper detection in the components associated with 
these failure modes. There were a good number of failure modes (F1, F3, F4, F5, 
F13, F14, and F26) whose ranking outcomes was not influenced by the increase in 
the weights of the criteria.
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Figure 5-1: Sensitivity analysis with the omission of one criterion to see the impact on failure mode ranks using the Fuzzy Interval TOPSIS approach. 
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Figure 5-2: Sensitivity analysis of an increase in criterion 1’s weight using the Fuzzy-interval TOPSIS 
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Figure 5-3: Sensitivity analysis of an increase in criterion 5’s weight using the Fuzzy-interval TOPSIS
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It is evident that the sensitivity of the criteria weight increase to each of the failure 
modes ranking outcome are varied and unique. The impact on the failure mode 
ranking outcome is different with respect to each criterion and the incremental 
criterion weights (see Figures in Appendix C). 
To further understand the effect of the criteria weights, fuzzy weights was varied 
using the Fuzzy TOPSIS technique and ranking outcomes observed. This was to 
represent human linguistic representation of sensitivity but in this case with more 
than one criterion weight been altered (increased and decreased). Figure 5-4 shows 
the sensitivity analysis outcome considering set criteria (group) fuzzy weight being 
varied. The four set of variations are: (a) Criteria C1, C2 and C3 was assigned a 
Medium (M) score while others were left as normal (Absolutely high- AH and Very 
high- VH); (b). C1, C2 and C3 assigned an AH weight with others kept constant; (c). 
C1, C2 and C3 assigned an M weight with other criteria assigned VH and (d). All 
criteria assigned equal weight of AH and VH.  
It was observed that assigning all criteria equal weight of AH or VH did have a similar 
impact on the ranking outcome of failure modes. This also establishes the impact or 
contribution of criterion weight on the ranking outcomes, given some failure modes 
became less critical or more critical as seen in the deviations. Also the sensitivity of 
assigning a Medium weight to the severity related criteria C7 to C9 showed that the 
greatest deviations (even distribution between failure modes that became less critical 
(e.g. F8, F9, F22, F26) and those that became more critical (e.g. F7, F25, F32)) in 
majority of the failure modes except those of F13 and F14 and F16. These criteria 
are not failure drivers but a measure of the consequence offered following these 
failures and the sensitivity shows they are sensitive and important. It was expected 
that these would change the dominance of F13 and F14 as most critical item given 
they were assigned high scores relative to C7 to C9 but the analysis have shown that 
even when these criteria are made of lesser importance they still stand out to be 
topmost critical failure modes given contributions from other 6 criteria.  
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Figure 5-4: Relative changes in criteria fuzzy weight to understand impact on failure modes outcome 
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The maintenance and testing related criteria (C1 to C3) have shown to be a 
sensitive contributor to the ranking of a BOP system component failure mode. 
An indication from the Figure 5-4 is that the external leakages of the choke and 
kill lines, shuttle valve coupling and tubing showed minor deviation of one rank 
step towards less criticality. While the failure to close and external leakage of 
the pipe ram (F10 and F2), internal leakages of the choke and kill valve and 
single acting SPM valve (F4 and F7) moved at least 3 and above ranks towards 
less criticality. Similarly, a minor decrease in rank change towards being more 
risk critical was observed for a number of failure modes. 
The sensitivity analysis confirms spurious unlatching of the wellhead hydraulic 
connector to be the most critical failure considering the several risk criteria as 
their ranks were preserved. While the ranking outcomes for the different 
sensitivity scenarios are nearly similar, a few deviations observed for some 
failure modes and these are owing to the influence of a criterion on that failure 
mode. It is important to note that the lower ranked failure modes in terms of 
criticality   
5.3 Research outcome validation 
To ensure the robustness of the identified failure mode evaluation in this 
research work, testing by way of comparison amongst different ranking 
outcomes and/or against established viewpoint is required to establish the 
findings. Several methods for validation exist for substantiating any research 
methodology such as sensitivity analysis and comparison with real 
world/verifiable data. While an end-end verification means of validation 
(progressive assurance explaining objective and presenting outcome) has been 
applied for every segment of this work, this section provides a confirmation of 
the validity of the research methodology and the findings against intended 
objectives. 
Weights can be assigned to the different experts to compensate for their degree 
of competency with a domain area of knowledge of the system under analysis. 
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These can be used to appropriate the evaluations in the failure analysis. Direct 
rating methods, Eigen-vector, point allocation or Delphi methods can be used to 
assign weights of experts (Chin et al, 2009).  Sensitivity analysis can be carried 
out for varying combinations of expert weights to ascertain the influence on 
failure mode ranking outcome.  However, equal weights can be considered for 
all experts contributing to the analysis if there is no sufficient rationale for 
disparity in their abilities (Liu, H et al 2014). In this research, a minimum 
benchmark (IWCF certification) was set for competence of the experts and 
some operational experience (in this case minimum of 5 years’ experience). 
Another way of sensitivity could have been to add more criteria. However to 
avoid overlap rendering criteria not independent, this was not considered as it 
could make sensitivity difficult. 
MCDA method application spanned the use of traditional tested technique such 
as the TOPSIS with variations in its algorithm formulation and PROMETHEE. 
This consisted how the weights were normalised (vector or linear), importance 
weight of criteria were assigned/and or obtained (directly from experts and use 
of Entropy method for generation), how the data is perceived and inputted 
(Fuzzy numbers considered as intervals or typical triangular shaped numbers or 
de-fuzzified fuzzy or crisp data).  
Similar or fairly different outcomes can often be generated using different 
MCDA techniques and exact same data, and this is due to the different 
computational and preference modelling structure of the techniques. None is 
better or worse but only one that performs better in some conditions, however, it 
these techniques have similarities in theories used for ranking alternatives. 
Hence, when some deviations are observed in the alternatives ranking, then the 
ranking results can be aggregated. The research goal in this thesis is to 
demonstrate efficiently the application of MCDA for better decision aiding for 
stakeholders. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that MCDA techniques 
are decision support tools and not a decision tool. They are best guide to help 
decision makers have an outcome to compare with their expert opinion/ existing 
knowledge/prior conceived viewpoints in order to make an informed judgement. 
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The outcome of the Multi-criteria analysis of the BOP system clearly shows 
failures of the Wellhead connector, LMRP hydraulic connector and Control 
system related failure as the Top 3 most critical failure with respect to a well 
control. The next in line are those of the ram and Annular preventer, which is 
closely consistent with the concluding coarse failure mode ranking (see Section 
2.9.3) in Holand and Awan, (2012). Also the discussion presented earlier 
showed some comparison with the outcome from ABS FMECAs(ABS, 2013d), 
however it is important to state that each analysis in themselves are correct with 
their outcome dependent on the experience and knowledge of the experts 
applied and also the approach of the analysis.  
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6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis entails multi-criteria assessment of the Subsea Blowout preventer 
(BOP) system. It has applied a combination of a traditional semi-quantitative 
risk analysis technique and MCDA techniques to understand in more detail the 
failure risk associated with the BOP System. This chapter culminates the 
reporting of the findings of this doctoral research. The research significance, 
contribution to knowledge, challenges, and limitations of the applied 
methodology restated with some emphasis on salient points.  Also presented is 
an additional area of scholarship, which may be explored by future researchers. 
A high-level pointed conclusion established from the research, presented in this 
thesis, is thus summarised as follows: 
 BOP System is intrinsically a complex system 
 Traditional techniques used to assess non-complex system reliability 
(e.g. RBD with failure rates or general statistical or quantitative 
approach) are unable to capture the stochastic variations and 
uncertainties associated with complex systems. 
 Hence a more robust or multi-dimensional approach would be necessary 
to assess the BOP system and understand the risk of a loss of function 
at component level arising from an unreliability. 
 This need is driven by the relevance of the BOP System and the cost of 
its consequence; the drive for oil exploitation in deeper waters offering 
harsh environment, technical challenges and greater uncertainty; specific 
field challenges requiring modifications, e.g. HPHT wells 
 In this thesis traditional systematic risk assessment technique, FMECA 
has been applied to understand the weakness associated with the BOP 
system. 
 Also a major contribution to knowledge was made to the above 
understanding by the application of MCDA to the Subsea BOP System 
for a more representative failure risk ranking. 
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A critical failure mode list has been identified and the complicity associated with 
detectability of a failure mode seen from risk assessment rank outcome 
presented in Table 4-6. Extracted from the FMECA analysis were also critical 
Subsea BOP system components in Table 4-5. The analysis showed in Figure 
4-3, that the control systems contribute 46% of the aggregated component 
identified failure modes RPNs. The control systems are vital with great 
consequence however of lower risk consequently given the level of redundancy 
designed into the system. 
From the identified failure modes select critical list of 36 failure modes were 
further analysed using MCDA techniques and nine different criteria address the 
limitation of the FMECA technique. Table 8-1 shows a list of critical failure of 
component/subsystem from severity-based ranking and a representative listing 
from the MCDA analysis following the discussion of results. The research 
outcome shows results, which are not far from reality. 
Table 6-1 : Critical Component extract from MCDA analysis and Severity based 
coarse ranking   
 
Also it can be seen from the failure data that from a component perspective, the 
controls system is the most critical, having the least mean time to fail (MTTF). 
Though it has about the least average downtime per failure, it has the highest 
downtime per BOP-days –given its largest contribution to the total number of 
failures (represented across the three failure data tables). The FMECA analysis 
confirms the controls having the largest cumulative failure contribution and as 
such not a surprise it comes in the Top 3 critical failure list of the BOP System. 
Severity based Coarse list MCDA analysis ranking list
Wellhead Connector Wellhead Connector
LMRP Hydraulic Connector LMRP Hydraulic Connector
Control System Controls Set 1 (Accumulators, Double Acting SPM Valve, Shuttle Valve tubing and coupling, Shuttle Valve)
Blind shear Ram Fixed Pipe Ram *
Pipe Ram Annular Preventer
Flexible Joint Controls Set 2 (Single Acting SPM Valve, Manifold HPR, Annular HPR)
Annular Preventer Blind Shear Ram
Choke and Kill Line
Extract Critical Component 
*             Recall in this thesis Pipe Ram was considered to represent both Fixed and variable bore types
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Besides the controls, the next component critical failure mode/component set 
common to all three BOP failure data set are those of choke and kill lines, 
annular preventer and ram preventers. Beyond these three component failures, 
there exists no further common consistent rank amongst this data set. This can 
be compared with the FMECA outcome and it is not surprising, as outcome 
does not align perfectly with the MCDA rankings, which is more representative 
to measure risk of a failure mode in a system as against the conventional 3-
parameter FMECA assessment. 
The ranking outcome following the assessment of experts has provided a better 
ranking view point of the failure modes even as it does address the weakness of 
the FMECA technique. Most obvious improvement is providing a more 
encompassing outcome giving the spread of criteria and no ties in the ranks of 
the failure modes. 
6.2 Research Contribution 
This significance of this research is critical to the sustainability of the offshore 
industry specifically its drilling activities. The desire for a catastrophic event-free 
activity is closely related to an improved understanding of the BOP system as 
established in Chapter 1 and 2. Currently the price of oil is down which affects 
the cost of field developments and production, suggesting the level of risk 
tolerance is limited. Unreliability in the BOP system, which results in a failure 
with potential for a complete loss of well control, is a risk that would be 
undesirable. This work has added a new dimension to assessing the risk of 
failure associated with the BOP system. It presents criteria for assessing the 
risks by way of failure modes identified from a failure modes and effect analysis. 
In this research, we reviewed risk and reliability analysis, its process, the 
different techniques, and its application in the offshore industry across different 
stages. The role and use of the FMECA was reviewed with the gains and 
drawbacks presented. While these are known knowledge, this work presents it 
uniquely from a practical point of view by showing the misgivings in analysis 
outcome depending on what quantitative computation approach is used for 
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criticality ranking (classical risk definition or RPN). The limitations in the ranking 
outcome of FMECA using RPN, the confinement to assessment based on three 
criteria and the consideration of equal importance for the criteria was shown 
and discussed elaborately suggesting the need for improvement using multiple 
criteria decision analysis. 
Critical components of the BOP system have been identified following criticality 
ranking of the modes of component failures using the FMECA and four different 
MCDA (TOPSIS, Fuzzy TOPSIS, Fuzzy TOPSIS-interval data, and 
PROMETHEE) methods for consistency.  
The connectors were found to be the most critical with that of the wellhead as 
number one. This is not surprising as it is of higher pressure rating than the 
LMRP connector. The next critical set are control system related components, 
followed by Fixed and variable pipe rams and then the annular preventer. In the 
list is then another set of control items and then the Blind shear ram. The 
criticality of the control system and its component to the reliability and 
usefulness of the BOP system as barrier for the prevention of a loss of well 
control is again established and validates literature with field data. 
Findings from sensitivity analysis further validated analysis findings in addition 
to those of actual field data. 
The multicriteria analysis methodology shown in this thesis can help identify 
criteria that are important to understanding a technology or system and the 
areas of risk (failure modes) requiring attention or to be addressed by subject 
matter experts. The analysis in this thesis shows value in the application of 
MCDA to assessing technology or risk in technology as substantial correlation 
information between the assessment criteria and the alternatives can be derived 
from the decision outcome. An interactive sensitivity analysis using variation sin 
weight of criteria can also provide a much better decision aiding to the decision 
maker. 
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Despite the established benefits that can accrue from a risk assessment, it may 
not translate to a risk reduction if the assessment is considered as an end in 
itself. It is important for the process to be applied with an end-goal in mind and 
the outcomes in the form of understanding and actions be utilised to inform 
design, operation or procedural improvement, maintenance  activities. Also this 
decision outcomes be communicated amongst stakeholders and logged in a 
register/ management which can be assesed by different responsible parties 
with traceability of how they are addressed. Root causes and their failure 
associated mechanisms have been discussed indentifying aspects of BOP 
system components that need frequent review or improvement given varied 
operational scenarios. 
It is also important that a guideline be developed specifying when these 
assessments will be conducted and how the outcome will be managed. 
Company policy need to ensure a thorough review of BOP systems and its 
components prior to their use for a drilling or any other campaign. Modifications 
or changes in specifications/requirements (e.g minimum design pressure, well 
bore presure) for different scenarios have to be assessed in a workshop to 
understand thier impact on equipment reliability and operations. This can take 
the form of a technical risk categorisation and technology readiness level 
assessment process as described in API 17N (API 17N, 2009). 
6.3 Publication from PhD 
There are a number of publications from this work. Most of which are under 
review with Society of Underwater Technology (SUT) Journal, Ships and 
Offshore Structures Journal, and the International Journal of Systems 
Engineering and Assurance. 
Initials findings of this work were presented in the Mathematical Modelling in 
Maintenance and reliability Conference, Oxford University, (MIMAR) 2014. 
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6.4 Recommendation for future work 
This method may be adopted for analysis of more specific designs when 
necessary with suitable criteria, as identified, peculiar to the design and 
intended decision problem to be resolved.  
Two experts who declined to complete questionnaire on the basis of “not expert 
enough to contribute to the study” would have preferred to be part of the study 
within a group context. It is important to state that these two experts meet the 
requirements having requisite certifications, training and experience but were 
not confident enough due to the safety-critical nature of the Subsea BOP 
system. These echoes the gain of group decision making in the context of 
obtaining a broader view of the assessment given the variation of the different 
expert’s experiences. However group decision-making is not without challenges 
(not the subject of this work though) but in the course of this research, such an 
approach would be expensive, given limited funding, to bring together group of 
experts within a room. In this work an individual decision assessment has been 
utilised to reduce bias, however the analysis in itself is can be classified as a 
group decision-making framework. However when large number of criteria and 
alternatives are involved the complexity can be increased with more time 
required. Further work can be done to compare the outcome from both 
approaches within the context of MCDA implementation approach. This would 
be rather at subsystem or component level, otherwise decision outcome may be 
impaired due to experts being likely to be fatigued from the process. 
Alternatively, the use of an on-line individual voting system in group-decision 
making suggested by French (2007) can be explored. 
Also worth mentioning is the major constraint with increased depth is the issue 
of response time to activate a function, and control signal delivery (electrical or 
hydraulic). There are indications that all-electric controlled BOP system may be 
the trend in the near future. It would be of benefit to do a similar analysis on 
such a system.   
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Again while software systems are an improvement option, they can also fail 
which is a subject of concern for their use in a safety-critical embedded 
application as in the BOP system. Thus during the development of software, 
new versions may be released with new functions added given the need for 
improved performance or addressing bugs. It is important that new defects are 
not added or created, which can be multiplicity depending on the complexity of 
the software architecture. Hence rigorous testing, verification and validation are 
required prior to deployment. In addition, fault tolerance is another unique 
feature that software should have as mentioned in the previous sub-section. 
This also apply to the entire BOP system, as there is need for stakeholders to 
assess and agree what is essential and create specific standards for their 
development and improvement options given new drilling operational 
challenges. This way unnecessary addition of items e.g. three pods being 
considered by an OEM, or additional blind shear ram or even new technology 
software applications with greater foot print to achieve increased reliability 
would be optimised. Thus it would be ideal to have a single component that 
work, if a ram should be designed and can tested for all possible operational 
scenarios. 
While a good number of root causes have been identified, more attention 
should be directed to understanding Component functional capability such as 
using Finite element analysis to assess ram shearing performance for different 
scenarios, sealing performance of BOP. It may be interesting to see their 
performance relative to depth and material properties- this and above could 
help inform development of approaches and pointers for failure identification 
and evaluation. 
When specification are presented for drilling rigs which normally have the BOP 
systems on them (sometimes one or two), there needs to be clear specification 
on the BOP system and this should consist not just compliance with API 53 but 
also requirements should be made on the performance. It should incorporate 
the well owners experience or expert input for the required drilling operation rig 
is sought for. This is important as often BOP systems which can be re-dressed 
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to address some special concerns, e.g. if a well control situation is expected, or 
not and they are used as present on available drilling rig with dependence on rig 
crew experience/competence to address issues as they arise. 
All innovative ideas should be assessed using API17N and Technology 
readiness level assessment be conducted for improvement in BOP system 
functionality (e.g. a full subsea BOP control using acoustic communication 
rather than as a back-up for emergency situations amidst challenge with 
refraction of sound waves, multi path and reflection or signal to noise in water 
concerns) or improvement in specific component design (e.g. an improved ram 
that can have multiple functionalities to seal annular, shear and seal or a ram 
with capability to shear any type of tubing). Certificates can be provided and 
updated periodically following a change in associated technical risk category. 
Qualification activities need to be reinforced and reports of executed activities 
be requested by users of the equipment for assurance process and also 
stringent regimes be placed with penalties for the failure of maintenance and 
testing systems, inclusive of the personnel and organisational input. The API 
17N process for technical risk management can be adapted for applications to 
the BOP system for specific use of a BOP system on a drilling rig for a new 
field.  
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Appendix A Blowout Preventer Technology 
A.1 Drilling and Well control theory 
A.1.1 Blowout contributing elements 
(Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 2004) presented the need for adjustment factor that 
would consider other elements that forms the basis for the kick frequency, 
rather than the traditional assessment approach that utilises reliability data. 
Several elements contributing to blowout risk as used in the BlowFAM 
assessment approach is shown in Figure_Apx A_1 
 
Figure_Apx A-1: Schematic showing contributing elements to blowout risks 
((Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 2004)). 
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A.2 BOP System and components 
A.2.1 BOP System 
 
Figure_Apx A-2: The Macondo Deepwater Horizon BOP System (Grondahl, M. et 
al., 2010) 
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A.2.2 Annular BOP  
 Cameron DL Annular BOP (shown in Figure 4-10) 
This is a shorter in height BOP compared to other annular preventers. It is 
uniquely designed such that the operating piston and pusher plate is forced 
upward by closing pressure to displace the solid elastomer and compel the 
inward-closing of the packer. Besides stripping a pipe, the DL BOP is capable of 
closing and sealing an open hole as well as an object of any shape and size 
that can fit into the wellbore. It is available in size range of 7-1/16” to 21-1/4” 
and in working pressure range of 2000 to 20000 psi. Figure 4-10 shows a 
typical Cameron DL BOP. 
 
Figure_Apx A-3: The Cameron DL BOP 
 The Hydril GL Annular Blowout Preventers 
The Hydril Pressure control blowout preventer is designed with a long piston to 
provide balance, ease of operation and reliable operation. It is designed with a 
long-life packing unit, a latched head and operational capability of extending the 
intervals between packing unit and shop repairs for increased uptime. Greater 
flexibility for control hook-up is provided by the secondary chamber, offering a 
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reduced closing pressure and volumes for closing and opening. Figure 4-11 
shows a typical Hydril GL Annular preventer. 
 
Figure_Apx A-4: Hydril GL Annular Preventer (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 
Figure_Apx A-5: Plan View of the BOP Pipe ram before and upon demand (Rees, A. 
2011).  
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A.2.3 Subsea Wellhead Connector 
 
 
Figure_Apx A-6: SDX Stack Subsea Wellhead Connector 
 
A.2.4 Acoustic Control 
This control system type provides a back-up operational support for critical BOP 
functions (during normal drilling activity and in emergency) and is independent 
of the loss of primary control system. The emergency situation includes 
unplanned disconnect of the riser or loss of BOP control arising from other 
accidents. Water depth capability is specified by acoustic BOP control systems 
based on the assumptions of normal noise levels. Most new generation acoustic 
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BOP has operational water depth capability greater than 10000 ft. The Acoustic 
control system is mostly found on Offshore Norway Mobile Offshore Drilling 
Units (MODU) (Childers et al., 2004). 
A surface control unit with a receiver which communicates with a pod at the 
lower stack makes up the control system. Upon initiation of the function at 
surface, hydro-acoustic coded signals is sent from the top transducer (mounted 
in the water beneath the hull of the rig) to the transducer on the BOP stack. The 
received acoustic signal is converted to electrical signal at the subsea control to 
activate the solenoid valve for the specific BOP function. The sequence for 
signal transmission for the acoustic system is described in Figure_Apx A-7 
below. 
 
 
Figure_Apx A-7: Signal Sequence for acoustic control systems (Hals and Moines, 1984) 
There are innovations currently been made concerning the possibility of a full 
subsea BOP control using acoustic communication rather than as a back-up for 
emergency situations (given the highly advanced nature of available digital 
systems and technology in modern times) with a capability to offer reliability, 
integrity, and security at an appropriate level. This translates to a BOP without 
an umbilical with a number of benefits for MUX communication. The obvious 
benefits are the requirement for very little equipment on topside which increases 
available deck space, a reduction in transportation and handling cost since it 
can be quickly moved from one rig to another and umbilical with reels 
eliminated, respectively. This would reduce the total system downtime, as 
umbilical damage induced loss time is eliminated. Also as the riser run out, the 
moonpool handling of the umbilical is eliminated, thus improving the health and 
safety of system operations. This new thinking is not without challenges hence 
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the use of technology qualification programme. Some of the challenges of the 
subsea acoustic systems design are (MacLeod and Jaffrey, 2009): 
 Refraction issues: as sound waves do not travel through water in straight 
lines 
 Interference concerns: acoustic systems used for supporting other 
subsea applications including vessel position may interfere with each 
other and this is not desired. 
 Multi path effects resulting from reflections of hard surfaces and water 
layer. 
 Bandwidth and range concern, as low frequencies are required for large 
range and thus high data rates are not supported. 
 Signal to noise ratio issue, given the presence of noise in the water 
under a rig. 
Given this is for emergency or back-up the functions are very few. 
A.2.5 The Automatic Disconnect Function 
In the event of an unplanned separation of the drilling riser from the BOP, the 
blind shear rams of the BOP stack can be closed using an automatic mode 
function (AMF) of the subsea control system.  The wellbore can be secured 
should there be a loss of hydraulic power, electric power, and electronic 
communication between pods, through a sequence of functions are initiated by 
the AMF. It is able to achieve this as it monitors the connectivity of the surface 
control system to the BOP stack (Transocean, 2011). The AMF system consists 
of Subsea Electric Modules housed electrical circuitry and uses existing 
hardware such as valves, solenoids, pressurized hydraulic fluid to control the 
BOP.  
The AMF system consists of Subsea Electric Modules housed electrical circuitry 
and uses existing hardware such as valves, solenoids, pressurized hydraulic 
fluid to control the BOP. The AMF cards are designed to be independent. The 
components that make up the AMF system include (Transocean, 2010): 
 An AMF processor board (one per SEM, two per pod and four in the BOP 
system) 
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 Dedicated 9-volt (V) DC battery pack per AMF  
 27V DC battery pack shared for both SEM A and B (one per pod and two 
in BOP system). 
 Subsea hydraulic accumulators dedicated for operating AMF system 
functions  
 A custom software file added to the PLC in each of the SEMs that 
defines the hydraulic activation sequence and timing instructions 
 A bi-stable “latching” relay in each AMF card. Once the relay is latched in 
either the arm or disarm mode, it will remain in that mode whether it is 
powered or not. 
The schematic shown in Figure_Apx A 8 is a simplified AMF control system for 
the GOM Deepwater Horizon showing constituting components for descriptive 
purposes. However, the colours in the schematic besides the blue and yellow 
(for pod identification) shows the working condition of the components at the 
time of the blowout on the rig: green to mean working, red corresponding to 
failed state and orange for lower performance. In providing power to the SEM 
PLC, solenoid driver card, solenoids, AMF card and Subsea Transducer Module 
for the AMF sequence, non-rechargeable battery packs are used by every 
Cameron AMF system. A battery type with a flat discharge curve is used for this 
application by Cameron, implying that constant output voltage is supplied by the 
battery until it reaches the end of life. Hence, by merely measuring the voltage 
offers no practical way for predicting the battery life. Thus a replacement of the 
batteries is recommended by Cameron after one year of operation or 33 AMF 
actuations, or within 5 years of shelf-life. 
 
 213 
 
 
Figure_Apx A-8: A simplified schematic of the AMF control system (BP, 2010) 
 
A.2.6 Remote Operated Vehicle Intervention 
The Remote operated vehicle (ROV) has been very useful for intervening within 
the offshore environment especially for deepwater environments, where use of 
divers constitutes a risk. Considering the operation of the BOP and drilling 
operation, the ROV can be used for inspections and also a number of 
interventions to execute certain BOP functions such as: 
 Wellhead connector unlock 
 Riser connector unlock (primary and secondary) 
 Pipe ram “open” and ST-lock “lock” 
 BSR Ram close – auto shear arm 
 BSR Close and Open  
 LRMP connector opening/unlock 
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Hydraulic pressure can be provided to the BOP stack by the ROV through a hot 
stab panel, while other function simply entails a mechanical means of 
controlling valves. The AMF function and the autoshear function can be 
activated by the ROV and as such ROV intervention has been found in most 
rigs (e.g. drill ships and anchored semi-sub) with different BOP control systems. 
 
 
 
Figure_Apx A-9: The BOP Pod and a typical Cameron ‘Mark I’ SEM Housing 
located in each Pod (Transocean, 2010) 
A.2.7 Choke and Kill line and Valves 
Given the increase in drilling activities for greater depths, addition functions are 
prompted for the subsea BOP system, such as: 
 To enable static pressure monitoring in the BOP stack using the Kill line. 
 To use both lines as parallel choke lines for reducing pressure due to 
friction from circulation. 
According to Hawker, D. (2001), some requirements for chokes and kill line 
includes: 
 The kill line working pressure should be equal to or greater than that of 
the BOPs. 
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 The rated BOP stack operating pressure should have a pressure 
capacity as the manifold. 
 In isolating equipment(s) needing repairs, downstream the choke line, 
there should be alternative flare and flow routes. 
 The choke line should be as straight as possible and firmly anchored. 
 
 
Figure_Apx A-10: Typical configurations of the choke and kill lines 
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A.2.8 BOP and HPHT Drilling Limits 
Limitations offered by HPHT Environments while global HPHT fields have been 
categorized to show the current BOP limits and future challenge in Figure_Apx 
A-11. 
 
Figure_Apx A-12: BOP Limits and HPHT Drilling limits for Global Fields and 
Prospects (Source: Lobo, F. (2010)) 
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A.3 The Deepwarer Macondo related Diagrams 
A.3.1 BSR and drill-pipe position 
 
Figure_Apx A-13: Deepwater Horizon BOP as designed to shear a centred drill-pipe in the 
BSR and seal well (left). The drill-pipe found off-centre causing partial closure of the BSR 
leaving well unsealed. 
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A.3.2 Pressure effect on Drill-pipe 
 
Figure_Apx A-14: The effect of the resultant between internal and external 
pressures on drill pipe.
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B.1 BOP MULTI CRITERIA ANALYSIS QUESTIONNAIRE AND 
SAMPLE DATA SET 
 
 
 
Absolutely High AH
Very High VH
Fairly High FH
Slightly High SH
Medium High MH
Medium M
Medium Low ML
Low L
Very Low VL
Criteria Score/weight
 Improper maintenance 1- LOCS
 Improper maintenance 2- LOCM
Occurrence Inspection/testing 
ineffectivenes
System or Component Complexity
Safeguards from Detectibility
Safeguards from Redundancy
 Loss of a function (ANOTHER)
Loss of Multiple functions
Loss of all functions
Thank you for considering to assist me in my research work, it is highly appreciated. 
I intend to Assess the BOP System using a Multicriteria Analysis method. 
A select Critical failure mode list have been obtained from a FMECA analysis. 
This Analysis is not far from a FMECA analysis but considers more criteria. Please make an attempt to scale 
these failure modes and where you have concerns you can make notes on the side- this would be highly 
appreciated.
I need you to help me score the failure modes relative to a set of criteria as shown in sheet 2. 
The Scores/weights to be used are linguistic as shown below ranging from Absolutely high to Very Low.
I have modified the criteria list and provided this definition following initial consultation and agreement. Also for 
the assessment you can assume a BOP system with one Blind shear Ram, two annular preventers say 3 Pipe 
rams and a Casing shear ram.
This is entirely academic and so the gain may not be obvious at the outset. 
While I understand the rigour involved, whatever attempt can be made would be appreciated.
BOP MULTICRITERIA ANALYSIS
However before you proceed to Sheet 2 can you assign a level of importance (using the scale above or on a rank 
of 1 to 10) for the following criteria, listed below, in assessing the BOP system 
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Criteria Description 
 Improper 
maintenance- 
LOCS 
Improper maintenance 1 (C1): This measures 
the chances for an inability to restore the system 
to a functional state (i.e. the failure mode 
condition effected) with contribution from a lack 
of supervision (Maintenance includes spares and 
consumables replacement).  
 
Improper 
maintenance- 
LOCM  
Improper maintenance 2 (C2): The chances for 
an inability to restore the system to a functional 
state but with contributions from a lack of 
competence by management (Maintenance 
includes spares and consumables replacement). 
Management captures all the personnel related 
profiling such as trainings received, job/shift 
factors etc.)  
 
 Occurrence 
Inspection/testing 
ineffectiveness 
Occurrence due to Inspection/testing 
ineffectiveness (C3): This refers to the ability for 
the system to be tested or effectively  inspected 
and assure perform its function as intended (this 
includes the testing interval contribution to 
effectiveness). This criterion is a positive 
variable, thus a lower score or weight would be 
assigned should a testing effectiveness most 
likely prevent failure mode occurrence and the 
contrary, would be a higher weight.  
 
System or 
Component 
Complexity 
System or Component Complexity (C4): This 
measures the level of complication in the system 
due to increased interaction from more 
components, or combination of components from 
different manufacturers and its effect on the 
proper functioning of the equipment. E.g. more 
hydraulic supply routes, more tubing or complex 
stacking of hydraulic pipes from a multi shuttle 
valve assembly, which can create more leak 
paths.  
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Criteria Description 
 
Safeguards from 
Detectability 
Detectability (C5): This implies the ease of 
detecting a failure without it being hidden, i.e. the 
likelihood of a component or system functional 
state (working or not faulty) being noticed by a 
detection mechanism following an identified 
failure mode occurring. It is a negative variable.  
 
Safeguards from 
Redundancy 
Safeguards from Redundancy (C6): This is a 
measure of the system ability to recover from the 
occurrence of a fault or have alternative means 
or medium to ensure a fired function towards 
achieving well control is executed, i.e. a 
likelihood of a component or system function 
being safeguarded by redundancy following an 
identified failure mode occurring. This is a 
negative variable.  
 
 Loss of a 
function 
(ANOTHER) 
Loss of a function (ANOTHER) (C7): The 
potential for this failure mode to lead to loss of 
another function.  
 
Loss of Multiple 
functions 
Loss of Multiple functions (C8): The potential for 
this failure mode to lead to loss of more than one 
function.  
Loss of all 
functions 
 Loss of all functions (C9): The potential for this 
failure mode to lead to a complete loss of well 
control system function 
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Failure Modes
Failure 
Mode ID
ED1 ED2 ED3 ED4 ED5 ED6 ED7 ED8 ED9 ED10
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F1 ML ML M ML ML ML M ML ML L
Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage F2 MH FH FH FH SH FH SH FH FH FH
Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F3 ML M ML ML M ML ML ML M ML
Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F4 M ML M M M M M MH M M
Solenoid Valve Fail to Close F5 M M M M M M M M M M
Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage F6 MH MH MH SH MH MH MH MH MH MH
Choke and Kill Valve Internal Leakage F7 SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH
Blind Shear Ram External Leakage F8 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F9 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close F10 FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage F11 FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing - Post SV to BOP External leakageF12 FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
Welhead Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F13 AH AH AH AH AH AH AH AH AH AH
Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F14 AH AH AH AH AH AH AH AH AH AH
Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F15 M ML M ML M M M M L ML
Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F16 SH L SH SH SH FH SH SH MH SH
Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline) External Leakage F17 ML ML M ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage F18 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage F19 ML M L L M ML M ML M L
Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage F20 M M L M M ML M M ML ML
Shuttle Valve External Leakage F21 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage F22 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage F23 VL L L L VL L L VL L L
Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage F24 FH SH FH FH FH MH FH FH VH FH
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage F25 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas F26 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage F27 MH M M M MH MH MH M MH M
Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) F28 ML ML SH ML ML MH ML FH ML L
Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well F29 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Annular Preventer External Leakage F30 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Check Valve Internal Leakage F31 L L L L L L L L L L
Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal F32 FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close F33 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open F34 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Check Valve Stuck Closed F35 L VL VL L VL L VL VL VL VL
Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage F36 ML M ML M M M M M L M
 Improper maintenance- LOCS
C1   
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B.2  BOP System Failure mode ranking data sheets  
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Table_Apx B-1: Vector normalised weights of expert crisp decision matrix (TOPSIS)
 
Failure Mode ID C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
F1 0.1087 0.2011 0.1189 0.0906 0.1850 0.2310 0.2528 0.3112 0.0783
F2 0.2246 0.2936 0.2525 0.1359 0.1619 0.1650 0.1966 0.1334 0.0783
F3 0.1212 0.2064 0.2020 0.1359 0.1850 0.0660 0.2247 0.0889 0.0783
F4 0.1426 0.1495 0.2020 0.1359 0.1850 0.0660 0.2247 0.0889 0.0783
F5 0.1426 0.1779 0.2020 0.0906 0.2081 0.2970 0.1123 0.0445 0.0783
F6 0.1890 0.1424 0.2020 0.0906 0.1619 0.2970 0.1123 0.0445 0.0783
F7 0.2139 0.2491 0.1010 0.1359 0.1387 0.2640 0.0281 0.0445 0.0783
F8 0.1070 0.0712 0.0505 0.0906 0.0694 0.0330 0.1966 0.1334 0.0783
F9 0.0357 0.1779 0.1010 0.0906 0.1850 0.2310 0.2528 0.3112 0.0783
F10 0.2496 0.2491 0.1010 0.0906 0.0694 0.1650 0.0281 0.0445 0.0783
F11 0.2496 0.1548 0.1515 0.0453 0.1387 0.1980 0.2247 0.2223 0.0783
F12 0.2496 0.1424 0.1515 0.0453 0.1387 0.0330 0.2528 0.3556 0.0783
F13 0.3209 0.2491 0.3030 0.2266 0.2081 0.0330 0.2528 0.3556 0.7049
F14 0.3209 0.2491 0.3030 0.2266 0.2081 0.0330 0.2528 0.2667 0.3916
F15 0.1159 0.1424 0.3536 0.2719 0.0694 0.1650 0.2247 0.1778 0.0783
F16 0.1800 0.2491 0.2525 0.2719 0.1156 0.1650 0.2247 0.1778 0.0783
F17 0.1177 0.1424 0.1010 0.0906 0.2081 0.1320 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
F18 0.1070 0.1174 0.1010 0.0906 0.2081 0.1320 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
F19 0.1087 0.1281 0.1010 0.0906 0.2081 0.1320 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
F20 0.1159 0.1068 0.0505 0.1813 0.1850 0.1650 0.1123 0.0889 0.0783
F21 0.1783 0.2438 0.0505 0.1813 0.0925 0.0330 0.2528 0.0889 0.0783
F22 0.1070 0.1068 0.1515 0.0453 0.1619 0.0330 0.2247 0.0889 0.0783
F23 0.0570 0.1068 0.1515 0.1813 0.1850 0.0330 0.0562 0.0445 0.0783
F24 0.2371 0.0712 0.2020 0.2719 0.1387 0.0660 0.1123 0.1778 0.0783
F25 0.1783 0.1068 0.1010 0.2266 0.1619 0.2970 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
F26 0.0357 0.0356 0.2020 0.1813 0.1850 0.2640 0.2528 0.3556 0.3916
F27 0.1604 0.1762 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
F28 0.1480 0.0961 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
F29 0.1070 0.0943 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
F30 0.1070 0.0925 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.2970 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
F31 0.0713 0.1068 0.2020 0.0906 0.0925 0.2310 0.1404 0.0889 0.0783
F32 0.2496 0.2491 0.1010 0.2266 0.1850 0.0660 0.0562 0.0889 0.0783
F33 0.1070 0.1424 0.0505 0.1813 0.1850 0.1650 0.1404 0.0889 0.0783
F34 0.1070 0.1424 0.0505 0.1813 0.1850 0.1650 0.1404 0.1778 0.0783
F35 0.0596 0.1068 0.2020 0.0906 0.1850 0.1650 0.0379 0.0889 0.0783
F36 0.1405 0.1068 0.2525 0.1359 0.1619 0.1650 0.1966 0.1334 0.0783
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Table_Apx B-2: Weighted normalised weights of expert crisp decision matrix (TOPSIS) 
 
Failure Mode ID C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
F1 0.0111 0.0210 0.0128 0.0099 0.0191 0.0280 0.0270 0.0366 0.0100
F2 0.0229 0.0307 0.0272 0.0148 0.0167 0.0200 0.0210 0.0157 0.0100
F3 0.0124 0.0216 0.0218 0.0148 0.0191 0.0080 0.0240 0.0105 0.0100
F4 0.0145 0.0156 0.0218 0.0148 0.0191 0.0080 0.0240 0.0105 0.0100
F5 0.0145 0.0186 0.0218 0.0099 0.0215 0.0360 0.0120 0.0052 0.0100
F6 0.0193 0.0149 0.0218 0.0099 0.0167 0.0360 0.0120 0.0052 0.0100
F7 0.0218 0.0261 0.0109 0.0148 0.0143 0.0320 0.0030 0.0052 0.0100
F8 0.0109 0.0075 0.0054 0.0099 0.0072 0.0040 0.0210 0.0157 0.0100
F9 0.0036 0.0186 0.0109 0.0099 0.0191 0.0280 0.0270 0.0366 0.0100
F10 0.0255 0.0261 0.0109 0.0099 0.0072 0.0200 0.0030 0.0052 0.0100
F11 0.0255 0.0162 0.0163 0.0049 0.0143 0.0240 0.0240 0.0261 0.0100
F12 0.0255 0.0149 0.0163 0.0049 0.0143 0.0040 0.0270 0.0418 0.0100
F13 0.0327 0.0261 0.0326 0.0246 0.0215 0.0040 0.0270 0.0418 0.0903
F14 0.0327 0.0261 0.0326 0.0246 0.0215 0.0040 0.0270 0.0314 0.0502
F15 0.0118 0.0149 0.0381 0.0296 0.0072 0.0200 0.0240 0.0209 0.0100
F16 0.0184 0.0261 0.0272 0.0296 0.0119 0.0200 0.0240 0.0209 0.0100
F17 0.0120 0.0149 0.0109 0.0099 0.0215 0.0160 0.0120 0.0105 0.0100
F18 0.0109 0.0123 0.0109 0.0099 0.0215 0.0160 0.0120 0.0105 0.0100
F19 0.0111 0.0134 0.0109 0.0099 0.0215 0.0160 0.0120 0.0105 0.0100
F20 0.0118 0.0112 0.0054 0.0197 0.0191 0.0200 0.0120 0.0105 0.0100
F21 0.0182 0.0255 0.0054 0.0197 0.0095 0.0040 0.0270 0.0105 0.0100
F22 0.0109 0.0112 0.0163 0.0049 0.0167 0.0040 0.0240 0.0105 0.0100
F23 0.0058 0.0112 0.0163 0.0197 0.0191 0.0040 0.0060 0.0052 0.0100
F24 0.0242 0.0075 0.0218 0.0296 0.0143 0.0080 0.0120 0.0209 0.0100
F25 0.0182 0.0112 0.0109 0.0246 0.0167 0.0360 0.0060 0.0105 0.0100
F26 0.0036 0.0037 0.0218 0.0197 0.0191 0.0320 0.0270 0.0418 0.0502
F27 0.0164 0.0184 0.0109 0.0246 0.0191 0.0080 0.0060 0.0105 0.0100
F28 0.0151 0.0101 0.0109 0.0246 0.0191 0.0080 0.0060 0.0105 0.0100
F29 0.0109 0.0099 0.0109 0.0246 0.0191 0.0080 0.0060 0.0105 0.0100
F30 0.0109 0.0097 0.0109 0.0246 0.0191 0.0360 0.0060 0.0105 0.0100
F31 0.0073 0.0112 0.0218 0.0099 0.0095 0.0280 0.0150 0.0105 0.0100
F32 0.0255 0.0261 0.0109 0.0246 0.0191 0.0080 0.0060 0.0105 0.0100
F33 0.0109 0.0149 0.0054 0.0197 0.0191 0.0200 0.0150 0.0105 0.0100
F34 0.0109 0.0149 0.0054 0.0197 0.0191 0.0200 0.0150 0.0209 0.0100
F35 0.0061 0.0112 0.0218 0.0099 0.0191 0.0200 0.0040 0.0105 0.0100
F36 0.0143 0.0112 0.0272 0.0148 0.0167 0.0200 0.0210 0.0157 0.0100
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Table_Apx B-3 : Distance measures, relative closeness coefficients, and ranking for failure modes (TOPSIS) 
 
Failure modes Failure Mode ID D+i D
-
i RCi Ranking
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressureF1 0.0937 0.0454 0.3264 12
Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage F2 0.0891 0.0488 0.3539 9
Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F3 0.0926 0.0449 0.3266 11
Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F4 0.0930 0.0434 0.3182 13
Solenoid Valve Fail to Close F5 0.1018 0.0267 0.2077 33
Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage F6 0.1011 0.0276 0.2147 28
Choke and Kill Valve Internal Leakage F7 0.1015 0.0320 0.2398 24
Blind Shear Ram External Leakage F8 0.0982 0.0419 0.2990 17
Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressureF9 0.0965 0.0436 0.3114 15
Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close F10 0.0991 0.0386 0.2803 19
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage F11 0.0922 0.0427 0.3165 14
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing - Post SV to BOP External leakageF12 0.0888 0.0609 0.4069 4
Welhead Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F13 0.0167 0.1089 0.8668 1
Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F14 0.0447 0.0798 0.6408 2
Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F15 0.0885 0.0549 0.3827 5
Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F16 0.0867 0.0532 0.3803 6
Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline) External LeakageF17 0.0991 0.0275 0.2174 26
Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External LeakageF18 0.0997 0.0262 0.2083 32
Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External LeakageF19 0.0995 0.0267 0.2115 30
Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage F20 0.1002 0.0267 0.2102 31
Shuttle Valve External Leakage F21 0.0940 0.0517 0.3549 8
Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage F22 0.0973 0.0417 0.3002 16
Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage F23 0.1002 0.0379 0.2744 21
Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage F24 0.0898 0.0497 0.3565 7
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage F25 0.1017 0.0273 0.2115 29
Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas F26 0.0669 0.0635 0.4869 3
Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage F27 0.0960 0.0403 0.2957 18
Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) F28 0.0976 0.0376 0.2782 20
Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well F29 0.0985 0.0366 0.2706 22
Annular Preventer External Leakage F30 0.1035 0.0234 0.1845 35
Check Valve Internal Leakage F31 0.0992 0.0271 0.2148 27
Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal F32 0.0942 0.0471 0.3335 10
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close F33 0.0993 0.0288 0.2248 25
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open F34 0.0965 0.0324 0.2512 23
Check Valve Stuck Closed F35 0.1005 0.0254 0.2014 34
Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage F36 0.0926 0.0381 0.2916 19
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Table_Apx B-4 : Normalised Aggregate Fuzzy Expert Decision Matrix 
 
Failure Mode ID C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
F1 (0.1, 0.31, 0.5) (0.2, 0.53, 1) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F2 (0.4, 0.66, 0.8) (0.6, 0.85, 1) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F3 (0.2, 0.33, 0.5) (0.2, 0.56, 1) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F4 (0.2222, 0.4444, 0.6) (0.2222, 0.3778, 0.8889) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.7778, 0.8, 1) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F5 (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F6 (0.4, 0.51, 0.7) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F7 (0.5556, 0.6667, 0.7) (0.6667, 0.7778, 0.8889) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0.1, 0.2222) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F8 (0.25, 0.375, 0.4) (0.125, 0.25, 0.375) (0, 0.125, 0.25) (0.125, 0.25, 0.375) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.75, 0.7, 1) (0.25, 0.375, 0.5) (0, 0.125, 0.25)
F9 (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F10 (0.75, 0.875, 0.8) (0.75, 0.875, 1) (0.125, 0.25, 0.375) (0.125, 0.25, 0.375) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0.1, 0.25) (0, 0.125, 0.25) (0, 0.125, 0.25)
F11 (0.6667, 0.7778, 0.8) (0.3333, 0.4667, 0.6667) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.7778, 0.8, 1) (0.4444, 0.5556, 0.6667) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F12 (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F13 (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0, 0.9, 1)
F14 (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) (0, 0.5, 0.6)
F15 (0.1111, 0.3889, 0.5) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0.6667, 0.7778, 0.8889) (0.5556, 0.6667, 0.7778) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.7778, 0.8, 1) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F16 (0.1111, 0.6222, 0.8) (0.6667, 0.7778, 0.8889) (0.4444, 0.5556, 0.6667) (0.5556, 0.6667, 0.7778) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.7778, 0.8, 1) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F17 (0.2, 0.31, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F18 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.36, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F19 (0.1, 0.31, 0.5) (0.1, 0.37, 0.6) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F20 (0.1111, 0.3889, 0.5) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3333, 0.4, 0.5556) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F21 (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.5, 0.67, 0.9) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F22 (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.7778, 0.8, 1) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F23 (0, 0.1889, 0.3) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.1111, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F24 (0.4444, 0.7556, 0.9) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0.5556, 0.6667, 0.7778) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3333, 0.4, 0.5556) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F25 (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F26 (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0, 0.1, 0.2) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.8, 0.9, 1) (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) (0, 0.5, 0.6)
F27 (0.3333, 0.5, 0.6) (0.3333, 0.4889, 0.8889) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0.4444, 0.5556, 0.6667) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.1111, 0.2, 0.3333) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F28 (0.1111, 0.4222, 0.8) (0.1111, 0.3222, 0.4444) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0.4444, 0.5556, 0.6667) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.1111, 0.2, 0.3333) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F29 (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4) (0.1111, 0.2556, 0.5556) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0.4444, 0.5556, 0.6667) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.1111, 0.2, 0.3333) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F30 (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (0.1, 0.27, 0.4) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0.1, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.2)
F31 (0.125, 0.25, 0.3) (0.25, 0.375, 0.5) (0.375, 0.5, 0.625) (0.125, 0.25, 0.375) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.5, 0.5, 0.75) (0.125, 0.25, 0.375) (0, 0.125, 0.25)
F32 (0.6667, 0.7778, 0.8) (0.6667, 0.7778, 0.8889) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0.4444, 0.5556, 0.6667) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.1111, 0.2, 0.3333) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F33 (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.4444, 0.5, 0.6667) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F34 (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.4444, 0.5, 0.6667) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F35 (0, 0.1444, 0.3) (0.2222, 0.3333, 0.4444) (0.3333, 0.4444, 0.5556) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0.12, 0.3333) (0.1111, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0.1111, 0.2222)
F36 (0.125, 0.45, 0.5) (0.25, 0.375, 0.5) (0.5, 0.625, 0.75) (0.25, 0.375, 0.5) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.75, 0.7, 1) (0.25, 0.375, 0.5) (0, 0.125, 0.25)
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Table_Apx B-5 : Weighted Normalised Aggregate Fuzzy Expert Decision Matrix 
 
Failure Mode 
ID
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
F1 (0.07, 0.248, 0.45) (0.12, 0.371, 0.8) (0.07, 0.16, 0.27) (0.03, 0.08, 0.15) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.64, 0.81, 1) (0.48, 0.63, 0.8) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F2 (0.28, 0.528, 0.72) (0.36, 0.595, 0.8) (0.28, 0.4, 0.54) (0.06, 0.12, 0.2) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.48, 0.63, 0.8) (0.16, 0.27, 0.4) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F3 (0.14, 0.264, 0.45) (0.12, 0.392, 0.8) (0.21, 0.32, 0.45) (0.06, 0.12, 0.2) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.56, 0.72, 0.9) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F4 (0.1556, 0.3556, 0.54) (0.1333, 0.2644, 0.7111) (0.2333, 0.3556, 0.5) (0.0667, 0.1333, 0.2222) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6222, 0.72, 1) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F5 (0.21, 0.32, 0.45) (0.24, 0.35, 0.48) (0.21, 0.32, 0.45) (0.03, 0.08, 0.15) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.24, 0.36, 0.5) (0, 0.09, 0.2) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F6 (0.28, 0.408, 0.63) (0.18, 0.28, 0.4) (0.21, 0.32, 0.45) (0.03, 0.08, 0.15) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.24, 0.36, 0.5) (0, 0.09, 0.2) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F7 (0.3889, 0.5333, 0.63) (0.4, 0.5444, 0.7111) (0.0778, 0.1778, 0.3) (0.0667, 0.1333, 0.2222) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0.09, 0.2222) (0, 0.1, 0.2222) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F8 (0.175, 0.3, 0.36) (0.075, 0.175, 0.3) (0, 0.1, 0.225) (0.0375, 0.1, 0.1875) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6, 0.63, 1) (0.2, 0.3375, 0.5) (0, 0.1125, 0.25)
F9 (0, 0.08, 0.18) (0.24, 0.35, 0.48) (0.07, 0.16, 0.27) (0.03, 0.08, 0.15) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.64, 0.81, 1) (0.48, 0.63, 0.8) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F10 (0.525, 0.7, 0.72) (0.45, 0.6125, 0.8) (0.0875, 0.2, 0.3375) (0.0375, 0.1, 0.1875) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0.09, 0.25) (0, 0.1125, 0.25) (0, 0.1125, 0.25)
F11 (0.4667, 0.6222, 0.72) (0.2, 0.3267, 0.5333) (0.1556, 0.2667, 0.4) (0, 0.0444, 0.1111) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6222, 0.72, 1) (0.3556, 0.5, 0.6667) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F12 (0.42, 0.56, 0.72) (0.18, 0.28, 0.4) (0.14, 0.24, 0.36) (0, 0.04, 0.1) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.64, 0.81, 1) (0.56, 0.72, 0.9) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F13 (0.56, 0.72, 0.9) (0.36, 0.49, 0.64) (0.35, 0.48, 0.63) (0.12, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.64, 0.81, 1) (0.56, 0.72, 0.9) (0, 0.81, 1)
F14 (0.56, 0.72, 0.9) (0.36, 0.49, 0.64) (0.35, 0.48, 0.63) (0.12, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.64, 0.81, 1) (0.4, 0.54, 0.7) (0, 0.45, 0.6)
F15 (0.0778, 0.3111, 0.45) (0.2, 0.3111, 0.4444) (0.4667, 0.6222, 0.8) (0.1667, 0.2667, 0.3889) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6222, 0.72, 1) (0.2667, 0.4, 0.5556) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F16 (0.0778, 0.4978, 0.72) (0.4, 0.5444, 0.7111) (0.3111, 0.4444, 0.6) (0.1667, 0.2667, 0.3889) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6222, 0.72, 1) (0.2667, 0.4, 0.5556) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F17 (0.14, 0.248, 0.45) (0.18, 0.28, 0.4) (0.07, 0.16, 0.27) (0.03, 0.08, 0.15) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.24, 0.36, 0.5) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F18 (0.14, 0.24, 0.36) (0.06, 0.252, 0.4) (0.07, 0.16, 0.27) (0.03, 0.08, 0.15) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.24, 0.36, 0.5) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F19 (0.07, 0.248, 0.45) (0.06, 0.259, 0.48) (0.07, 0.16, 0.27) (0.03, 0.08, 0.15) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.24, 0.36, 0.5) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F20 (0.0778, 0.3111, 0.45) (0.1333, 0.2333, 0.3556) (0, 0.0889, 0.2) (0.1, 0.1778, 0.2778) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.2667, 0.36, 0.5556) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F21 (0.28, 0.4, 0.54) (0.3, 0.469, 0.72) (0, 0.08, 0.18) (0.09, 0.16, 0.25) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.64, 0.81, 1) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F22 (0.1556, 0.2667, 0.36) (0.1333, 0.2333, 0.3556) (0.1556, 0.2667, 0.4) (0, 0.0444, 0.1111) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6222, 0.72, 1) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F23 (0, 0.1511, 0.27) (0.1333, 0.2333, 0.3556) (0.1556, 0.2667, 0.4) (0.1, 0.1778, 0.2778) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.0889, 0.18, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F24 (0.3111, 0.6044, 0.81) (0.0667, 0.1556, 0.2667) (0.2333, 0.3556, 0.5) (0.1667, 0.2667, 0.3889) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.2667, 0.36, 0.5556) (0.2667, 0.4, 0.5556) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F25 (0.28, 0.4, 0.54) (0.12, 0.21, 0.32) (0.07, 0.16, 0.27) (0.12, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F26 (0, 0.08, 0.18) (0, 0.07, 0.16) (0.21, 0.32, 0.45) (0.09, 0.16, 0.25) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.64, 0.81, 1) (0.56, 0.72, 0.9) (0, 0.45, 0.6)
F27 (0.2333, 0.4, 0.54) (0.2, 0.3422, 0.7111) (0.0778, 0.1778, 0.3) (0.1333, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.0889, 0.18, 0.3333) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F28 (0.0778, 0.3378, 0.72) (0.0667, 0.2256, 0.3556) (0.0778, 0.1778, 0.3) (0.1333, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.0889, 0.18, 0.3333) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F29 (0.1556, 0.2667, 0.36) (0.0667, 0.1789, 0.4444) (0.0778, 0.1778, 0.3) (0.1333, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.0889, 0.18, 0.3333) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F30 (0.14, 0.24, 0.36) (0.06, 0.189, 0.32) (0.07, 0.16, 0.27) (0.12, 0.2, 0.3) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0.08, 0.18, 0.3) (0, 0.09, 0.2)
F31 (0.0875, 0.2, 0.27) (0.15, 0.2625, 0.4) (0.2625, 0.4, 0.5625) (0.0375, 0.1, 0.1875) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.4, 0.45, 0.75) (0.1, 0.225, 0.375) (0, 0.1125, 0.25)
F32 (0.4667, 0.6222, 0.72) (0.4, 0.5444, 0.7111) (0.0778, 0.1778, 0.3) (0.1333, 0.2222, 0.3333) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.0889, 0.18, 0.3333) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F33 (0.1556, 0.2667, 0.36) (0.2, 0.3111, 0.4444) (0, 0.0889, 0.2) (0.1, 0.1778, 0.2778) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3556, 0.45, 0.6667) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F34 (0.1556, 0.2667, 0.36) (0.2, 0.3111, 0.4444) (0, 0.0889, 0.2) (0.1, 0.1778, 0.2778) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.3556, 0.45, 0.6667) (0.2667, 0.4, 0.5556) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F35 (0, 0.1156, 0.27) (0.1333, 0.2333, 0.3556) (0.2333, 0.3556, 0.5) (0.0333, 0.0889, 0.1667) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0.108, 0.3333) (0.0889, 0.2, 0.3333) (0, 0.1, 0.2222)
F36 (0.0875, 0.36, 0.45) (0.15, 0.2625, 0.4) (0.35, 0.5, 0.675) (0.075, 0.15, 0.25) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (0.6, 0.63, 1) (0.2, 0.3375, 0.5) (0, 0.1125, 0.25)
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Table_Apx B-6 : Distance measures, relative closeness coefficients, and ranking 
for failure modes (Fuzzy-TOPSIS) 
 
 
Failure Mode ID D
+
i D
-
i RCi Ranking
F1 7.1005 3.0295 0.2991 9
F2 6.8735 3.1465 0.3140 6
F3 7.3720 2.6930 0.2676 15
F4 7.2856 2.8289 0.2797 11
F5 7.7300 2.0200 0.2072 26
F6 7.7160 2.0790 0.2123 24
F7 7.6939 2.1044 0.2148 23
F8 7.5788 2.2888 0.2319 19
F9 7.1700 2.6400 0.2691 14
F10 7.4863 2.3613 0.2398 17
F11 6.8100 3.1167 0.3140 7
F12 6.6600 3.2100 0.3252 5
F13 5.5900 4.8000 0.4620 1
F14 5.9400 4.2300 0.4159 2
F15 6.7344 3.2961 0.3286 4
F16 6.5911 3.5856 0.3523 3
F17 7.9310 1.8340 0.1878 30
F18 8.0090 1.7710 0.1811 33
F19 8.0365 1.8635 0.1882 29
F20 7.9311 1.9328 0.1959 28
F21 7.2105 2.6895 0.2717 13
F22 7.5067 2.3067 0.2351 18
F23 8.1567 1.6450 0.1678 36
F24 7.2233 2.7706 0.2772 12
F25 7.9150 1.8250 0.1874 31
F26 6.9450 3.0750 0.3069 8
F27 7.7778 2.1978 0.2203 22
F28 8.0117 2.0206 0.2014 27
F29 8.0317 1.8261 0.1852 32
F30 8.1055 1.6445 0.1687 35
F31 7.6063 2.2725 0.2300 21
F32 7.3489 2.5000 0.2538 16
F33 7.7528 2.0494 0.2091 25
F34 7.5639 2.2606 0.2301 20
F35 8.1549 1.6912 0.1718 34
F36 7.0925 2.9388 0.2930 10
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B.2.2 BOP System Failure mode ranking Using Fuzzy TOPSIS -
Interval method  
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Table_Apx B-7 : Fuzzy Expert interval decision matrix 
 
C1   (L) C1     (U) C2 (L) C2    (U) C3  (L) C3    (U) C4 (L) C4   (U) C5   (L) C5    (U) C6   (L) C6   (U) C7   (L) C7   (U) C8  (L) C8    (U) C9  (L) C9   (U)
F1 0.1 0.5 0.2 1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 0.6 0.8 0 0.2
F2 0.4 0.8 0.6 1 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0 0.2
F3 0.2 0.5 0.2 1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F4 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.3 0.5 0 0.2 0 0.2
F6 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 0.3 0.5 0 0.2 0 0.2
F7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.2
F8 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0 0.2
F9 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 0.6 0.8 0 0.2
F10 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.2
F11 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6 0 0.2
F12 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0 0.2 0.8 1 0.7 0.9 0 0.2
F13 0.8 1 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.8 1 0.7 0.9 0.8 1
F14 0.8 1 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.8 1 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6
F15 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.5 0 0.2
F16 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.5 0 0.2
F17 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F18 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F19 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F20 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F21 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.9 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0 0.2 0.8 1 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F22 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.6 0.8 0 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F23 0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0 0.2 0 0.2
F24 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0 0.2
F25 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F26 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 1 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6
F27 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F28 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F29 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F30 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F31 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F32 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F33 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F34 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0 0.2
F35 0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6 0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.2
F36 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0 0.2
0.121272412 0.106743027 0.117563964 0.1281473280.108785552 0.103107460.101978427 0.104674271 0.107727557
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Table_Apx B-8:  Weighted normalised fuzzy expert interval decision matrix 
 
C1   (L) C1     (U) C2 (L) C2    (U) C3  (L) C3    (U) C4 (L) C4   (U) C5   (L) C5    (U) C6   (L) C6   (U) C7   (L) C7   (U) C8  (L) C8    (U) C9  (L) C9   (U)
F1 0.00243 0.01215 0.00489 0.02446 0.00257 0.00770 0.00334 0.01001 0.01154 0.02845 0.01644 0.02193 0.01641 0.02051 0.02125 0.02833 0.00000 0.01281
F2 0.00972 0.01944 0.01468 0.02446 0.01027 0.01540 0.00667 0.01334 0.00989 0.02529 0.01096 0.01644 0.01231 0.01641 0.00708 0.01417 0.00000 0.01281
F3 0.00486 0.01215 0.00489 0.02446 0.00770 0.01284 0.00667 0.01334 0.01154 0.02845 0.00274 0.00822 0.01436 0.01846 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F4 0.00486 0.01458 0.00489 0.01957 0.00770 0.01284 0.00667 0.01334 0.01154 0.02845 0.00274 0.00822 0.01436 0.01846 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F5 0.00729 0.01215 0.00978 0.01468 0.00770 0.01284 0.00334 0.01001 0.01319 0.03161 0.02193 0.02741 0.00615 0.01025 0.00000 0.00708 0.00000 0.01281
F6 0.00972 0.01701 0.00734 0.01223 0.00770 0.01284 0.00334 0.01001 0.00989 0.02529 0.02193 0.02741 0.00615 0.01025 0.00000 0.00708 0.00000 0.01281
F7 0.01215 0.01701 0.01468 0.01957 0.00257 0.00770 0.00667 0.01334 0.00824 0.02213 0.01918 0.02467 0.00000 0.00410 0.00000 0.00708 0.00000 0.01281
F8 0.00486 0.00972 0.00245 0.00734 0.00000 0.00513 0.00334 0.01001 0.00330 0.01264 0.00000 0.00548 0.01231 0.01641 0.00708 0.01417 0.00000 0.01281
F9 0.00000 0.00486 0.00978 0.01468 0.00257 0.00770 0.00334 0.01001 0.01154 0.02845 0.01644 0.02193 0.01641 0.02051 0.02125 0.02833 0.00000 0.01281
F10 0.01458 0.01944 0.01468 0.01957 0.00257 0.00770 0.00334 0.01001 0.00330 0.01264 0.01096 0.01644 0.00000 0.00410 0.00000 0.00708 0.00000 0.01281
F11 0.01458 0.01944 0.00734 0.01468 0.00513 0.01027 0.00000 0.00667 0.00824 0.02213 0.01370 0.01918 0.01436 0.01846 0.01417 0.02125 0.00000 0.01281
F12 0.01458 0.01944 0.00734 0.01223 0.00513 0.01027 0.00000 0.00667 0.00824 0.02213 0.00000 0.00548 0.01641 0.02051 0.02479 0.03187 0.00000 0.01281
F13 0.01944 0.02430 0.01468 0.01957 0.01284 0.01797 0.01334 0.02001 0.01319 0.03161 0.00000 0.00548 0.01641 0.02051 0.02479 0.03187 0.05126 0.06407
F14 0.01944 0.02430 0.01468 0.01957 0.01284 0.01797 0.01334 0.02001 0.01319 0.03161 0.00000 0.00548 0.01641 0.02051 0.01771 0.02479 0.02563 0.03844
F15 0.00243 0.01215 0.00734 0.01223 0.01540 0.02054 0.01668 0.02335 0.00330 0.01264 0.01096 0.01644 0.01436 0.01846 0.01062 0.01771 0.00000 0.01281
F16 0.00243 0.01944 0.01468 0.01957 0.01027 0.01540 0.01668 0.02335 0.00660 0.01897 0.01096 0.01644 0.01436 0.01846 0.01062 0.01771 0.00000 0.01281
F17 0.00486 0.01215 0.00734 0.01223 0.00257 0.00770 0.00334 0.01001 0.01319 0.03161 0.00822 0.01370 0.00615 0.01025 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F18 0.00486 0.00972 0.00245 0.01223 0.00257 0.00770 0.00334 0.01001 0.01319 0.03161 0.00822 0.01370 0.00615 0.01025 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F19 0.00243 0.01215 0.00245 0.01468 0.00257 0.00770 0.00334 0.01001 0.01319 0.03161 0.00822 0.01370 0.00615 0.01025 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F20 0.00243 0.01215 0.00489 0.00978 0.00000 0.00513 0.01001 0.01668 0.01154 0.02845 0.01096 0.01644 0.00615 0.01025 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F21 0.00972 0.01458 0.01223 0.02202 0.00000 0.00513 0.01001 0.01668 0.00495 0.01580 0.00000 0.00548 0.01641 0.02051 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F22 0.00486 0.00972 0.00489 0.00978 0.00513 0.01027 0.00000 0.00667 0.00989 0.02529 0.00000 0.00548 0.01436 0.01846 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F23 0.00000 0.00729 0.00489 0.00978 0.00513 0.01027 0.01001 0.01668 0.01154 0.02845 0.00000 0.00548 0.00205 0.00615 0.00000 0.00708 0.00000 0.01281
F24 0.00972 0.02187 0.00245 0.00734 0.00770 0.01284 0.01668 0.02335 0.00824 0.02213 0.00274 0.00822 0.00615 0.01025 0.01062 0.01771 0.00000 0.01281
F25 0.00972 0.01458 0.00489 0.00978 0.00257 0.00770 0.01334 0.02001 0.00989 0.02529 0.02193 0.02741 0.00205 0.00615 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F26 0.00000 0.00486 0.00000 0.00489 0.00770 0.01284 0.01001 0.01668 0.01154 0.02845 0.01918 0.02467 0.01641 0.02051 0.02479 0.03187 0.02563 0.03844
F27 0.00729 0.01458 0.00734 0.01957 0.00257 0.00770 0.01334 0.02001 0.01154 0.02845 0.00274 0.00822 0.00205 0.00615 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F28 0.00243 0.01944 0.00245 0.00978 0.00257 0.00770 0.01334 0.02001 0.01154 0.02845 0.00274 0.00822 0.00205 0.00615 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F29 0.00486 0.00972 0.00245 0.01223 0.00257 0.00770 0.01334 0.02001 0.01154 0.02845 0.00274 0.00822 0.00205 0.00615 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F30 0.00486 0.00972 0.00245 0.00978 0.00257 0.00770 0.01334 0.02001 0.01154 0.02845 0.02193 0.02741 0.00205 0.00615 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F31 0.00243 0.00729 0.00489 0.00978 0.00770 0.01284 0.00334 0.01001 0.00495 0.01580 0.01644 0.02193 0.00820 0.01231 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F32 0.01458 0.01944 0.01468 0.01957 0.00257 0.00770 0.01334 0.02001 0.01154 0.02845 0.00274 0.00822 0.00205 0.00615 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F33 0.00486 0.00972 0.00734 0.01223 0.00000 0.00513 0.01001 0.01668 0.01154 0.02845 0.01096 0.01644 0.00820 0.01231 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F34 0.00486 0.00972 0.00734 0.01223 0.00000 0.00513 0.01001 0.01668 0.01154 0.02845 0.01096 0.01644 0.00820 0.01231 0.01062 0.01771 0.00000 0.01281
F35 0.00000 0.00729 0.00489 0.00978 0.00770 0.01284 0.00334 0.01001 0.01154 0.02845 0.01096 0.01644 0.00000 0.00615 0.00354 0.01062 0.00000 0.01281
F36 0.00243 0.01215 0.00489 0.00978 0.01027 0.01540 0.00667 0.01334 0.00989 0.02529 0.01096 0.01644 0.01231 0.01641 0.00708 0.01417 0.00000 0.01281
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Table_Apx B-9 : Distance measures, relative closeness coefficients, and ranking for failure modes 
(Fuzzy-TOPSIS-interval method) 
 
 
Failure Mode ID D+ D- RC Ranking
Manifold Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F1 0.0531 0.0833 0.3892 10
Fixed Pipe Ram External Leakage F2 0.0526 0.0789 0.3999 9
Single Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F3 0.0521 0.0828 0.3865 11
Single Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F4 0.0507 0.0828 0.3797 14
Solenoid Valve Fail to Close F5 0.0363 0.0892 0.2893 36
Solenoid Valve fail to Operate-low voltage F6 0.0391 0.0874 0.3089 32
Choke and Kill Valve Internal Leakage F7 0.0419 0.0857 0.3282 25
Blind Shear Ram External Leakage F8 0.0496 0.0812 0.3793 15
Annular Hydraulic Pressure Regulator Unstable output pressure F9 0.0481 0.0829 0.3668 17
Fixed Pipe Ram Fail to Close F10 0.0472 0.0825 0.3636 18
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing External leakage F11 0.0493 0.0797 0.3824 13
Shuttle Valve coupling and Tubing - Post SV to BOP External leakage F12 0.0598 0.0757 0.4414 4
Welhead Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F13 0.0913 0.0366 0.7136 1
Hydraulic Connectors Spuriously Unlatches F14 0.0728 0.0530 0.5788 2
Double Acting SPM Valve External Leakage F15 0.0562 0.0761 0.4246 6
Double Acting SPM Valve Internal Leakage F16 0.0571 0.0764 0.4277 5
Choke and Kill Line (Jumper hoseline) External Leakage F17 0.0393 0.0866 0.3123 31
Choke and Kill Line (Riser Attached Line) External Leakage F18 0.0386 0.0877 0.3059 33
Choke and Kill Line (BOP Attached Line) External Leakage F19 0.0401 0.0883 0.3127 30
Choke and Kill Valves External Leakage F20 0.0400 0.0865 0.3165 28
Shuttle Valve External Leakage F21 0.0562 0.0779 0.4191 7
Shuttle Valve Coupling and Tubing Blockage F22 0.0467 0.0837 0.3582 19
Riser BOP Flexible Joint External Leakage F23 0.0440 0.0867 0.3368 24
Small Bore Hydraulic tubing Leakage F24 0.0546 0.0780 0.4115 8
Annular Preventer Internal Leakage F25 0.0398 0.0866 0.3149 29
Subsea Accumulators Loss of Pre-charge gas F26 0.0623 0.0657 0.4865 3
Blind Shear Ram Internal leakage F27 0.0488 0.0834 0.3691 16
Blind Shear Ram Fails to Close (seal open-hole) F28 0.0475 0.0856 0.3569 20
Blind Shear Ram Failts to Shear and Close well F29 0.0451 0.0851 0.3463 22
Annular Preventer External Leakage F30 0.0374 0.0890 0.2958 35
Check Valve Internal Leakage F31 0.0409 0.0844 0.3265 26
Annular Preventer Fails to Close/seal F32 0.0505 0.0810 0.3838 12
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Close F33 0.0406 0.0850 0.3232 27
Choke and Kill Valves Fails to Open F34 0.0430 0.0830 0.3415 23
Check Valve Stuck Closed F35 0.0374 0.0881 0.2981 34
Fixed Pipe Ram Internal leakage F36 0.0451 0.0824 0.3538 21
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B.2.3 BOP System Failure mode ranking Using PROMETHEE 
Table_Apx B-10 : Unicriterion flows matrix 
 
Failure Modes C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
F1 -0.2571 0.4857 -0.3714 1 1 -0.6 0.8286 0.8 -0.0857
F2 0.5429 1 0.7714 -0.1429 0.2571 -0.2 0.2 0.3143 -0.0857
F3 -0.0286 0.5429 0.4571 -0.1429 -0.2857 0.4286 0.4571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F4 0.0571 0.2 0.4571 -0.1429 -0.2857 0.4286 0.4571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F5 0.0571 0.4 0.4571 -0.5714 -0.8571 -0.9143 -0.2571 -0.8857 -0.0857
F6 0.4286 0 0.4571 -0.5714 0.2571 -0.9143 -0.2571 -0.8857 -0.0857
F7 0.4857 0.8 -0.3714 -0.1429 0.5143 -0.7429 -0.9714 -0.8857 -0.0857
F8 -0.4857 -0.9143 -0.8857 -0.5714 0.8857 0.8286 0.2 0.3143 -0.0857
F9 -0.9714 0.4 -0.3714 -0.5714 -0.2857 -0.6 0.8286 0.8 -0.0857
F10 0.8 0.8 -0.3714 -0.5714 0.8857 -0.2 -0.9714 -0.8857 -0.0857
F11 0.8 0.2571 0.1143 -0.9429 0.5143 -0.4857 0.4571 0.6571 -0.0857
F12 0.8 0 0.1143 -0.9429 0.5143 0.8286 0.8286 0.9429 1
F13 0.9714 0.8 0.9143 0.5714 -0.8571 0.8286 0.8286 0.9429 0.9143
F14 0.9714 0.8 0.9143 0.5714 -0.8571 0.8286 0.8286 0.7143 -0.0857
F15 -0.2 0 1 0.8857 0.8857 -0.2 0.4571 0.5143 -0.0857
F16 0.3714 0.8 0.7714 0.8857 0.6571 -0.2 0.4571 0.5143 -0.0857
F17 -0.1143 0 -0.3714 -0.5714 -0.8571 0.1429 -0.2571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F18 -0.4857 -0.2571 -0.3714 -0.5714 -0.8571 0.1429 -0.2571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F19 -0.8 -0.2 -0.3714 -0.5714 -0.8571 0.1429 -0.2571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F20 0.6286 -0.4857 -0.8857 0.1714 -0.2857 -0.2 -0.2571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F21 0.2857 0.6 -0.8857 0.1714 0.7429 0.8286 0.8286 -0.2571 -0.0857
F22 -0.4857 -0.4857 0.1143 -0.9429 0.2571 0.8286 0.4571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F23 -0.8 -0.4857 0.1143 0.1714 -0.2857 0.8286 -0.6571 -0.8857 -0.0857
F24 0.6286 -0.9143 0.4571 0.8857 0.5143 0.4286 -0.2571 0.5143 -0.0857
F25 0.2857 -0.4857 -0.3714 0.5714 0.2571 -0.9143 -0.6571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F26 -0.9714 -1 0.4571 0.1714 -0.2857 -0.7429 0.8286 0.9429 0.9143
F27 0.2 0.3143 -0.3714 0.5714 -0.2857 0.4286 -0.6571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F28 0.1429 -0.7143 -0.3714 0.5714 -0.2857 0.4286 -0.6571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F29 -0.4857 -0.7714 -0.3714 0.5714 -0.2857 0.4286 -0.6571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F30 -0.4857 -0.8286 -0.3714 0.5714 -0.2857 -0.9143 -0.6571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F31 -0.7143 -0.4857 0.4571 -0.5714 0.7429 -0.6 0.0286 -0.2571 -0.0857
F32 0.8 0.8 -0.3714 0.5714 -0.2857 0.4286 -0.6571 -0.2571 -0.0857
F33 -0.4857 0 -0.8857 0.1714 -0.2857 -0.2 0.0286 -0.2571 -0.0857
F34 -0.4857 0 -0.8857 0.1714 -0.2857 -0.2 0.0286 0.5143 -0.0857
F35 -0.8857 -0.4857 0.4571 -0.5714 -0.2857 -0.2 -0.8857 -0.2571 -0.0857
F36 -0.1143 -0.4857 0.7714 -0.1429 0.2571 -0.2 0.2 0.3143 -0.0857
Unicriterion flows
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Table_Apx B-11: Multicriteria flows (failure modes in decreasing order of criticality) 
Failure Modes Phi Phi+ Phi-
F13 0.672 0.7826 0.1105
F14 0.517 0.6517 0.1347
F12 0.4723 0.6892 0.217
F16 0.4429 0.6227 0.1798
F15 0.349 0.5759 0.2269
F1 0.2952 0.5563 0.261
F2 0.2772 0.5445 0.2674
F24 0.241 0.5161 0.2751
F21 0.2395 0.4979 0.2584
F11 0.1274 0.481 0.3536
F3 0.1177 0.4192 0.3015
F32 0.0986 0.384 0.2853
F4 0.0906 0.4042 0.3137
F26 0.0611 0.4753 0.4142
F36 0.0546 0.4229 0.3682
F27 -0.0134 0.3398 0.3532
F22 -0.0561 0.3372 0.3932
F8 -0.0637 0.3594 0.4231
F10 -0.0886 0.3278 0.4164
F9 -0.0901 0.3275 0.4176
F28 -0.1269 0.2831 0.41
F34 -0.1275 0.3064 0.4339
F31 -0.1709 0.2874 0.4583
F7 -0.1781 0.3058 0.4839
F20 -0.1859 0.2551 0.441
F25 -0.1953 0.2569 0.4522
F6 -0.1961 0.2842 0.4803
F29 -0.197 0.2393 0.4363
F23 -0.2157 0.2653 0.481
F33 -0.2182 0.2393 0.4574
F17 -0.2535 0.2264 0.48
F5 -0.307 0.2318 0.5388
F18 -0.3183 0.1942 0.5125
F35 -0.3436 0.176 0.5196
F19 -0.3444 0.1885 0.5329
F30 -0.3658 0.1601 0.5259
Multicriteria flows
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Appendix C Sensitivity Analysis 
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Table_Apx C-1 : TOPSIS Failure modes criticality sensitivity analysis 
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Table_Apx C-2:  Fuzzy TOPSIS Failure modes criticality sensitivity analysis 
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Figure_Apx C-1: Sensitivity analysis of criteria omission using the TOPSIS technique. 
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Figure_Apx C-2: Sensitivity analysis of a criterion omission using the Fuzzy TOPSIS technique. 
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Figure_Apx C-3: Sensitivity analysis of an increase in criterion 2’s weight using the Fuzzy-interval TOPSIS 
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Figure_Apx C-4: Sensitivity analysis of an increase in criterion 3’s weight using the Fuzzy-interval TOPSIS 
 254 
 
 
 
Figure_Apx C-5: Sensitivity analysis of an increase in criterion 4’s weight using the Fuzzy-interval TOPSIS 
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Figure_Apx C-6: Sensitivity analysis of an increase in criterion 6’s weight using the Fuzzy-interval TOPSIS 
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Appendix D Initial Assessment Criteria Hierarchy  
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Appendix E Risk Assessment Annex 
 
E.1 Risk Assessment Methodologies 
While risk analysis tries to satisfy the goal of identifying possible accident 
scenarios, their likelihood and consequences to provide details of the overall 
risk to the system, it also identifies the contributors to risks to inform optimal 
changes or improvement actions (geared towards risk reduction). Risk 
assessment could be qualitative, quantitative or semi- quantitative (a mixture of 
both). These classes can be also be grouped into deterministic, probabilistic 
and a combination of both approaches based on the output data. This however 
depends on the goal of the analysis, amount and type of data available and/or 
experts’ judgement. 
A spectrum of risk analysis methods exists, which fall into these classes 
mentioned above, however not all are able to conduct a combination of all three 
unique elements amongst other as described in Figure 2-1: identification, 
assessment, and hierarchisation/ management/control. Figure_ApxE-1 
showcases different risk analysis and assessment techniques under three main 
categories namely the qualitative, quantitative and semi-qualitative/hybrid or 
combination techniques.  
Most of the known qualitative risk methods, though structured, are simple, 
descriptive, and fundamentally used for hazard/risk identification, while some 
extend to include some qualitative evaluation and categorisation based on 
some relative judgement, which is mostly subjective. In this method likelihood of 
occurrence and severity determined are entirely qualitative. Most of these 
techniques identify hazards or risks depending on the perspective being 
considered in the analysis. These can be generic/scenario, system, 
environment or activities based, however it is important for an adequate 
technique to be applied. 
 258 
 
FTA
HEAT/HFEA
Hybrid Techniques                       
(Semi Qualitative )
FMECA
ETA
RBM
LOPA
Other Specialised 
Methods
Risk Matrix
Quantitative Techniques
WRA
QADS
CREA Method
PRAT Technique
PEA Method
QRA Technique
DMRA
Bowtie
Safety Inspections & 
Audit
Other Focused Structured 
Qualitative Methods
Qualitative Techniques
Check lists
What-If Analysis /SWIFT
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FMEA
HAZOP
HAZID
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Hazard Review
STEP Technique
Risk Matrix
Risk Analysis and Assessment Methodologies
 
Figure_Apx E-1: Risk Analysis and Assessment Methodologies Classification 
(Adapted from (Marhavilas et al., 2011) 
(Marhavilas et al., 2011) give a good overview of qualitative methods such as 
Failure modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Checklist, Hazard Identification 
(HAZID)/ Environmental Impact identification (ENVID), Hazard review, What –If 
Analysis, Task Analysis, Hazard and Operability Study (Labovský et al., 2007; 
Reniers et al., 2005), Sequential Timed Event Plotting (STEP) (Kontogiannis et 
al., 2000). 
Semi-Quantitative risk methods have likelihood of occurrence and severity 
approximately quantified over a range. The relevance of risk analysis methods 
that fall in this class entails their suitability for analysing/assessing risk from a 
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wide range and combination of equipment failures, failure and accident 
scenarios or events, human error, and other external situations. However, 
implementation of the process of these techniques can be time-consuming and 
complicated and challenging when applied to complex systems. Examples 
include FMECA, Fault tree analysis (FTA) and Event tree analysis (ETA). 
In Quantitative Risk Assessment method, likelihood of occurrence and potential 
severity level are fully quantified for scenarios considered or identified. This 
would often require the use of existing failure/loss in integrity data and even 
computation models for simulating such events. In the offshore industry, such 
assessment includes fire and collision modelling, dropped object analysis, 
evacuation modelling, blowout risk modelling, etc.  From Figure 3-3, amongst 
the methods shown, it appears there exist a number of methods and variants, 
however the QRA would be discussed in a little more detail. 
Decision Matrix Risk Assessment (DMRA) is a systematic technique which 
evaluates risk or a risk ranking using a combination of consequence/severity 
and likelihood range. Following the identification of hazards, a risk matrix is 
constructed and/or applied to describe the risk level and inform management 
decision. Risk assessment by way of a risk matrix is easy, the only challenge is 
having the right and suitable one, which varies from one organisation to another 
(Haimes, 2009). QRA as tool to safety engineering is like process simulation to 
process engineering and finite elements to structural engineering. It starts 
usually with a formal qualitative risk assessment in identifying hazards and then 
an evaluation of the risks components should data be available. The matrix will 
be quantitative in its categories description, however where it is qualitative, then 
the DMRA would be a qualitative one. 
Other Quantitative methods includes Weighted risk analysis -WRA (Suddle, 
2009), Proportional Risk Assessment technique-PRAT (Marhavilas and 
Koulouriotis, 2012) Societal risk estimation -SRE (Risktec, 2007) Clinical Risk 
and Error analysis- CRE (Trucco and Cavallin, 2006), Predictive Epistemic 
Approach–PEA (Vaidogas, 2006), Quantitative assessment of domino 
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scenarios - QADS (Marhavilas et al., 2011). Besides the established qualitative 
methods for purely risk/hazard identification, commonly used methods are 
FMEA, FMECA, FTA and HAZOP (Bernardi et al., 2013). 
The FMEA is a systematic method of identifying potential failure modes and 
what their effects are locally and globally. It is a technique designed to reveal 
weakness in a system, design and can support other more detailed risk 
assessment techniques. (See Section 2.2 for more details). FMECA is the 
quantitative form of FMEA. While the methodology remains the same the only 
difference being the quantification failure modes criticality. It has found 
extensive use and has been recommended as the first approach to carry out in 
a structured reliability program as it helps identify weakness in design. It also 
feeds into several other analysis such as the FTA, technology qualification 
given identified weakness or as part of a development process, spare parts 
requirements and maintenance analysis, (see the next section for more detail). 
Fault Tree Analysis follows a top-down approach to provide a detailed and 
acceptable way of predicting quantified system failures (Top Events) frequency. 
FTA uses a digital logic to represent how a Top Event can occur or ways in 
which a system can fail. Probabilities of system failing or frequencies of events 
can be calculated at a point in time and/or under certain conditions. Events and 
gates (e.g. AND gate, OR gate) are used to construct fault trees in depicting 
possible logical combinations of human errors, equipment failures, and other 
external events that can cause specific accidents or Top Events. When either of 
two or more events are required to give rise to an intermediate event, an OR 
gate is used. An AND gate is used when both or all of the initial events are 
required to cause an intermediate event. Fault tree modelling for reliability 
purpose, can consist of a combination of repairable and non-repairable failures, 
and how they can affect reliability of the system over its lifetime (i.e., if it’s 
relatively constant, increases or decreases with time). It can help establish 
maintenance task and intervals. Also while safeguards can be defined from the 
fault tree, for more complex trees visualising safeguards can be challenging and 
common cause failures (a single failure that can setback two or more 
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safeguards or affect multiple devices operation that should be considered as 
independent) may be concealed. Hence Minimal Cut Set analysis, Common 
Cause Failure Analysis (CCFA), Sensitivity and Importance Measures Analysis 
have been developed to help identify minimal cut-sets and dominant failures.  
For more details on FTA see Rausand, (2004). 
HAZOP is a systematic technique that uses guide words (e.g. more flow or less 
pressure) to identify deviations from normal operating conditions of a process or 
design and evaluates their effect. A multidisciplinary team of experts is required 
for the process and proper planning and management of the process and 
identified hazard/risk requiring actions is necessary for effective outcome. A 
version of HAZOP applied to drilling, heavy-lifts, which are considered safety 
critical is called Procedural HAZOP (CMPT, 1999). 
Other Specialised Techniques includes risk analysis techniques extensions 
being developed and utilised that combines multiple attributes of the different 
techniques discussed so far. Another approach is to view the application of risk 
analysis techniques for frequency or/and consequence modelling. For some 
hazards (e.g. marine hazards), there is interdependence between the 
frequencies and consequence. In such scenarios the hazards are considered 
specifically hence specialised analysis e.g. collision analysis, reliability analysis, 
and structural analysis. Reliability analysis (RA) techniques application does not 
consider consequence but almost only the failure likelihood of a system under 
consideration. Examples of methods used for RA includes FTA, ETA, FMECA, 
reliability simulation, and human reliability analysis (which considers a human 
operator as an item to be analysed). 
Fixed offshore platforms structural safety assessment have used risk principles 
quite independently and basically known as Structural reliability analysis (SRA).  
The loads on structures and their resistance in a probabilistic manner is the 
focus of SRA. Though the goals of SRA and QRA are similar, they have had 
quite different evolution. For Offshore Structures, CMPT (1999) pointed out the 
challenges in integrating SRA analysis into QRA despite the potentials. All types 
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of uncertainties, especially those from human error are not included in SRA; 
Probabilities from actuarial or field data are used in QRA and such data for 
structural failures are difficult to obtain and usually not available; Non-structural 
failures as well their interaction with structure component failures are not 
accounted for in SRA. (Basu and Bhattacharya, 2001) presented a case that 
failures could arise from interactions (involving structural and non-structural 
failures) and that such probability data be made available for better risk 
assessment. 
E.1.1 Choice of technique and the drift from/to Qualitative ones 
The complexity and size of the risk influences the selection of a method to be 
used.  When the complexity and risk levels are high QRA is preferred, when the 
complexity and risk levels are both low then qualitative risk assessments can be 
used. Also considering the risk level i.e. if intolerable or broadly acceptable, 
qualitative risk assessments or QRA can be used respectively.  This is depicted 
by the diagram in Figure_Apx E-2 as described, where Q is qualitative, SQ is 
Semi-quantitative 
 
(a)  
(b)  
Figure_Apx E-3: Proportionate risk assessment and an alternative description of the 
approach to risk assessment as a function of risk level and complexity (HSE 2006). 
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When performing a risk management exercise, there should not be an over 
dependence on QRA results alone. QRAs are subjective and uncertain in terms 
of the validity of their input and assumptions. As a risk comparison technique, 
QRAs are valuable as a means expressing the differences in relative risk levels 
for considered options. On the other hand a good understanding of the 
acceptability of risk and risk profile with the efficiency of controls in place can be 
achieved through qualitative risk assessment. However, for certain system 
aspects requiring in-depth analysis qualitative risk assessments should not be 
used in isolation. 
E.2 Risk Assessment Application in the Offshore Industry- Brief 
Note 
Risk analysis has found application in offshore project development from the 
concept to decommissioning. This section presents a select detail of relevant 
studies on the use of Risk assessment on individual components and systems 
(see Table_Apx E 1) as well as on operational procedures at different stages 
within the offshore marine and subsea industries 
At the feasibility or appraisal stage, the Qualitative techniques are likely very 
suitable or a high level form of any detailed method (quantitative or semi-
quantitative) would apply. This includes SWIFT, HAZID, Risk matrix or even a 
high-level System FMECA. At the design stage QRA have been used to screen 
out high risk alternatives along with high cost options, and undertake design 
audits of systems with critical functions (e.g. the BOP and its associated control 
systems) with the goal of meeting desired business expectations which also 
includes the minimization of danger to personnel and prevention of severe 
damage to environment. Other useful techniques include FTA, SWIFT, HAZOP, 
Hazard review, HAZID, and other specialised techniques. Though at the early 
(concept or front end) design phase, similar studies on previous designs can be 
modified in a risk assessment workshop. Also detailed risk quantification may 
not be considered at this stage for standard concepts or design. 
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Upon the completion of the design concept selection and a detailed stage, the 
project team can then move to installing the manufactured/procured system and 
its components.The outcome of the risk analysis (e.g. FMECA) have assisted in 
justifying actions in the inspection maintenance and repair dossier. The 
improvement of system performance (e.g. by way of upgrade or debottlenecking 
works) have also been supported with risk analysis/assessment to ensure 
activities do not introduce new risk or weaken barrier performance. Beyond 
Production also presented in applications is the case of life extension activities 
and decommissioning. For decommissioning it has been applied to 
demonstrating ALARP, assessing removal options and risk to different 
personnel (Kierans et al., 2004). This includes addressing environmental issues 
and those of safety not previously considered. SWIFT, hazard review, SRE 
(considering political and societal aspects) and ETA would be ideal techniques 
for this phase. 
Risk assessment has been seamlessly integrated into drilling programs with a 
goal of understanding weakness or limitations in design or project plan, to 
improve decision making, minimize cost and loss rime to system. One of such is 
the development of flexible structured hierarchical risk assessment models for 
drilling operations (Khatlan et al., 2007). Risk analysis has been applied to 
understanding and improving well integrity for preventing risk of a blowout- a 
major contributor to the total risk profile of offshore oil and gas installations, with 
a significant consequence in relation to loss of lives, asset integrity and 
environment damage.  
Currently there is an increased attention on the challenges and risks of drilling 
into high pressure high temperature (HPHT) fields, following the Macondo well 
blow-out in the GOM; highlighting concerns such as managing pressure and 
temperature for field life, cement/sealant long term integrity for corrosive 
environment, testing equipment issues for wells, proppant function and 
chemical control and electrical/power battery limits (Mazero, 2012; Proehl, 
2006) This has opened up discussions and plans of developing technologies to 
match these challenges. Most of the HPHT wells are located in deepwater 
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environments characterised by pervasive complexity in its operations and cost 
especially from rig rental and long trip times. This can be amplified for ultra-
deepwater fields showing how technical capabilities are stretched which can 
often result to increased risk with excessive equipment wear and tear. With 
such high cost and risks requiring only the biggest and most favourable deep 
prospects be drilled, a continued application of risk analysis would be seen. 
The benefits of risk reduction measures incorporation into the design of 
facilities, which were informed by risk analysis has been established. This 
helped with achieving operator’s risk management benchmark and compliance 
with regulators. See (Overfield and Collins, 2002) 
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Table_Apx E-1: Review of Risk Assessment Application in the Offshore Industry 
 
No Paper Citation
Technique Name/ Software 
Used
Application/System/Scenario Lifecycle Phase Comments/Points to note
1
Risk Assessment of a BOP and Control System for 10,000' 
Water Depths (Quilici et al., 1998)
QRA-FTA Drilling/ Design Audit of BOP Design 
The results of the assessment identified a combination of component 
failures, operator errors, and environmental conditions required for the BOP 
failure. This informed design changes that improved the control system 
reliability. 
2 Risk Management in Exploration Drilling (Thorogood et al., 2000)
Checklist, Qualitative and 
Quantitative risk methods applied in 
different context (see Comments)
Drilling /Project, well, location-
specific, environmental and 
operational risk assessment
Through-life
There is an emphasis on the significance of lesson learned as an input into 
the assessment to buttress the evolving and dynamic nature of the model. 
Risk Analysis context considered includes: Environmental risk Assessment, 
Operational risk assessment, Well risk assessment (technical), project risk 
assessment (political, schedule, financial or political)
3
Focused Risk Management Brings a Step-Change Improvement 
in Drilling Performance at Sakhalin's Oduptu ERD Development 
(Mohammed et al., 2006)
Qualitative and some specialised 
quantitative modelling of 
consequence and frequency
Design and in-Use for 
Drilling
Strategy for drilling operations risk management was developed using cavity 
formation events refined for wells.
It identified threats , post event consequences and then used expert 
personnel experience to identify threat mitigation barriers/strategies
4
An Integrated System for Risk Assessment of Drilling Operations 
in OIl and Gas Wells (Khatlan et al., 2007)
Hierarchial Drilling Operation Risk 
Assessment (DORA)- 
brainstorming technique, Delphi 
and the Matrix method
Drilling /Project, well, location-
specific, environmental and 
operational risk assessment
Design and in-Use for 
Drilling
The goal is to provide information required for decision making and 
minimizing cost, loss time to the system. The risk considered were those 
emanating from man, machine and earth. 
The last phase of the DORA process model is one of a dynamic risk 
assessment and revise plan. This recognises the fact that changes to the 
program or risks can occur and thus data from monitoring devices in place 
would be used for updating before a new evaluation. 
5
Dynamically Positioned Completion Operations Risk Analysis 
(Barrilleaux et al., 2001)
Quantitative approach- probabilistic 
Approach, Uncertainty analysis/ 
Decision Analysis by Tree Age -
DATA software-speadsheet
DP completion operations Operations
The risk analysis was to ascertain potential financial exposure incurrable 
when conducting completion operations from DP vessels, compared to a 
moored vessel.
6
Application of a Deepwater Riser Risk Analysis to Drilling 
Operations and Riser Design (Ambrose et al., 2001)
Specialised Quantitative risk 
analysis technique- Drive-off, storm 
occurrence per activity, failure per 
activity probabilities
Drilling/ Riser
Design and in-Use for 
Drilling
The risk assessment entailed amongst others, determinining  the 
percentage of time that the
vessel is exposed to various seas and swell from 0 to 90- degree headings
The analysis considered several scenarios and results showed risk 
sensitivity to vessel type used.
7
Comparison of Quantitative Blowout Risk Assessment 
Approaches (Dervo and Blom-Jensen, 2004)
 BLOFAM Quantitative risk analysis 
approach
Drilling/ Blowout Risk
Design and in-Use for 
Drilling
The BLOWFAM approach is compared with traditional approach to blowout 
risk assessment.
BLOWFAM combines well specific well and installation information.
Unlike traditional approaches BLOWFAM requires risk analyst to have good 
knowledge and understanding of drilling and blowout parlance.
8
Dynamically Positioned Completion Operations Risk Analysis 
(Overfield and Collins, 2002)
QRA- ETA /FLACS (Flame 
acceleratoor simulation,
FPSO installations
Conceptual and 
detailed design stage 
Design features influenced the risk contributions from the hazards
QRA used to demonstrate  risk-acceptance criteria as defined by an 
operator. QRA outcome informed the design basis and used for a 
verification basis. 
9
Comparative Risk Analysis of Two FPSO Mooring Configurations 
(Stiff and Ferrari, 2003)
HAZID and Structural Reliability 
Assessment  techniques
FPSO (spread-moored & turret-
morrred configuartions)
Concept selection/ 
Design Phase
Risk analysis was applied to provide information concerning the relative risk 
and potential differences between the two configurations.
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No Paper Citation
Technique Name/ Software 
Used
Application/System/Scenario Lifecycle Phase Comments/Points to note
10
Risk Assessment of offshore Engineering Equipment Projects- A 
Case Study of Fall Pipe Vessel in China (Zhao et al., 2011)
Fuzzy-Analytical Hierachy Process Fall pipe vessel
Design and 
Operations
Experts opinion was vital to completion: Interviews and field study was used.
11
Risk & Reliability Based Fitness for Service (FFS) Assessment 
for Subsea Pipelines (Mustapha, and Bai, 2011)
QRA, SRA Subsea Pipelines Throughlife
It attempts to address using risk assessment to inform pipeline segments 
reliability targets and contribute input for FFS. 
A unique synergy of QRA and SRA is demonstrated.
12
Lessons learnt from recent Deepwater Riser Projects (Saint-
Marcoux et al., 2010)
FMECA
Procurement, fabrication or 
installation scenarios for a Hybrid 
Riser Towers (HRT) for DW 
Production 
Manufacturing, 
Installation and 
Commisioning Phase
Only a few parameters could be analyzed as the FMECA covers a range of 
concepts and so difficult to cascade into a detailed quantitative analysis. 
The outcome of the FMECA helped justified actions in the inspection 
maintenance and repair dossier.
13
Assessing the Risk of Riser and Piepline Failures on Offshore 
Installations (Comer, et al., 1991)
QRA -Frequency 
estimation,Consequence Modelling 
and Impact Assessment
Riser Pipeline System failure Operations
This paper is over 20 years old and as such the calculatiosn  were done 
using spreadsheet.
Risk presentation was mainly the Potential loss of life (PLL)and F-N plots 
was used to show different fatality incident levels contributions to the PLL.
The results showed varied outcomes in risk reduction potential of an SSIV 
for different installation cases considered and hence the need for risk 
analysis tool to be applied to unique cases.
14
Risk Assessment as a Tool in establishing the requirement of 
Subsea isolation Valves in Subsea Pipelines (Dhar, R.. 2009)
QRA -Frequency estimation, ETA, 
Consequence Modelling and
 Impact Assessment-Quantitative 
and Qualitative
Riser Pipeline System failure
Though Generic but 
applicable in Design 
Stage.
Quantitative Assessment- Personnel risk, PLL Risk, Asset Risk (e.g. 
Structural failure of platform leg or lower deck), and Environmental.
Qualitative Assessment- Cases where no data is available or risk potential 
exist in the future. E.g Dropped object
Challenges in consequence Assessment ( e.g erronous results may be 
generated from softwares for large hole size release cases) and risk 
assessment (e.g. frequency influences th eoverall risk greatly and can be 
misleading) were presented. 
15
Addresing the integration and Installation HSE Risks for 
Deepwater Project (Warwick and Grant, 2006)
HAZID with risk Matrix
ETA- for more detailed assesment 
involving scenarios with interrelated 
issues
/SACS was used for impact load 
and damage to pipe works , CFD 
for gas dispersion modelling
Offshore riser-pipeline system (a 
case of introduction of buy-back 
gas to the facility during hook-up 
and commisiioning)
Installation and 
commissioning
Existing risk analysis techniques need adaptation to address new risk posed 
by newly understood complexity in the offshore industry e.h those 
associated with integration and installation
16
BlowFlow - a New Tool Within Blowout Risk Management (Arild et 
al., 2008)
Quantitative approach- probabilistic 
Approach, Uncertainty analysis/ 
BlowFlow
Drilling Risk Throughlife
Monte carlo  Simulation technique is used to provide several potential 
blowout rate and durations
As known uncertainty exist with decision support system using probabilistic 
distribution, environmental risk analysis would suffer a drawback given 
implictness with what blowout rate to use (expected, weighted, worst case?)
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No Paper Citation
Technique Name/ Software 
Used
Application/System/Scenario Lifecycle Phase Comments/Points to note
17
Risk Analysis Techniques Applied to Floating Oil production in 
Deepwater Offshore Environments (Carpignano et al., 1998).
QRA-FMEA (for wellhead) and 
HAZOP (for turret and flowlines) 
were used hazard identification, 
Risk matrix approach was used to 
estimate the accident probabilities 
and consequences.
Event tree to describe the 
sequence for different operative 
stage (spontaneous and artificial-
lift)
FPSO- DW and Ultra DW Throughlife
In this study, databanks were initially investigated to identify initiating events 
(e.g. crane accidents, anchor system failures, falling loads and blow out) for 
accidents involving FPSO, in addition to data for different working conditions 
(i.e. drilling to operations) to provide a general overview
18
Risk Assessment of Platform Decommisioning and Removal 
(Kierans et al., 2004)
Quantitative, Bowtie /Custom-made 
Excel spreadsheet 
Platform removal (Frigg field )
Decommissioning/ 
Removal
Overall risk puture was developed from occupational related risk, residual 
hydrocarbon risk and other major hazard that are concept dependent and 
otherwise. 
Demonstrating ALARP, the effectiveness of barriers, and a measure of how 
the risks vary for different personnel and different removal options was the 
focus of the work.
In the course of the study, where no/insufficient data is available, certain risk 
level evaluations required were made by experts.
19
Conceptual Framework: Semi-PSS for Sustainable 
Decommissioning of Offshore Platforms in Malaysia (Lun, et al. 
2012)
Hazard function concept, Risk 
matrix, DRMA 
Offshore Jacket Platforms
Decommissioning/ 
Removal
Fully Quantutative methods for assessing aeging structires may not be 
feasible, hence the use of other evaluation mediums such as competent 
engineering judgement, detailed analysis from similar platforms or 
reference data.
20
Appllication of Fuzzy Sets Theory in Qualitative and Quantitative 
Risk Assessment (Anatoly, B. , et al., 2002)
Risk matrix (ALARP Criteria) / 
Fuzzy St Theory
Offshore lifting/ towing Operation Installation
Where databases that are reliable are not  available and ascertaining 
outcome probabilities is challenging for analysisng certain operations fuzzy 
set theory can be adapted to traditional risk analysis.
 Experts judgement was relied on for assessing uncertainty levels. The 
need to obtain  real data from operations via data collection, or Inspection 
and monitoring was emphasised.
21
Holistic Approach to Subsea Integrity management and Reliability 
and Their Application to Greenfield and Brownfield Projects.
HAZID , Checklist - Throughlife; 
Bowtie -Design stage; 
HAZOP-Detailed design, 
Installation and commissioning
Subsea production System (new 
and Old developments)
Throughlife
The approach is geared towards a subsea intergrity management program 
development and implementation. This emphasises the use of risk 
assessment tool or risk-based approaches.
The importance or transparency and tractibility in efficiently sharing 
knowledge and lessons learnt from different projects/facilities was 
emphasised.
22
The Longannet to Goldeneye project: Challenges in Developing 
and End-to-End CCS Scheme (Garnham,  andTucker, 2012)
HAZID, HAZOP and Bowtie
Carbon Capture and Storage 
System (Onshore and Offshore )
Throughlife
Initial Risk register was pivotal to initial commercial negotiations which 
included what risk were business as usual ordemonstrated risk and how they 
would be adressed. 
Bowtie was used to analyse containment risk- identified mitigation barries 
(natural, engineered and reactive)
23
Risk -Based Classification of offshore Production Systems 
(Tremblay et al., 2007)
HAZID, QRA, HAZOP, and /or 
FMEA
Offshore production System Throughlife
The potential of classification via risk-based verification (RBV) was 
demonstrated, despite the typical prescriptive classification methods . 
RBV provided a project specific view to understanding risk that are critical to 
a facility and inform an installation specific Class plan
Integral to the approach is knowing what the overall performance criteria for 
the facility is,against which safety critical elements can be assesed.
A major impedement could arise from an absence of key stakeholders 
commitment
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24
Risk-based Assessment for the Existed Submarine Pipeline 
(Zhao and Wang, 2010
HAZID, Risk Matrix,  DRMA Subsea Pipeline system Operations
It emphasises the role of data to assessing and categorsing risk levels, how 
such information can be time dependent and why asset managers need to 
update risk levels
Qualitative, quantitative and semi-quantitative risk analysis methods can be 
applied to operating pipelines based on current technology and data  
25
Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Fire Systems of Tankers (Martins 
and Goyano, 2007)
Checklist, HAZID, Risk matrix, 
FTA, ETA, Delphi
 Tankers Fire System (Marine) Throughlife
IMO (2002) guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment is presented and the 
first step (hazard identification) applied to the system of interest.
Hazard Scenarios were classified using five frequency classes and four 
Severity classes - IMO's seven frequency classes were modified based on 
Ship's operational life and owner's experience in relation to the associated 
hazards.
The need for personnel competence (vis-avis good training) and clear 
procedures for operators was emphasised.
26
Safety and Risk Analysis of Natural Gas Hydrate Pellet Carrier 
(Kaehler, and Hamann, 2012)
HAZID-FMECA Gas-Hydrate Carrier (Marine) Throughlife
An alternative to conventional LNG carrier was systematically assesed and 
results showed diverse comparative advantages for different scenarios 
considered.
Scenarios considered included PLL, Potential loss of cargo, fire risk, and 
societial risk. Results also gave indicative directions for further studies and 
sensitivity/optimisation analysis to fully understand and verify the technology 
option.
27
Environmental Risk Assessment Utilising Bowtie Methodology 
(Jones and Israni, 2012)
HAZID and ENVID by way of a 
Bow-tie 
Offshore LNG Platform Throughlife
In addition to the establihed benefits of Bowtie methodology, attention was 
drawn to its utility for reviewing production start-up and  difficult challenges 
with specific process stream.
28
Risk assessment of aging ship hull structures in the presence of 
corrosion and fatigue (Akpan, et al. 2002)
Structural Reliability Analysis -
Analytical Model (Ultimate limit 
Strength, Second order reliability 
model)
Hull Structure Ageing Stage 
Risk associated with an aeging asset was better assessed using time 
dependent random functions reliability model as it had lower reliability values 
than those of instanteneous reliability.
The accuracy of the models used for the assessment of ultimate strength 
determines the qulaity of the results would be and also numerical models 
are considered to be of more quality than analytical models.
  
29
Use of Fuzzy Sets Theory in Qualitative and Quantitative 
RiskAssessment  (Zolotukin and Gudmestan,  2000)
ETA/Fuzzy St Theory
Towing operaion failure to 
assess consquence (damage or 
Loss of deck)
Installation Same as below
30
Assessment of existing offshore structures for asset extension 
(Ersdal G. 2005)
HAZID, HAZOP, SRA- Collapse 
Analysis, Damage strength and 
reserve free board ratio, 
Probabilistic Structural Model 
Simulation  
Offshore Structures Life- Extension
Risk evaluation is integral to any assessment of an asset for life extension 
consideration. 
Bothe Quantitative and Qualitative methods are useful and uncertainties 
exist in the degradation mechnaisms and their estimation, data available, risk 
screening techniques, risk reduction means and acceptance criteria, and 
competence of analyst..
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